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Corruption in local self-government.
No accurate and reliable information available
to the public on the financing of
electoral campaigns.
Constant difficulties of disabled persons in
getting around obstacles in the places where
they live.
Laws passed without satisfactory supervisory
mechanisms and sanctions.
The inefficiency of courts leads to cases
frequently falling into the statute of limitation.
The education system fails to eliminate the
problem of the inadequate education of
disadvantaged children.
Insufficient topics in educational programmes
related to gender and
physical diversity.
Students unable to select
educational contents to
a sufficient extent.
Lack of opportunity for students to initiate
specific changes aimed at improving
higher education.
Unequal access of small enterprises
to public tenders.
Non-transparent privatisation of
state-owned companies.
Inefficient fight against the hidden economy.
Daily newspapers under the influence
of particular interest groups.
Do you wish to live in a society where such
statements from our everyday life are
continually repeated?
Probably not.
If not, this means that you wish to live in a
society where you have the opportunity to
choose, to become involved and to make a
difference.
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Corruption in local self-government.
No accurate and reliable information available
to the public on the financing of electoral
campaigns.
Constant difficulties of disabled persons in
getting around obstacles in the places where
they live.
Laws passed without satisfactory supervisory
mechanisms and sanctions.
The inefficiency of courts leads to cases
frequently falling into the statute of limitation.
The education system fails to eliminate the
problem of the inadequate education of
disadvantaged children.
Insufficient topics in educational programmes
related to gender and physical diversity.
Students unable to select educational
contents to a sufficient extent.
Lack of opportunity for students to initiate
specific changes aimed at improving higher
education.
Unequal access of small enterprises to public
tenders.
Non-transparent privatisation of state-owned
companies.
Inefficient fight against the hidden economy.
Daily newspapers under the influence of
particular interest groups.
Do you wish to live in a society where such
statements from our everyday life are
continually repeated?
Probably not.
If not, this means that you wish to live in a
society where you have the opportunity to
choose, to become involved and to make a
difference.
Declarative statements in themselves will not
change a society from one where there is no
choice, involvement or influence, into a society
where one can choose, become involved
and make a difference. Such a change can
be brought about only through a process of
constant, joint efforts to strengthen the
independence of individuals based on
knowledge and integrity, and through the
institutional capacity to provide efficient and
equal services to meet citizens’ needs.
Although there are different aspects to an
open society, drawing a parallel with the
concept of an open system might help to
clarify certain patterns. Openness and
complexity are inseparable: the reality of
personal and institutional life is based on an
uninterrupted chain of interactions between
the environment and the system (both
individual and institutional). However, what
can be done is to develop the capacities to
understand and manage these interactions.
If closedness, which can be accepted only
Foreword
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in rare and extraordinary situations, gets out
of control for a longer period of time, then
the viability of the entire system is threatened.
An open society is an ever elusive goal;
however, the crucial thing is the process itself.
Only when the process of everyday choices,
participation and influence in creating a
system of values to allow us to achieve
harmony with people and nature by using
the “seventh generation” test (ensuring that
we do not close the opportunity for making
choices, participating and making a difference
for future generations) becomes everyday
practice for all of us can we say that we have
achieved an open society (as a process, and
not a condition).
Invitation
Here we present the first report of the open
society study which consists of a description
of the conceptual framework, methodology
and interpretation of the results of expert and
public opinion for all the six dimensions of
an open society: rule of law, education, the
med ia ,  economic  f reedoms and
entrepreneurship, transparency and the
democratic quality of political processes, and
minorities and marginalised groups. The
composite open society indexes will be
available only in the following year when the
second study has been completed. Since
the aim of this project is to contribute to the
development of an open society, we are open
for cooperation, suggestions and discussion
on all its parts, from the strengthening of the
conceptual framework and the further
development of the methodological approach,
to the application of the results. All the results
of the conducted study are in the public
domain at www.soros.hr.
Acknowledgements
We are particularly proud that the idea, its
elaboration through the conceptual
framework, and the design of the
methodology for studying societal openness
have attracted such a broad group of Croatian
experts. The following persons actively
participated in conceiving the idea and the
conceptual framework, and in drawing up
the methodology: Dragan BagiÊ, Æarko BajiÊ,
Ivan BuriÊ, Gvozden Flego, Tin Gazivoda,
Draæen LaliÊ, Slavica Singer, Marina ©krabalo,
Aleksandar ©tulhofer, Vesna TerπeliË, Nenad
Zakoπek. Professor Joseph LaPalombara
from Yale University, USA, provided important
support in all the stages of the project
development.
Two roundtable discussions (in September
2003 and September 2004) gave rise to
0 1 0
useful ideas in shaping the OPEN SOCIETY
FORUM project which was conducted with
the participation of Croatian and foreign
experts or representatives of international
organisations. In addition, Kalman Mizsei,
Director of the UNDP regional office for Europe
and new independent states, also contributed
this year to improving the universal nature of
the methodological approach.
The study itself involved 125 experts from all
the six study areas/dimensions, who, through
their expert insight, comments and
suggestions, contributed significantly to the
quality and credibility of the study. Without
them, this study would not have been possible
and we would like to take this opportunity to
thank them.
Without the pioneering work of interpreting
the results of the study, this stage of the
project would not have been completed. For
this, we wish to extend our gratitude to Davor
Gjenero (minorities and marginalised groups),
Zrinjka Peruπko (the media), Tomislav
Reπkovac (education), Velimir ©onje
(economic freedoms and entrepreneurship),
Ksenija TurkoviÊ (rule of law), Nenad Zakoπek
(transparency and democratic quality of
political processes). Marina ©krabalo, Nataπa
©krbiÊ, and Hrvoje JuriÊ gave their authorial
contribution with two case studies, one a
representative example of openness, and the
other an example of closedness.
Special thanks go to Simona Goldstein and
Andrea Feldman who achieved the
impossible, communicating with, and
organising, the study team, experts,
roundtables, designers and printers.
Our founder and donor, George Soros, has
supported the project from the original
concept to its implementation and to the
production of this report. His continuous
interest in the open society and systematic
support to projects through which steps are
made towards the democratisation of society
was once again an invaluable contribution,
and we thank him from the very heart.
0 1 1
Open Society Forum:
Why, How and for Whom?
Since 1992, the Open Society Institute -
Croatia has positioned itself as a significant
participant in the development of civil society
in Croatia, anticipating and initiating changes
whose strategic focus has always received
confirmation in the political, societal and
economic development of the country. With
a new strategic platform based on the OPEN
SOCIETY FORUM, the Open Society Institute
- Croatia continues to operate proactively.
Why an Open Society Forum?
The answer comes from our belief that Croatia
should have a clear vision and strategy for
the development of society in the future which
must be shaped through the common efforts
of all the actors of social, political and
economic life in Croatia. Our efforts in
promoting an open society provide
opportunities to individuals and interest groups
to become involved in these processes.
The actual need to strengthen civil initiatives
in Croatia has been intensified by the
processes of preparation for joining the
European Union, but also by the long-term
presence of serious problems which slow
down the development of Croatia (for
instance, an unwillingness to face the past,
the consequences of corruption in
pr ivat isat ion,  long-term and h igh
unemployment, low competitiveness, the low
level of entrepreneurial activity, high
indebtedness, (un)concealed discrimination
of particular marginalised groups). In the
process of the development of civil society
in transition countries, inclusion, i.e. the
capacity to act in society, is of the highest
order. Candidate countries must devote
special attention to remove all obstacles to
individual and collective freedoms and
entrepreneurship; these countries should
promote and stimulate societal openness
and inclusion at all levels.
The Open Society Forum was launched in
2005 after two years of preparations, with
the intention of identifying through research
the processes of societal openness in Croatia
in selected areas, and to make the results of
the study accessible to the broadest public,
to initiate a public debate on these results,
and to offer funding for projects in the area
of advocacy and policy making, with the aim
of opening up “pockets” in areas with the
greatest lack of openness.
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Aims
- To develop an open society index which
will be universal in terms of methodology,
and which will allow for contextualisation
through interpretation
- To identify examples of openness and
closedness
- To allow for comparisons through time, by
calculating the open society index  annually
or biannually
- To use open society indexes to promote
advocacy projects and projects focused on
the development of public policies
- To intensify democratisation processes
- To strengthen the participation of citizens
in the processes of political decision making
- To develop the vision of Croatia as an open
society
Methodological basis
The conceptual framework of the Open
Society Forum embraces the following
assumptions:
- An open society is a process through which
human rights are made accessible to all
members of society
- An open society is a  package  of human
rights which consists of civil, political,
economic and social rights
Through research and through advocacy, we
will monitor the openness of Croatian society
in the following areas:
- education
- rule of law
- media
- economic freedoms and
entrepreneurship
- transparency and democratic quality
of political processes
- minorities and marginalised groups
The dimensions of openness are measured
through criteria which are adapted according
to the nature of the dimension of openness:
- inclusion
- access to information
- freedom of expressing opinion and
opportunities for public debate
- potential for change
- accountability
- autonomy
The study of openness is organised annually
(or biannually), by using a methodology based
on expert opinion, public opinion, and an in-
depth analysis of selected examples of
openness/closedness through the case-study
method. In this way, it will be possible to
establish any gap between the expected
(ideal) and the real, and the difference between
expert and public opinion. Besides, the
repetition of the research annually (or
biannually) will allow for comparisons to be
made through time.
The expected results will be available in the
following formats:
- Reports on the state of openness in all the
six areas (dimensions) through selected
criteria, with an in-depth analysis of
openness/closedness by means of the case-
study method,
- The open society index which will be
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established for each area of openness and
for all six areas together,
- An on-line debate to promote public
discussion on the current problems of societal
openness.
Users
- NGOs  - advocacy
- NGOs or other organisations involved in
shaping policies - pressure to change public
policies
- Government - for the change of public
policies
- International institutions/donors (EU, UNDP,
the World Bank, international assistance
agencies...) - for designing programmes
focused on Croatia
The research results have been made
accessible to the public, and represent an
invitation to NGOs to propose projects aimed
at strengthening advocacy in the areas of
societal closedness, as well as projects to
help change public policies. In this way, we
are attempting at the same time to measure
the openness of society, and to focus on the
behavioural practice of an open society, and
not on the regulatory definition of openness.
At the same time, through such an approach,
we are participating in building public
awareness of the societal changes necessary
to create an open society, and in achieving
a consensus on the urgency of reforms and
on the priority activities within the processes
to achieve change.
The Openness of
Croatian society 2005
(first results)
By describing societal openness through six
dimensions, i.e. though the transparency and
democratic quality of political processes, the
relationship towards minorit ies and
marginalised groups, the rule of law,
education, economic freedoms and
entrepreneurship, and the media, 125
interviewed experts assessed the importance
of each of the identified dimensions by
allocating a total of 100 points, in the following
manner:
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Figure 1 - Importance of individual dimensions
(3) law
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(4) education
(6) media
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(5) the economy
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The exceptional supremacy of the relative
“weight” of the importance of the rule of law,
and the relatively equal importance of the
democratic quality of political processes,
education, media, and the relationship
towards minorities and marginalised groups
define in empirical terms the current scientific
views on the processes of democratisation
of societies, especially those in transition.
The attitude towards economic freedoms
and entrepreneurship may be the result of
an insufficiently clear definition of what an
open, free market means (from the
traditionalist understanding of market
openness as laissez faire to regulation
processes with the aim of creating/maintaining
an efficient and functioning free market).
Nevertheless, what is most important is that
all the dimensions that define an open society
received confirmation of their importance
through the experts’ opinions.
Base: entire sample, n=125
How to read the graph?
Out of a total of 100 points for the
importance of the dimension to the
total openness of society, law
received an average of 24 points.
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It will be interesting to see how stable these
assessments of importance are from year to
year, and whether and how much they will
vary in other countries where the study is to
be conducted.
In each of the dimensions of societal
openness, experts estimated the importance
of individual indicators and gave an
assessment of the situation in Croatia. In
doing so, they used a scale from 1 to 7,
where grade 1 means that the individual
indicator is the least important and a grade
7 means that it is the most important, or
where grade 1 indicates that the indicator is
not present in Croatia, and grade 7 that it is
strongly present in Croatia. The average
assessments of the experts are used to
describe the difference between the
importance of individual indicators and their
presence in Croatia.
Regardless of which dimension of sociey
openness is considered, two conclusions
may be drawn for all of them:
1. the situation regarding societal openness
in Croatia is far from what the experts regard
as crucial for societal openness, which means
that there is huge room for advocacy activities
and for a change of public policies;
2. the agreement of  the experts on the
importance of the indicators in describing
individual dimensions is much greater than
when assessing the situation of openness in
Croatia.
The need for advocacy is additionally stressed
by the results of the survey conducted on a
random and representative sample of the
general population of 1500 Croatian citizens
over 18, which was conducted in February
2005 within an omnibus face-to-face survey
conducted by the Puls Agency. This part of
the survey produced two key pieces of
information:
1. the definition of “open society” used in
this study (“a society where everything is
freely discussed and where all citizens,
regardless of their identity and belonging,
have equal opportunities”) was recognised
by less than half of the respondents (47.1%),
where there were no significant differences
between women and men, although the
younger and more educated the respondents,
the more they accepted such a definition;
2. the citizens, just like the experts, accepted
that all six dimensions were important for
societal openness, but they used a different
ranking of importance: they consider as most
important a high-quality education system
that is equal for all, followed by the democratic
quality of political decision making, the rule
o f  law,  economic  f reedoms and
entrepreneurship, and finally, freedom and
the media, and minority rights.
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1 The first figure relates to the assessment of importance in general, and the second figure to the assessment of the
situation regarding this indicator in Croatia.
Rule of law
Experts in the area of the rule of law did not have significant difficulties in evaluating the
importance of the indicators, but the assessments of the situation of individual indicators in
this dimension of societal openness in Croatia are very low: autonomy of the judiciary system
(6.3 vs 2.6)1, access to legal protection (6.0 vs 2.9), efficiency of the judiciary (6.0 vs 2.1),
citizens’ trust in the justice system (5.9 vs 2.1), quality of legislation (5.8 vs 3.1) and control
of the work of the justice system (5.6 vs 2.6).
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Figure 2. Rule of law - a dimension
of an open society
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Figure 3. Transparency and democratic quality of
political processes - a dimension of an open society
Transparency and democratic quality of political processes
Six indicators were used to measure the transparency and democratic quality of political
processes as a dimension of societal openness, whose presence in assessing the openness
of Croatian society was evaluated by the experts as significantly lacking: possibility of control
and legality (6.6 vs 2.5), transparency and access to information (6.2 vs 2.8), autonomy (5.9
vs 2.9), accountability (5.7 vs 2.4), participation and vertical openness (5.6 vs 2.6), and
professionalism and rationality (5.3 vs 2.4).
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Figure 4. Education - a dimension of an open society
Education
Education as a dimension of an open society was measured by the experts through six
indicators, showing that its contribution to the openness of Croatian society is also lacking:
efficiency and autonomy (6.2 vs 2.6), control and legality (6.1 vs 2.5), availability and access
to all citizens (6.0 vs 3.7), possibility and effectiveness of public debate (5.9 vs 2.3), pluralism
(5.9 vs 2.5), and transparency of work and access to information (5.7 vs 2.5).
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Figure 5 . The media  -  a dimension of an open society
Media
The media as a dimension of an open society was measured by the experts through six
indicators whose contribution to the openness of Croatian society was assessed as relatively
better than other dimensions (although with most variability in opinions): autonomy and
independence (6.3 vs 3.5), professionalism and rationality (6.2 vs 3.2), lack of monopolies and
equality (6.1 vs 3.0), media openness (6.0 vs 3.2), quality of media legislation (5.9 vs 3.6), and
efficiency of civil society institutions (5.5 vs 3.0).
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Figure 6. Relationship towards minorities and
marginalised groups - a dimension of an open society
Minorities and marginalised groups
The relationship towards minorities and marginalised groups as a dimension of an open society
was measured by the experts through four indicators whose contribution to the openness of
Croatian society was also assessed as relatively better than the contribution of other dimensions
(apart from the media): quality of the fight against discrimination (6.3 vs 3.0), the relationship
of the majority and correctness of public communication (6.3 vs 3.0), quality of control
mechanisms (6.1 vs 2.7), and quality of formal protection of rights and freedoms (5.8 vs 3.8).
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Figure 7 . Economic rights and
entrepreneurship - a dimension of an open society
Economic rights and entrepreneurship
The experts used six indicators to measure the importance of economic rights and
entrepreneurship for societal openness. Their contribution to the openness of Croatian society
is far from desirable: control and legality (6.0 vs 2.4), equity in market competition (5.9 vs 2.9),
autonomy and efficiency (5.8 vs 2.6), opportunity for participation (5.6 vs 2.8), access to
information (5.6 vs 2.9), and effectiveness of public debate (5.3 vs 2.6).
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Democratization universally implies and indeed
requires that the following characteristics are
present in society:  1) Individual rights are
officially recognized and protected. 2) The
powers of government, at every level, are
limited, both constitutionally and by the division
and separation of powers.  3) Institutions that
make up civil society are well articulated and
strong. 4) The social, economic and political
systems are “inclusive,” in the sense that
persons are not, on the basis of invidious
distinctions, excluded from participating in
each of these spheres.
Societ ies that combine these four
characteristics, we believe, represent empirical
examples of that which philosophers  like
Henri Bergson and Karl Popper had in mind
in their discussions of the Open Society and
its development.  In recent years, the vast
output of scholarly works that address the
problems and processes of democratization,
particularly those of countries said to be “in
transition,” reflects that critical salience of
these four characteristics.
We propose to make the concept of
“inclusiveness” a working surrogate for the
definition of an Open Society.  The activities
in which OSI Croatia will become engaged
will be guided principally by this idea.  We
believe that its use is particularly justified, and
will be empirically very helpful, is a society
that is as ethnically divided as Croatia;  which
has experienced several decades of
authoritarian rule, which impeded social and
economic, as well as political, evolution in a
more open and democratic direction.
In its proposed new departure, OSI’s program
will involve both a monitoring (or survey)
dimension and a pro-active, policy-promoting
agenda. The first of these activities in
conceived essentially as an empirical effort
to identify structural and institutional obstacles
or bottlenecks that lie in the way of making
Croatia’s economic, social and political
systems more inclusive.  The second, pro-
active dimension would involve an
organizational effort, alone but certainly in
cooperation with others, to encourage public
policies designed to alleviate these obstacles,
and to remove bottlenecks.
Conceptually, those aspects of Croatian
society that would be surveyed are those
that involve the life chances, the human rights
and protection, and the economic and political
participation opportunities that are available
to the nation’s citizens and residents.
Life Chances.  These are understood in the
classical sociological sense. Social
stratification exists in all manner of societies,
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but societies differ in the extent, for example,
to which a stratification system is based on
heredity, race, ethnicity, religion, wealth or
other distinctive criteria that, in any democratic
or open society, would be considered
invidious.
OSI surveys under this heading would search
for evidence as to the range and degree of
inequality existing in, for example,  type of
housing, education, specialized training,
medical care, jobs in the private and public
sectors, etc. available in Croatia.  It will be
important to establish whether there are
invidious discriminations practiced here, that
are based on such criteria as race, gender,
religion, ethnicity, class, geographic location,
etc.
Human Rights.  Regarding this criterion,
one need information that goes beyond some
typical measures of this important concept,
many of which are limited to codifying what
may be written into national constitutions, or
prescribed by law.  Some information on
certain of these rights (e.g., shelter, medical
assistance, information) will be gleaned from
survey information gathered under the Life
Chances heading.  But one needs to look
empirically at other practices as well.
Limited government implies, above all, that
the political system, and the institutions that
comprise it, add up to a rule of law and not
of men. It would mean that there are real, not
just abstract or theoretical, protections against
arbitrary or discriminatory behavior practiced
against citizens by those in positions of
authority.
Information to be gathered under this heading
would be combined with and added to already
existing systems that seek to measure aspects
of human rights around the world. POLITY
IV is one of these, which has developed a
21-variable index of how well given countries
are doing in the development and
maintenance of democratic requisites.
“Balkan Watch,” of the American University
in Washington, D.C., as well the World Institute
of Development Economics at the U.N.
University at Helsinki, are two other sources
of information against which data collected
in Croatia can and will be checked.  An
additional source that relates to both this and
the next conceptual category would be the
following two books:  E.P. McMahon & T.A.P.
Sinclair (eds.), Democratic Institution
Performance: Research and Pol icy
Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002);
and D. Berg-Schlosser (ed.), Democratization:
The State of the Art. (Weisbaden: VS Verlag
fur Socialwissenschaften, 2004).
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Economic and Political Participation.
These two dimensions will be assessed
separately, but they are related conceptually,
in the sense that although a free market and
competition are not actually necessary
conditions for democratic development, the
two phenomena appear to be closely related.
Thus, OSI Croatia’s surveys, as well as its
panel of experts (see below) will by utilized
to gauge the extent to which the political and
economic systems are open, or moving in
that direction.  Indicators will also be such as
to register when, and along which component
variables of each of these  concepts
(economic and political participation) there
may be regression as well.
Regarding political openness, the Polity IV
Index, or some variation of it, will be utilized.
We will want to look at constitutional and
legal provisions that related to the formation
and actions of political parties, and the norms
that govern party representatives who sit on
legislative or other governmental bodies.
Attention will be paid any activity that has the
aim or effect of inhibiting the formation of
and/or participation of political parties and
their auxiliary organizations.  Similar attention
will be paid to the norms and practices relating
to electoral campaigns and the act of voting.
In the economic sphere, degree of openness
will obviously be immediately affected by the
distribution of life chances, such as education,
access to medical assistance, or to specialized
training, etc.  Attention will also be paid the
degree to which the labor market itself is
open to all qualified, or potentially qualified,
persons, regardless of considerations that
are invidious (e.g., gender, ethnicity, religion,
age, etc.),
Beyond these obvious measures, special
attention will be given the question of
entrepreneurial development.  Societies in
transition typically require special programs,
designed to encourage the emergence of
small and medium size business enterprises,
and to provide the financial assistance as well
as the training that this aspect of development
requires.  Again, openness will imply that
access to this particular means of participating
validly in the economy be made available on
a non-discriminatory basis.
In both of these spheres, effective participation
will be immediately and profoundly affected
by universality with which information is
available to the nation’s citizens.  This factor
is deeply influenced by such component
variables as: 1) the structure of ownership of
the media; 2) laws and practices involving
governmental censorship; 3) degree of
t ransparency regarding the publ ic
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bureaucratic, judicial, executive aspects of
government; 4) degree of transparency
regarding corporate activities in the private
sector; 5) the plurality of information sources;
6) the density of NGOs that are found in civil
society.
In both the economic and political spheres
of participation, the status of minorities will
require special attention.  Some of the
information that is relevant to this matter will
be gleaned from several of the component
indicators that will make up the measures or
indexes used to evaluate life chances, human
rights, and economic and pol i t ical
participation.
Nevertheless, minorities in Croatia (e.g.,
Gypsies) will require separated attention,
because of the attention that is being paid to
them, including by the European Union.
Summary. Not all of the categorical concepts,
or the component variables that will be used
to make them measurable, can be readily
and reliable quantified.  Those that can be
more accurately measured, and systematically
recorded as time-series data, will be treated
that way.  Other components will be more
loosely measured, in terms, for example, of
“more” or “less”, “high” of “low.”
The use of panels of experts in several fields
(e.g., human rights, political participation,
economic opportunity, information systems)
is designed to add some rigor to these looser,
less-easily-quantified categories.  Something
analogous to the “Delphic Method,” widely
used in Western corporate and governmental
circles, will be the methodology utilized in
activating this dimension of the survey and
monitoring program.
Pro Action.  As indicated at the beginning of
this conceptual statement, data gathering of
the kind described is not intended as a form
of “monitoring,” in the sense of focusing on
what is wrong and/or calling attention to
Croatia’s failures.  Among other things, the
surveys themselves will be a rich source of
information regarding what actually works,
and were and in what areas successes are
registered.
The operational purpose of the activities
summarized it to bring them to bear on the
making of new public policies, and the
modification of existing policies.  The action
program would urge the consideration of
policies that would accelerate the evolution
of more openness, in specific spheres.  It
would also be a means through which
knowledge of workable solutions, or “best
practices,” would be “bench-marked” and
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more widely shared.  Such information would
apply to modes of organization and behavior
in the private sector as well.
OSI, of course, cannot and should not engage
in this policy-promoting activity all by itself.
Efforts will be made to involve other
organizations in civil society to become actively
involved as well, perhaps in broad-gauged
coalitions designed to affect or influence public
policy.
In some of the promotional or change-oriented
activities, it is possible that the UNDP, or the
World Bank, might become involved. The
point being that, in the next phase of its
development, OSI Croatia should both seek
to create action-oriented partnerships and
coalitions, or to join existing ones, where the
change-oriented public policy goals, or similar
objectives, are shared by others.
Open Society
Index:
Aleksandar ©tulhofer
Theoretical Concept,
Methodology
and Measurement
Open Society Index: Theoretical
Concept, Methodology and
Measurement Aleksandar ©tulhofer
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As part of the Open Society Forum (OSF)
Project, the work on the development of the
open society index (hereinafter - OSI)
commenced in early 2004. From the outset,
OSI was designed as the backbone of the
project, with the following objectives:
(a) Quantitative monitoring of the
dynamics of the opening / closing of
society;
(b) Identification of “critical points” and
generators of closedness, which are
analysed by qualitative methods in the next
step (see the chapter dealing with the case
studies);
(c) Quantitative comparison of the
degree of openness of (post)transition
societies of Central, Eastern and
Southeast Europe.
Based on expert opinion,1 the OSI was
designed as an instrument to enable the
continual measurement of the degree of
societal openness in a given society, but also
to allow for a comparison of societal opening
in the countries of the region.2 Calculation of
the OSI should be effected every year, or at
least once in two years.
Monitoring the dynamics of opening in a
given society, and comparing the degree of
openness in different societies, is based on
seven figures within the OSI. These are the
average values of six basic dimensions of an
open society and the general index value,
the figure which indicates the overall degree
of openness of a given society.
The Croatian pilot project includes a public
opinion poll,3 whose objective was to find to
what extent the general public understands
the concept of an open society, and how it
assesses the openness of Croatian society.
In the long term, the public opinion poll
enables the monitoring of the effectiveness
of advocacy campaigns based on the analysis
of the OSI. The decision about whether or
not the public opinion poll will be included in
the final research package has not yet been
made.
Step One: Theoretical
Framework and
Operationalisation
The OSI is based on the model of an open
society, i.e., its theoretical understanding,
which highlights six key dimensions of societal
openness (for details, see the theoretical
chapter):
(a) The rights of minorities and
marginalised groups
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(b) The education system
(c) The rule of law
(d) Economic freedoms and
entrepreneurship
(e) The media
(f) The transparency and democratic
quality of political processes
The areas indicated above are, according to
a theoretical elaboration, basic generators
of societal openness, or closedness.
Following the discussions among the
members of the OSF Project Committee, the
areas/dimensions are operationalised through
five criteria: (1) scope (inclusiveness), (2)
transparency of activities, (3) openness to
criticism and public debate, (4) potential for
change, and (5) accountability. In order for
these universal criteria to translate into
measurable indicators, in November 2004 a
corresponding questionnaire was sent to a
large group of experts (N =120).4
Although the experts were given the task of
identifying concrete phenomena/processes
whose measurement would lead to a situation
assessment - i.e., degree of openness of
society - in each of the six dimensions, and
thereby to the GVI, their responses also
revealed something else. Namely, an analysis
of the collected material indicated that the
idea of universal criteria is unsustainable.
Since each of the areas/dimensions contains
specific qualities which require special criteria,
a new list of criteria was developed:
(a) Rights of Minorities and Marginalised
Groups
- Formal protection of the rights and
freedoms of minorities and marginalised
social groups
- Existence of discrimination of minorities
and marginal groups
- Control mechanisms of the protection
of rights of minorities and marginalised
groups
- Attitude of the majority towards the
minority in public communication
(b) Education System
- The possibility of participation in
education
- Pluralism in education
- The possibility and efficiency of public
debate
- Transparency
- Independence
- Quality education processes
- Lawfulness and compliance control
(c) The Rule of Law
- Quality of legislation
0 3 2
- Availability of legal protection for all
citizens
- Quality control of the work of the judiciary
- Efficiency of the system
- Independence
- Public trust in the judiciary
(d) Economic Freedoms and
Entrepreneurship
- The possibility of participation in market
competition
- Equality in market competition
- The possibility and efficiency of public
debate
- Transparency
- Independence
- Lawfulness and compliance control
(e) The Media
- Independence
- Professionalism
- Absence of monopolies (equality of
media market competition)
- Openness (scope)
- Media legislation
- Efficiency of civil society institutions in
the area of the media
(f) Democratic Quality of Political
Processes
- The possibility of participation and
vertical openness
- Lawfulness and compliance control
- Transparency
- Accountability
- Independence
- Professionalism
Step Two: Development
of the Questionnaire, Fine
Tuning and Data
Collection
In the next step, six questionnaires were
developed, one for each area/dimension.
Each questionnaire consists of the following
parts:
(A) Introduction, in which the importance
of the areas/dimensions for societal openness
is explained;
(B) Instructions for filling out the
questionnaire;
(C) Indicators
(each criterion is operationalised with twenty
or so indicators); the respondent uses a
seven-point scale to indicate the extent to
which a specific indicator (e.g. “independence
of public television from specific political
options”) is important for ideal societal
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openness, and to assess its state in Croatia
(to what extent, currently, public television is
really independent);
(D) Proposals for the improvement of
openness; in this part, the respondents are
requested to briefly state (up to) 5
measures/activities which could significantly
improve the degree of openness within the
areas/d imensions covered by the
questionnaire;
(E) Identification of cases; in the final part,
the respondent has to state (up to) 3 cases
which illustrate the opening of Croatian society
and (up to) 3 cases which illustrate the closing
of Croatian society in the last year or two.
After the questionnaires were drawn up, they
were sent for review. Each questionnaire was
reviewed by at least two members of the
Project Committee, as well as by two external
reviewers who are specialists in the
area/dimension deal t  wi th by the
questionnaire. After analysing the reviews,
the questionnaires were fine-tuned.
At the same time, work took place on creating
a database of experts, i.e., the future
respondents. Table 1 shows the list of social
positions on the basis of which the initial
sample was made. Subsequently, we asked
initial correspondents to nominate 5 experts
in their respective fields, taking into
consideration regional representation. In the
next round we contacted the experts who
had been nominated in this way and asked
them to nominate another 5 experts.
Consequently, an expert base was created
with a total of 399 names. The number of
required iterations of the “snowballing”
technique is currently an open issue.5
In early February 2005, questionnaires were
sent by post and by e-mail to 312 addresses.
Although the standard sample for the OSI
will include 120 experts,6 in this pilot research
we wanted to have a larger number of
respondents, sufficient for statistical tests
and for the fine tuning of instruments.7 Yet,
regardless of the fact that experts were offered
only a small honorarium (EUR 100), the final
sample included 125 respondents.
Development of the final version of the
questionnaire - by selecting the items which
will make up the standard questionnaire - is
not yet possible. The final version of the
questionnaire will be drawn up after the
implementation and analyses of the results
of the second pilot study, which will ensure
the necessary (total) number of respondents
for multivariate statistical analyses. Only
subsequent to these analyses will a final
decision about the mode of selecting the
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sample be made, the alternatives being: (a)
a survey of randomly selected respondents
(in each round the questionnaire is sent to
various addresses) and (b) a survey of top-
notch experts (the questionnaire is sent to
the same people each time).8
Step Three: Link
between the OSI
and Case Studies
In addition to the calculation of the general
degree of openness of society (GVI), the OSI
enables a number of important insights to
be gained: (a) ranking the dimensions
according to the relative importance for the
openness of a given society,9 (b) ranking the
dimensions according to the degree of
openness in the given society,10 and - by
combining the two - (c) perceiving the
dimension where closedness is the most
problematic in terms of society. In addition,
the final part of the questionnaire is used to
identify the “critical points” and “success
stories”, from which the most frequently
mentioned (one good and one bad case) are
then processed in detail. The qualitative part
of the OSF project is based on the responses
of experts to the last two questions in the
questionnaire, in which a description is sought
of (up to) 3 cases/situations which have
contributed to the opening and closing of
the given society, respectively. The most
frequently mentioned positive and the most
frequently mentioned negative example
become subjects for two case studies.
An alternative manner of determining the
subject of the case studies would begin with
the identification of the best and worst rated
area/dimension, after which the most
frequently mentioned negative example within
the worst rated dimension would become
the subject of the first case study, whereas
the most frequently mentioned positive
example within the best rated dimension
would become the subject of the second
one. The final assessment of the manner of
selection of the case studies will be made
after the analysis of the second pilot study.
Step Four:
Public Opinion Poll
A public opinion poll was undertaken in order
to establish if the general public is, and to
what extent, familiar with the idea of an open
society, and to what degree it assesses the
openness of Croatian society. The importance
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of this assessment of openness is shown in
a time perspective, in which the dynamics of
the assessment of the general public indicates
the (non)efficiency and scope of advocacy
activities arising from expert assessments.
Successful and publicly recognised advocacy
should result in the perception of an increase
in the degree of openness in the given society.
The Croatian pilot study, the so-called
omnibus public opinion poll, included the
question on what an open society is (5
different definitions were provided), questions
about the relative importance of six basic
dimensions of an open society (6 items) and
a number of questions from which, by using
statistical analysis, the openness assessment
index (30  items) will be developed.11
Step Five: the OSI
and Advocacy Activities
Considering that the Open Society Forum
Project consists of three parts - the
development of the OSI, the preparation of
two case studies, and advocacy - it should
be noted that there is a double connection
between the OSI and advocacy activities.
On one hand, the focus and objectives of
advocacy are determined by an analysis of
the data collected by the surveying of experts.
Identification of “critical points”, within specific
dimensions, in which closure is most present,
is the basic landmark for advocacy activities.
In other words, the focus and objectives of
advocacy ensue from an analysis of the
questionnaire described above. In the long
term, bearing in mind the continuity of
calculation of the OSI, it becomes clear that
the dynamics of the values of the OSI will
also be a kind of test of the efficiency of
advocacy undertaken in the previous period.
An increase in the index value would indirectly
imply efficiency in the advocacy activities,
whereas a fall or stagnation would imply lower
efficiency or even failure. Of course, the above
should be taken with great caution. Namely,
it is impossible to differentiate - in a precise
and methodologically convincing manner -
between the influence of advocacy and the
possible impact on the OSI values of some
other social developments (such as, for
instance, changes in the international relations
or foreign policy of a country).
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Professional status of the members of the initial sample
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Table 1 - Structure of the Initial Sample
1) Dean of the largest faculty of economics in the country
2) Dean of the largest faculty of political science in the country
3) Dean of the largest faculty of philosophy in the country
4) Head of the sociology department at the largest faculty in the country
5) Head of the department of philosophy at the largest faculty in the country
6) Dean of the largest faculty of law in the country
7) Dean of the teacher training college in the capital or head of the pedagogy department at the largest
faculty in the capital
8, 9, 10) Editors of the business section in three dailies with the biggest circulation
11, 12, 13) Editors of the political section of three dailies with the biggest circulation
14, 15) Editors-in-chief of two political weeklies with the biggest circulation
16) President of the largest society in terms of membership of the most numerous ethnic minority in the country
17) President of the largest trade union in the country in terms of membership
18) President of the largest Employers’ Association in the country in terms of membership
19) President of the section for social sciences of the Academy of Arts and Sciences
20) President of the Open Society Institute
21) Ombudsman for Gender Equality
22) President of the most influential organisation for the protection of human rights
23) President of the most influential organisation for the protection of women’s rights
24) President of the Association of Journalists
25) President of the most influential trade union in the country
1 Initially, the OSI was designed as a combination of an analysis of public statistics and expert assessment. This idea
was subsequently discarded for two reasons. The first was the fact that public statistics of the countries of post-
communist Europe contain too few indicators of societal openness. Second, the combining of various kinds of data
(public statistics and expert assessment) represents a great methodological problem, particularly if the objective is
the construction of a single numeric indicator (GIV).
2 With further elaboration, the OSI could also be applied in a wider international framework.
3 The issue is the inclusion of a smaller number of variables into the standard omnibus public opinion polls.
4 The procedure was as follows: for each area/dimension, a separate protocol was developed in which the majority
of questions was of an open type. The protocols were sent (by post and e-mail) to the addresses of a dozen experts
in a particular field. The list of experts was formed on the basis of a proposal of the members of the Board of the
OSF. The response rate of the contacted experts was only 10%.
5 The need was also found for the inclusion of regional institutions with a view to avoiding concentration of an initial
group of experts in the capital.
6 The database of experts, whose size necessarily depends on the demographic characteristics of each specific
country, is used for the random selection of 120 names, which is repeated every year. In this way, the OSI will not
be based on always the same circle of experts - even in the countries with a small number of experts.
7 The same strategy will be applied in another pilot study.
8 Ranking of experts according to excellence would be determined by the number of nominations.
9 The rank is determined by the arithmetical values of the relative importance of dimensions/areas.
10 According to the arithmetical values of the assessment of openness of each specific dimension/area.
11 The public opinion poll was conducted in February 2005 by the Puls agency.
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In the drafting of the open society index as
an integral part of the Open Society Forum
project, the following methods were used:
the survey (a public opinion poll using a
representative sample of Croatian citizens of
legal age); the structured written interview
(on a sample of 120 experts in six social
dimensions recognised as being of key
importance for social openness); and the
case study (two studies chosen on the basis
of experts’ evaluations). Quantitative and
qualitative research methods were combined
in the process so as to establish the dynamics
of the opening/closing of society, to recognise
the critical points in this dynamics, to create
the conditions for longitudinal monitoring of
this process in Croatia, and to compare the
level of openness in (post)transition societies
of Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe.
The results of this research will be applied to
advocate social openness, that is, to
encourage the given societies to become
more open.
This part of the report consists of the following
subsections: establishing the case study
methods, describing the procedure used in
the process of choosing the cases; and
showing the methodological aspects used
in the drafting of the two case studies (one
being an illustration of the process of the
opening of Croatian society, the other of its
closing).
Determining Case
Study Methods
The case study is a research method used
in the social sciences for basic exploration,
description or explanation of social
phenomena where it is especially important
to describe the interrelation between any
given phenomenon and its social context.
The case study is used to investigate
temporally and spatially limited segments of
modern, ever changing social phenomena
conditioned by their respective contexts.1
This method studies such phenomena as
are “placed in precisely determined temporal
and spatial frames and such phenomena as
can be analytically isolated as individual
problems”2 (Kasapovic, 1998:95).
The special value of the case study is that it
can provide a detailed, in depth description
of a specific phenomenon, of complex
relationships between different phenomena,
of the influence of the relevant context, and
of the investigation of situations whose results
are not sufficiently clear after other research
methods have been used. The case study
is therefore conducted in relation to subjects
which, due to their complexity, their rather
specific nature and their other characteristics,
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are not well suited to different, and especially
not to “classical”, research methods. Although
the accent is put on qualitative data and
interpretation, the case study may also include
a mix of quantitative and qualitative data and
analytical procedures. Also, although the
accent here is placed on the direct
observation and investigation of real
phenomena, in conducting a case study
primary and secondary written sources are
used in connection with the specific
phenomenon - which is also the subject of
research - as well as its context (statistical
entries, media writings, existing social and
scientific analyses).
Since there is less chance of making
generalisations exclusively on the basis of a
case study than there is on the basis of other
methods (for example, research based on a
representative sample, or diachronic
research), the case study is particularly useful
as a complementary method for achieving a
targeted, in-depth insight into already
determined aspects of some broader
phenomenon that is being researched. It is
possible, on the basis of a case study, to
arrive at specific generalisations by comparing
the deductions of the case study with
theoretical assumptions on one hand, and
research conclusions with the same subject
developed through the use of other methods
on the other. In the course of the process it
would be useful, in the long run, to create a
basis for those case studies which treat the
same broader phenomenon and which may
be compared in terms of the consistency of
key research questions, as well as in terms
of focusing on the examination of the
processes and reasons that lead to a certain
phenomena, instead of being directed
towards the spread and intensity of these
phenomena.
Case studies are based on the following
methodological principles.
1) Continuity: preparing a social openness
case study has, in the Open Society Forum
Project, been postulated as a consecutive,
continuous study of previously determined
aspects of social openness in previously
defined one or two year periods, through
case analyses within previously defined social
phenomena re levant  for  a bet ter
understanding of social openness.
2) Comparability: the methodology should
be unique; since this is a campaign
investigation encompassing a two-year period
at most, the accent is put on timely
implementation and application. Although
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the degree of comparability within the context
of a case study may be limited, the case
study makes itself possible by using uniform
research techniques and research questions,
the focus being on those social phenomena
which may be investigated on the basis of
various cases.
3) Reliability: in the preparation of a case
study, reliability is ensured by making sure
that protocols (research blueprints) are stable
and reliable, by triangulating sources and
methods, by involving key respondents in
the process of interpreting the findings and
comparing them with the existing analyses
of the studied phenomenon.
4) Coherence: different research phases
are logically interconnected, so that the
process of choosing a case study has its
basis in the evaluation of the experts who
have answered the questionnaire on the most
important dimensions of social openness in
the time period that is being evaluated. It is
also suggested that, in the process of drafting
the full framework for this research, the
procedural markers should be set for a
comprehensive interpretation of the findings
arrived at through different methodological
phases and that those findings should be
linked with both the theoretical and campaign
undertakings.
5) Campaign orientation: the choice of
methods is to be made on the basis of their
interactive potential for art iculating
recommendations for improvement of the
diagnosed state and for achieving
transparency of the entire project’s content
and purpose. It is also necessary to include
in it perspectives of individuals and groups
that have been directly affected by a specific
studied phenomenon, especially concerning
the problem of marginalisation. This research
method affirms the experiences and
assessments of those who have been
affected by a lack of openness in society
and, at least within this framework, prevents
the emergence of further instances of
exclusion.
Description of the
Process of Choosing a
Case Study
In the course of preparations for the drafting
of the Index, the following criteria for choosing
two case studies were established:
a) there is a reasonable foundation for
choosing specific cases on the basis of
experts’ evaluations
b) specific cases are of relevance to public
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advocacy of social openness
c) there exists a need to establish a
continuity in the observation of social themes
and phenomena related to social openness
or closedness
a) There is a reasonable foundation for
choosing specific cases on the basis of
experts’ evaluations
All the experts, no matter which dimension
they may have been responsible for
evaluating, were asked the following
questions:
1. Please list three genuinely illustrative
examples (a situation, a case, an event) from
Croatian public life (societal, political,
economic events) which took place in the
preceding period and which testify to
(demonstrate, indicate) the opening up, or
openness, of society in Croatia.
2. Please list three genuinely illustrative
examples (a situation, a case, an event) from
Croatian public life (societal, political,
economic events) which took place in the
preceding period and which testify to
(demonstrate, indicate) the closing, or the
closedness, of society in Croatia.
For these questions to produce the desired
results (through the listing of illustrative
examples of societal openness or closedness)
it was important to make sure that
respondents were familiar with the definition
of societal openness (as outlined in the
introductory part of the questionnaire). The
questions were asked at the end of the
questionnaire, within the context of which
the experts then evaluated, in their respective
fields of expertise, the degree of openness,
or closedness, of society. In the process of
evaluation, these experts could list examples
related to societal events in a comprehensive
manner, not only those related to the societal
events’ respective dimensions.
Examples listed by experts in the process of
evaluation were grouped by subject, so that
the frequency with which they occurred could
be established. A total of 339 examples
demonstrating societal openness were listed,
as well as 330 examples which demonstrated
a lack of societal openness. What follows is
an outline of the most frequent themes related
to openness, or the opening of society
(including 155 out of a total of 339 examples
that were listed by experts), and nine of the
most common subjects related to closedness
or the closing of society (including 137 out
of a total of 330 examples listed by experts).
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SUBJECT: OPENNESS OF SOCIETY Frequency Dimension of
Progress
The Government, the media and the public are more tolerant towards
Serbs and other ethnic minorities
ethnic
minorities30
The (reluctant) resignation of Minister Æuæul caused by public opinion
and and scandals revealed by the media
political
responsibility,
influence of the public
29
The Puljiz Affair - support of the media, the public, and various associations to
Helena Puljiz and the removal of the director of the Counter-Intelligence Agency
(POA) from his post - the work of secret services presented in a negative light
political responsibility,
influence of the public25
The government, society and the media are more tolerant towards
ethnic minorities and various marginalised groups, especially towards
the LGBTIQ community, the Roma minority, invalids, etc.
ethnic
minorities22
The media have taken an active stand towards political cases; journalists
are more independent from politics; corruption scandals are disclosed.
influence of the
public13
Higher independence of the Croatian television (HRT) from the
Government and politics as well as better quality reporting
influence of the
public10
Freedom of action, higher degree of transparency in the work of and influence
exerted by civil society institutions, but especially by those institutions which
fight against discrimination and marginalisation - Croatian Helsinki Committee,
Gong, B.a.b.e. and Iskorak
ethnic minorities,
influence of the
public
9
Consensus between the Government and the opposition in regard to
Croatia’s accession to the EU - and in regard to Croatia’s strategic goals reform processes9
The Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports has opened a web
discussion about important issues of education and is showing more
willingness to change its decisions as a result of public discussion
transparency of
institutions, reforms,
influence of the public
8
Table 1 - The most frequent subjects
related to opennes
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SUBJECT: CLOSEDNESS OF SOCIETY Frequency Dimension of
closedness
The influence of the Catholic Church on the judiciary regarding sexuality,
reproductive rights and the rights of sexual minorities
ethnic minorities,
human rights26
Primitivism and the large influence exerted by POA (Counter-Intelligence
Agency); unclear role of and supervision over the secret services,
intelligence investigations of the work of journalists
freedom in the
media, transparency
of the institutions
24
Non-transparency in the sale of state-owned companies, the granting
of concessions and subsidies; support of monopolies
transparency
21
The Gotovina case and the problem of incomplete cooperation
with ICTY
inadequate degree
of the rule of law13
Postponing or practically abolishing the founding of the Commission
for the Conflict of Interest; a high degree of corruption and conflict of
interest is to be found within the ranks of persons in power
political.
responsibility13
Evading the application of an integration policy for the Roma minority
- inadequate integration of Roma children in schools
ethnic minorities12
The Croatian population displays intolerance and xenophobia towards others
- towards ethnic minorities, gays, foreigners, asylum seekers; propagation of
racial intolerance and xenophobia, crimes based on racial hate
ethnic minorities,
human rights, the
degree of violence
10
Privatisation frauds and inadequacy of appropriate sanctions; revision
of the privatisation process as a “Yes” option", tacit agreement
between the Government and the opposition
transparency of the
institutions, reforms,
the rule of law
9
Censorship of the extract on Prime Minister Sanader, related  origin
of PM Sanader’s property as (not) discussed on the Latinica show, 14
February 2005
lack of freedom in
the media9
b) What is relevant to the advocacy of
public support?
Although the choice of each case is primarily
based on the frequency with which it occurs
(to be found in the experts’ answers) the
Forum also took into consideration, in making
its final decision, the factor of the campaigning
orientation of the project, that is, the potential
usefulness of these case studies in
encouraging public advocacy of societal
openness in the ensuing period. This
usefulness is related to the degree of interest
that a particular subject may trigger in the
public eye. Public advocacy would represent
an attempt to influence important processes
where a lack of societal openness is
expressed, on one hand, and to emphasise
the positive steps made towards the opening
up of society, on the other hand.
Table 2 - The most frequent subjects
related to the closing of society
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c) A need to realise continuity in the
observation of social themes related to
the opening/closing of society.
An attempt has been made to ensure
continuity in the observation of societal
themes and phenomena related to the
opening/closing of society: during the process
of evaluation of the openness of society, each
of the two chosen examples of social praxis
served as a point of origin in defining the
case study analysis unit within the context
of three different, interrelated social
phenomena that concern the following:
1. Marginalisation of Social Groups
 (the accent here was put on the manifestation
and process of marginalisation as well as on
the opportunities for and obstructions to
decreasing the degree of marginalisation of
social groups. In consequence, the focus is
placed on social groups that are of relevance
to our understanding of the openness of
society and on their interaction with civil
institutions and public policies).
2. Openness or closedness of public
institutions
(the accent was put on the manifestations of
and the reasons for openness/closedness
of institutions as well as on related
opportunities for and obstructions to
increasing openness. In consequence, the
focus is placed on the structural base of
societal openness and on the interaction of
public institutions with social groups and
public policies).
3. Openness of public policies
 (the accent was put on the transparency of
and the degree of participation achieved in
the making and implementation of public
policies. The most important thing in this
case study is the political content, which is
of relevance to our understanding of societal
openness and which interacts, through public
debate and other mediums, with social
groups and societal institutions).
By preparing the case study within the
parameters of the aforementioned categories,
the potential insight into the specific nature
of openness/closedness of society is
consequently enriched, as well as the potential
number of different bases for conducting
case studies. Such a choice of categories
for the case study is based on our
understanding of societal openness and its
key components, especially because it is
possible, within the context of the three
categories of the case study, to encompass
all the criteria of societal openness – 1)
inclusiveness/opportunity for participation;
2) access to information; 3) opportunity for,
and effectiveness of, public criticism and
debate; 4) capacity for change/innovation;
5) accountability.
On the basis of the described criteria, the
following themes were chosen:
- The government, the public and the media
display a higher degree of tolerance towards
the Serb minority (a case study illustrating
the processes of the opening of society).
- The influence exerted by the Catholic Church
on sexual and reproductive rights, and on
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health policy (a case study illustrating the
closing of society.
An Outline of
Methodological Aspects
in the Process
of Drafting Two Different
Case Studies
Researchers used protocols in the drafting
of these case studies. Protocols are essential
methodological tools in the drafting of a case
study: they resemble a miniature research
blueprint. Each protocol contains specific
instructions related to all the key steps taken
in the drafting of the study: a definition of the
specific goals of the study (diagnostic goal
and action goal); definition of the unit of
analysis or unit of the case; explanation of
why a specific case has been selected; key
questions; the choice of methods and data
sources; guidelines for the interpretation and
the structuring of the study; guidelines for
the shaping of the conclusion and
recommendations; suggestions for the
publication and applicability of the case study;
overview of the necessary resources (the
profile of the investigator and his/her
associates).
Three different protocols - relative to the type
of phenomenon which the given case study
aims to describe and analyse - were prepared
to suit the purposes of this case study: The
position of marginalised groups; 2) the
functioning of institutions; 3) the process of
establishing or shaping public policy, with
the stress being placed on the aspect of
public debate. As part of this year’s research,
the analysis protocol of the marginalised
groups’ position was readapted and used in
the drafting of the Serb minority case study,
while the analysis protocol of the public policy
process was used in the preparation for the
drafting of the case study of the influence of
the Catholic Church on sexual, health, and
reproductive rights policy.
What is special about any case study is the
variety of available research methods and
procedures. In the two aforementioned
studies, such qualitative methods as the
document analysis, semi-structured individual
and group interviews, and the observation
of relevant events predominate. Moreover,
the existing research results arrived at through
the employment of quantitative methods were
also either used or further interpreted. The
following data sources are key sources to
both of this year’s case studies:
- official reports and documents belonging
to various institutions (the Republic of Croatia
Statistical Bureau, Public Prosecutor’s Office,
Croatian Helsinki Committee, narrowly
specialised organisations, etc.)
- various associations and institutions’ web
pages and forums (Croatian Bishop’s
Conference, Ministry of Science, Education,
and Sports, Informative Catholic Agency,
Women’s Network, and others)
- media writings (Jutarnji List, Glas Koncila,
Identitet and other media)
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- persons directly involved in the problematic
of the cases: semi-structured interviews with
ten persons involved in the case study of the
influence of the Catholic Church in Croatia
on politics as regards sexuality, reproductive
health and the rights of sexual minorities
(individual contacts); thirteen people in some
way involved in the problem (or theme) of the
position of the Serbian minority in Croatia
(nine of them participated in a group interview;
four of them were interviewed individually).
- the results of other relevant research studies
- professional literature
The triangulation of data sources was
achieved by coordinated management of the
sources.
In this context it is important to mention that
the specific nature of the case study of the
position of marginalised groups, in this case
the Serbian minority, was marked by the
direct involvement of the members of that
group, not only as respondents, but also as
participants in the process of interpretation,
whereby it was possible to enhance both the
degree of “polyphony” in the study and the
intersubjective nature of the process of
communication within the context of these
research studies.
Finally, it should be noted that the existence
of three different comprehensive, elaborate
protocols has created a basis for the future
drafting of a whole array of case studies
which would relate to the three types of
societal phenomena - marginalised groups,
institutions, and public policies. The fact that
the said protocols are stable enhances the
potential for comparing case studies within
the context of a particular type of societal
phenomenon, which is especially important
given that the degree of comparability of case
studies is in principle limited. The project has
the intention of enriching the heretofore
modest body of documentation on the subject
of these modern societal processes which
are related to the opening/closing of society
and which are manifested in concrete,
temporally limited cases. Such an approach
enables us to enhance the consistency of
the methodology or protocols in the
preparation of case studies. The research
study should thereby be conducted with less
strain, which, given the fact that this project
is both long term and of an applied nature,
is extremely important.
1 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, London: Sage Publications, 2003.
2 KasapoviÊ, Mirjana, “ZagrebaËka politiËka kriza 1995.-1997.: Sukob demokratskih i autoritarnih vrijednosti. Studija
sluËaja.”, in: KasapoviÊ, Mirjana, Ivan ©iber and Nenad Zakoπek, BiraËi i demokracija, Zagreb: Alinea, 1998.
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Democracy is usually defined as a system of
rule of the majority, which, at the same time,
ensures the protection of minorities. This
definition includes the protection of temporary
“political”, but also of “permanent”, minorities.
Minority groups who are unable to become
a majority in society by forming coalitions,
and whose position cannot be changed
through classical mechanisms of liberal
democracy - by forming coalitions or through
the results of elections - enjoy special
protection in consolidated democracies and
open societies.
Open society and
minority rights
The rights of national minorities were also
protected in previous
cen tu r i es  t h rough
bilateral agreements
between the state where
the minority lived, and
the state to which the
minority belonged. The
issue of minority protection as part of
international law was declaratively resolved
through the right to “humanitarian intervention”
by the state to which the minority belonged
in the case where the fundamental rights of
the minority were threatened. This principle
was often abused by certain countries to
achieve their geopolitical interests.
The establishment of the League of Nations
led to the formation of what is known as a
minority system. Along with the dissolution
of three large empires and the formation of
new nation states after World War I, “pockets”
of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities were
formed, which had  justified reason to fear
that the new order would cause a threat to
their fundamental rights. For this reason, the
major victorious Allied Powers requested that
the newly formed states conclude agreements
on the protection of ethnic, linguistic and
religious minorities. The first signed agreement
was that between the Allied Powers and
Poland, signed in 1919. Subsequently, the
minority system of the League of Nations fell
apart, together with the organisation itself.
It was only after World War II that human
rights became, in the true sense of the word,
part of international law, and that the
protection of minority rights was no longer
treated as a bilateral issue of the state in
which the minority lived and the state of its
people, or as a “geopolitical issue”, but
became part of a complex of human rights
Democracy is usually defined as
a system of rule of the majority,
which, at the same time, ensures
the protection of minorities.
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In order to build an open society, it is necessary to create
a system that protects minority rights as collective human
rights, that defines the manner of exercising them, and
that builds mechanisms to protect them.
protection. Minority rights, being collective
rights, belong to the third generation of human
rights. Human rights of the first generation
consist of all civil and political rights; second-
generation rights are economic, social and
cultural rights; third-generation rights are the
right to development, the right to peace, the
right to a healthy and sustainable environment,
the right to use the results of common human
heritage and the right to communication.
First-generation rights relate to the protection
of the individual and are emphasised “against”
the state. Their protection is possible both
at national and at international level. Second-
generation rights enable the individual to
request something from the state, and may
only be exercised at national level. Third-
generation rights are defined in such a way
that they cannot be efficiently determined
(either “against the state”, or from the state),
or efficiently exercised. Therefore, in order to
build an open society, it is necessary to create
a system that protects minority rights as
collective human rights, that defines the
manner of exercising them, and that builds
mechanisms to protect them.
Development of the legal
infrastructure for the
protection of minorities
in Croatia
Since Croatia is a plural society, the building
of minority protection is exceptionally
important. The level of political culture, the
type of political mentality where all social
power belongs to the majority, ignorance of
the principle of rule of law, as well as
inadequate legal security, affect minority
groups most of all, especially permanent
ones. The creation of a minority protection
mechanism for Croatia was thus a
precondition for international recognition
imposed by the “Badinter Commission”. At
that time, minority rights were defined for the
first time as part of the complex of human
rights protection, and, pursuant to
international advice, the Croatian Parliament,
on 15 December 1991, adopted the
Constitutional Act on Human Rights and
Freedoms and on the Rights of Ethnic and
National Communities or Minorities. However,
after a substantial part of this Constitutional
Act was abrogated by a Parliament decision
in 1995, and since a great part of the
provisions were never in fact applied (for
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Table 1 - Importance of individual areas;
assessment of experts in individual areas
(1)
politics
(2)
minorities
(3)
law
(4)
education
(5)
economy
(6)
media
(1)politics
n 12 12 12 12 12 12
30Maximum 20 25 30 25 20
10Minimum 10 10 15 10 0
5,345St. deviation 3,298 4,166 4,420 4,338 5,054
St. error 1,543,952 1,203 1,276 1,252 1,459
Median 18 15 20 15 15 15
Arithm.
mean 17 16 21 17 13 17
example, the right of members of national minorities to representation, or proportional representation, in bodies of local
and regional self-government) until 13 December 2002, when (partially to meet the obligation arising from the Stabilisation
and Association Agreement of Croatia with the EU) the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities was
adopted, Croatia did not have a comprehensive legal infrastructure to protect national minority rights.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the surveyed experts in the protection of minorities consider the area of law as certainly
the most important area for evaluating the openness of society and that they give this area the same significance as
legal experts, and more significance than experts in other areas.
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(2) minorities
6,301St. deviation 5,880 5,497 12,250 7,158 3,650
St. error
Median 17 18 20 10 10 15
Arithm.
mean 17 18 26 14 10 17
1,1501,074 1,004 2,236 1,307 ,666
(1)
politics
(2)
minorities
(3)
law
(4)
education
(5)
the economy
(6)
the media
n 30 30 30 30 30 30
40Maximum 30 30 51 40 17
9Minimum 5 10 10 5 5
(3) legal
n 6 6 6 6 6 6
20Maximum 20 20 30 25 15
5Minimum 10 10 20 10 10
5,477St. deviation 4,082 4,082 3,764 5,845 2,739
St. error 2,2361,667 1,667 1,537 2,386 1,118
Median 12,50 12,50 25 20 12,50 15
Arithm.
mean 13 13 26 19 13 15
(4) education
St. error 2,2361,667 1,667 1,537 2,386 1,118
Median 19 ,836 1,429 ,986 ,736 ,871
Arithm.
mean 16 13 25 20 12 15
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(5) economy
n 19 19 19 19 19 19
20Maximum 30 30 30 30 30
5Minimum 5 5 10 5 7
5,269St. deviation 6,197 6,281 5,581 6,858 6,205
St. error 1,2091,422 1,441 1,280 1,573 1,424
Median 18 10 25 18 18 13
Arithm.
mean 17 12 24 17 18 13
(6) media
n 17 17 17 17 17 17
30Maximum 30 25 50 30 15
5Minimum 10 5 5 5 5
6,571St. deviation 6,276 5,175 10,038 5,644 3,881
St. error 1,5941,522 1,255 2,435 1,369 ,941
Median 20 15 20 15 10 19
Aritm.
sredina 20 15 23 15 10 18
n 26 26 26 26 26 26
25Maximum 30 20 50 30 20
10Minimum 10 5 15 10 5
4,439St. deviation 5,143 4,403 7,287 5,027 3,752
(1)
politics
(2)
minorities
(3)
law
(4)
education
(5)
the economy
(6)
the media
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Figure 1 - Importance of all indicators
Relationship between
the majority and the
minority and
communication
Formal protection of the
rights and freedoms of
minorities and
marginalised groups
Existence of control
mechanisms for the
protection of minority
rights
Discrimination of
minorities and
marginalised groups
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
30
24
24
23
Arithmetic mean of the assessment of importance (total points = 100)
However, by adopting the Constitutional Act and on its implementation (by forming bodies
of local and regional self-government in conformity with the exercise of the right to
representation/proportional representation, by founding the Council for National Minorities,
and by establishing state institutions dealing with the protection of minorities, in conformity
with the Constitutional Act) conditions were created where experts in minority issues no longer
considered the issue of formal protection of the rights and freedoms of minorities and
marginalised social groups as the most important indicator for assessing the openness of
society when dealing with the complex of minority issues. Considerably greater importance
was given to the relationship of the majority towards the minority and to the fairness of public
communication than to the issue of formal protection of rights. The existence of control
mechanisms for the protection of the rights of minorities and marginalised groups is regarded
as important as the formal protection system, and the issue of discrimination of minorities and
marginalised groups only slightly less important.
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Besides this, the evaluation of experts shows
that in the area of formal protection of the
rights of minorities and marginalised social
groups there is a significantly smaller
difference between the assessed importance
of an individual issue and the assessment of
the state of affairs than in other areas, and
primarily in the relation of the majority towards
minorities and marginalised groups. Formal
legal protection, then, ceases to be the key
problem of minority protection, and the focus
of interest moves to issues connected to the
relation between the majority and the minority,
issues of communication between groups,
and the building of efficient social mechanisms
of control and regulation.
Experts assess most highly the current
condition when they deal with indicators such
as the one that all national minorities have
the right to activities guaranteed by the
Constitution and by law, through which they
express their specific cultural characteristics,
which signifies the formal protection of human
rights. They give the lowest grades to the
condition relating to issues of the reaction of
local authorities to the violation of the rights
of national minorities (an issue related to
supervisory mechanisms) and in the event
of discriminatory attitudes of state officials
which are not sanctioned in any way (an issue
of discrimination). According to the opinions
of the surveyed experts, the worst condition
is established in the case of the (lack of)
inclusion of the state in campaigns whose
aim is to raise public awareness about minority
problems, the (lack of) sensitivity of the public
to the discrimination of sexual minorities, and
particularly in the large social distance
between members of the majority population
and the Roma.
Formal protection of
minorities and
marginalised social
groups
Under international supervision (the UN, the
Badinter Commission, OSCE, the Venice
Commission, the EU, obligations arising from
the SAA) Croatia has developed quite an
admirable system of protection of national
minorities. From the evaluation of the surveyed
experts it is very clear that the formal
protection of the rights of members of national
minorities is no longer a central problem. This
is not only shown by the assessment of the
importance of the complex of formal minority
protection, but also by the fact that the formal
rights of national minorities were evaluated
Formal legal protection, then, ceases to be the key problem of
minority protection, and the focus of interest moves to issues
connected to the relation between the majority and the minority,
issues of communication between groups, and the building of
efficient social mechanisms of control and regulation.
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as best, and when speaking of formal legal
protection, according to their assessment,
things are worst in the case of the protection
of the formal rights of sexual minorities. The
lowest assessment was given to the
accessibility of infrastructural support provided
by the state to associations and activities of
sexual minorities, and the inclusion of
members of sexual minorities in decision
making when their rights are at stake.
The Croatian system of protection of national
minorities, although not fully legally consistent,
has certain values which make it admirable.
However, there are more legal inconsistencies
when we speak about the relation between
the Constitution and the Constitutional Act
on the Rights of National Minorities. The most
important inconsistency of the constitutional
model is the fact that although the
Constitution provides for the passing of only
two constitutional acts - one on the
Constitutional Court, and one on the
implementation of the Constitution - there
are two additional acts (besides the
Constitutional Act on the Rights of National
Minorities, there is also the Constitutional Act
on Cooperation with ICTY). Even though the
drafters of the Constitution did not foresee
this, which is an indicator that the
constitutional-legal solution of the problems
of national minorit ies is primari ly a
consequence of international pressure, and
not a reflection of the “intrinsic” political need
to resolve an important segment of internal
politics, the Constitutional Act was adopted
through the procedure necessary for the
adoption of organic laws. This fact alone
strongly guarantees the stability of the legal
regulation of minority rights.
Another inconsistency in the Croatian
constitutional-legal regulation of minority rights
is the fact that the Constitution, in its
Preamble, lists the national minorities which
are recognised as having the status of
“autochthonous” national minorities: “the
Republic of Croatia is established as the
national state of the Croatian nation and the
state of the members of autochthonous
national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks,
Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans,
Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians and
the others who are its citizens, and who are
guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian
nationality and the realisation of national rights
in accordance with the democratic norms of
the United Nations Organisation and the
countries of the free world.” The Constitutional
Act, however, when dealing with the rights
of national minorities, does not mention
“autochthonousness”, which is in any case
The Constitutional Act was adopted through the
procedure necessary for the adoption of organic
laws. This fact alone strongly guarantees the
stability of the legal regulation of minority rights.
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a disputable term in the
literature dealing with the
protection of minority
rights.
Most modern states
adopt the principle of
“autochthonousness” and allocate specific
minority rights only to the minorities explicitly
listed in the specific document (Constitution,
law), and only the minority which is situated
in a defined territory (not the territory of the
ent i re state)  is  considered to be
autochthonous, and only if this is a
homogeneous territory, settled through at
least three generations, and if its presence
is not the consequence of economic
migrations. The Croatian Constitutional Act
on the Rights of National Minorities, however,
does not derive the right to specific minority
protection from its being listed in a legal
document.
Article 5 of the Constitutional Act gives the
following definition of national minority: “A
national minority in the sense of this
Constitutional Act, is a group of Croatian
citizens whose members traditionally inhabit
the territory of the Republic of Croatia, its
members having ethnic, linguistic, cultural
and/or religious characteristics different from
other citizens and are led by the wish to
preserve these characteristics”. According
to this definition, each group of Croatian
citizens which meets these conditions may
exercise their rights as a national minority,
regardless of whether in the Preamble of the
Constitution they are mentioned as an
“autochthonous” minority. In this way, through
the Constitutional Act, the legislator
recognises minority rights in a significantly
broader sense than was the intention of the
drafters of the basic constitutional document.
This social advancement is a clear indicator
of the achieved increase in the openness of
society. Consequently, the issue of
constitutional and legal protection of the
guaranteed rights to perform activities
thorough which the members of national
minorities express their specific characteristics
is considered by the experts as the best
solution, not just when dealing with the formal
legal protection of minorities, but with minority
protection in general (average grade 4.73).
It is precisely for this reason that experts in
minority issues, unlike some politicians who
are members of minorities, do not stress the
issue of the Preamble to the Constitution and
the minorities listed therein as a significant
problem when exercising minority rights.
Minority rights, as collective rights, are
The issue of constitutional and
legal protection of the guaranteed
rights to perform activities
thorough which the members of
national minorities express their
specific characteristics is
considered by the experts as the
best solution, not just when
dealing with the formal legal
protection of minorities, but with
minority protection in general.
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Experts consider the legally guaranteed representation
of members of national minorities in bodies of local
self-government in regions with a larger share of
national minorities as one of the best solutions to the
problem of formal minority protection.
exercised first of all at local and regional
levels. The task of the national legislation is
to ensure the principle of the rule of law and
equality before the law, and national minorities
exercise their interests primarily in the areas
where they live. The right to representation
and proportional representation of national
minority members in bodies of local and
regional self-government had not been
resolved unti l  the adoption of the
Constitutional Act on the Rights of National
Minorities, or of the Act on the Amendments
to the Act on the Election of Members of
Representative Bodies of Units of Local and
Regional Self-Government on 14 March 2003.
When evaluating the current situation of the
protection of minority rights, experts consider
the legally guaranteed representation of
members of national minorities in bodies of
local self-government in regions with a larger
share of national minorities as one of the best
solutions to the problem of formal minority
protection (average grade 4.07).
When dealing with the formal protection of
the rights and freedoms of minorities and
marginalised groups, experts evaluate highly
the legal regulations which ensure the equality
of women (average grade 4.53) and the legal
guarantee of the equality of all religious
communities, and the free expression of
religious beliefs (average grade 4.37).
The equality-based relationship of all religious
communities with the state was graded much
lower (3.17). Unlike the legal protection of
the rights of national minorities and the formal
equality of women, which the experts assess
as relatively good, the legal regulation of the
position of sexual minorities was graded
significantly lower (average grade of 3.17).
In fact, the legal infrastructure is the least
weak element of formal protection of
marginalised social groups (which can, for
example, also be observed in the fact that
the availability of infrastructural state support
to sexual minorities has been assessed as
far worse than the formal legal regulation of
protection and equality. Therefore, experts
assess the actual efforts invested for the
inclusion of persons with disabilities into all
aspects of social life significantly lower than
the formal legal equality of marginalised
groups (average grade 2.97), as well as the
efforts to remove physical barriers for people
with disabilities (2.9) or the concrete will of
the political authorities also to promote and
protect the rights and freedoms of minorities
(2.79)
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Discrimination of
minorities and
marginalised groups
Article 14 of the Constitution is the first to
prohibit discrimination in the chapter dealing
with the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. “Everyone in the
Republic of Croatia shall enjoy all rights and
freedoms, regardless of race, colour, gender,
language, religion, political or other belief,
national or social origin, property, birth,
educat ion,  socia l  status or other
characteristics. All shall be equal before the
law”.
Although discrimination on racial, national,
religious, gender or other bases is prohibited
by the Constitution, experts assess the actual
situation in dealing with the issue of preventing
the discrimination of minorities and
marginalised groups as significantly worse
than the formal protection of minority rights.
The discrimination of women in career
promotion and employment, and the
discrimination of persons culturally determined
as a minority in becoming equally involved
in all aspects of social life is the least
prominent (both are given an average grade
of 3.17). According to this assessment, the
dependence of social mobility on gender is
one of the less prominent discriminatory
aspects compared to marginalised groups
in modern Croatian society (average grade
3.07).
Experts assess that the members of national
minorit ies, although exposed to a
discriminatory relation, are relatively more
protected in their career promotion in state
institutions (grade 2.77) then when employed
and promoted in general (2.63). Such an
assessment is probably the reflection of the
controversy that exists in the constitutional-
legal, or legislative infrastructure on the
protect ion of minor i ty r ights.  The
Constitutional Act, as an instructive regulation,
mentions the positive discrimination of
members of national minorities related to
employment in bodies of the state
administration, in the justice system and the
administrative apparatus of local self
government, in those areas where the minority
makes up a significant part of the population.
However, while in these areas (where the
minority makes up more than 15% of the
total population) the issue of proportional
representation of minority members in
representative bodies and bodies that
conduct executive  tasks of local and regional
self government is regulated by the Act on
Experts assess that the members of national minorities, although exposed
to a discriminatory relation, are relatively more protected in their career
promotion in state institutions then when employed and promoted in general.
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Local and Regional Self-Government, or by
the Act on the Election of Bodies of Local
and Regional Self-Government, laws and
subordinate regulations which relate to
employment in public services (education or
health care), bodies of state administration
(police, regional services of central authorities)
or the justice system do not regulate this
instructive constitutional-legal provision. Since
the Constitutional Act cannot be directly
applied, it is not possible to implement
measures against the discrimination of
minority members in employment, not even
in the state administration.
The principle of the rule of law is the main
principle for the organisation of an open
society, and legal protection is the basic
precondit ion for achieving a non-
discriminatory relation towards individuals
and groups. For this reason, experts also
assess as exceptionally important the
impartiality of the judiciary in proceedings
which involve minority members (6.97), but
also the value of trust in the justice system,
in other words, the confidence of national
minority members that they will not be
discriminated against in court (6.86). However,
the assessment of the actual situation is
significantly different from the assessment of
the importance of these two values. The real
impartiality of courts
in proceedings in
which members of
national minorities
appear as parties in
t he  d i spu te  i s
assessed by the
surveyed experts with a somewhat higher
grade (2.57) than the confidence of national
minority members that they will not be
discriminated against before courts on the
basis of their nationality (2.27). Therefore, the
mistrust of the members of national minorities
in the mechanisms of the rule of law and in
equality before the law is even greater than
the actual discriminatory practice of the justice
system.
Such a lack of trust in judicial institutions
leads to the situation where members of
minorities often do not even try to exercise
their legal rights, but reconcile themselves
with, and accept, the discriminatory practice
shown by other public authority bodies. The
conviction that the discriminatory attitudes
of state officials will not be sanctioned (the
probability of being dismissed for this reason
is assessed with the extremely low grade of
1.63 by the surveyed experts) also contributes
to this picture of the acceptance of this
discriminatory practice by minorities or
The principle of the rule of law is
the main principle for the
organisation of an open society, and
legal protection is the basic
precondition for achieving a non-
discriminatory relation towards
individuals and groups.
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Balanced and sustainable regional social
development is one of the three pillars
of the European Union, and the problem
of balanced social development is one
of its most serious structural problems.
marginalised groups.
Balanced and sustainable regional social
development is one of the three pillars of the
European Union, and the problem of balanced
social development is one of its most serious
structural problems. Although EU accession
is proclaimed as the most important political
goal of nearly all the political parties in Croatia,
the issue of equal and balanced social
development has not been stressed as an
important developmental and social issue in
political discourse. One dimension of the
imbalanced social development of Croatia is
related to its policy towards national minorities.
Although an attempt has been made,
especially from the position of authority, to
interpret this imbalanced social development
solely as a consequence of the war, the fact
is that it is particularly the areas inhabited by
a high percentage of members of national
minorities that lag behind most in terms of
social development. The care taken by the
state to contribute to the equal development
of parts of the country where a large number
of members of national minorities are settled
is assessed by the surveyed experts with an
average grade of 2.47. They also consider
that equal social development is exceptionally
important for the building of an open society
(6.73).
The surveyed experts assess that the
inequality of women is more prominent in the
family than in society in general (non-
discrimination in employment is graded with
3.17; in social mobility with 3.07; and non-
discriminatory practice in the family with 2.57).
People with disabilities are exposed to a high
degree of discrimination in employment, and
the discriminatory position of homosexual
persons is the most prominent when
compared to all minorities or marginalised
groups.
The Existence of control
mechanisms for the
protection of the rights of
minorities and
marginalised groups
Although Croatia, to a large extent following
international pressure, has mainly successfully
resolved the issue of the formal-legal
protect ion of  nat iona l  minor i t ies ,
notwithstanding the fact that the legal
protection of marginalised social groups has
remained largely unresolved, the basic
problem that arises is the question of building
supervisory mechanisms for the protection
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of minority rights. When evaluating the
situation in some segments of the protection
of minorities, experts in the protection of
minority rights give the lowest grade to the
condition of control institutions (an average
of 2.7, while the average grade of formal
protection is 3.8). This weak assessment is
made worse by the fact that the experts gave
a relatively good assessment to the
functioning of civil society when dealing with
the relationship towards minorities. The
existence and activity of civil society
organisations that deal with the protection
of the national and religious rights of minorities
is assessed with an average grade of 4.4,
and the activity of organisations dealing with
gender equality is assessed even higher -
with 4.67. Civil society organisations are less
well organised in terms of protection of the
equality of persons with disabilities. The
general public is significantly less sensitive
than civil society to minority issues.
The promptness of public reaction to cases
of the violation of the rights and freedoms of
national minorities was assessed with an
average grade of 2.93, the same as
compliance to laws guaranteeing the
protection of the rights and freedoms of
national minorities.
From the weak assessment of the situation,
in terms of the implementation of the law
(compared to the relatively well-assessed
sphere of formal protection), we may
conclude that civil society is much more
responsive and sensitive to the issue of
protecting the rights of national minorities
than are the institutions of the state in general.
The readiness and capacity of the
government to ensure that all minorities enjoy
their guaranteed rights in all parts of the
country was assessed much lower (average
grade 2.63). This case, where
the exercise of minority rights
is conditioned by the territory,
is perhaps most obvious in the
case of the Serbian minority
community exercising their
rights.
Four different (geopolitically
conditioned) groups can be
discerned in this minority, with
completely different opportunities in exercising
their rights. The Serbs from the Danube
region were granted their rights on the basis
of the Erdut Agreement and the process of
peaceful reintegration. In fact, the minority
there lives ghettoised, and parallel institutions
have been built (from kindergartens to
secondary schools, in terms of education)
for the two national communities. The minority
Civil society organisations are less well organised
in terms of protection of the equality of persons
with disabilities. The general public is significantly
less sensitive than civil society to minority issues.
Civil society is much more
responsive and sensitive to
the issue of protecting the
rights of national minorities
than are the institutions of the
state in general.
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is carrying the burden of difficult economic
circumstances, but is not socially excluded.
Serb returnees in areas where they used to
form a majority before the war, that is, in
areas that were defined as the districts of
Knin and Glina in the first Constitutional Act,
formally enjoy the rights laid down by the
Constitutional Act, but are actually completely
socially isolated, they have no chance of
finding a job, and no mechanisms of positive
discrimination are applied to them. In large
urban communities, Serbs are mainly
dispersed and are gradually being nationally
assimilated. Serbs arriving as refugees in
areas which had a mixed population before
the war and which are not passive and
isolated as the major part of the former
districts of Knin and Glina, find themselves
in the most difficult position. There, as for
example in the hinterland of Zadar, the
strongest pressure is made to prevent their
return, and state intervention is usually
missing. Due to this situation, the experts
gave the worst marks to the promptness and
efficiency of response of the state apparatus
(primarily the police) in preventing the violation
of minority rights and freedoms (an average
of 2.2) and the readiness of local authorities
to react in cases of violation of national
minority rights (the weakest grade: 2.03).
The relationship of the
majority towards the
minority and fairness of
public communication
The relationship of the majority towards the
minority is considered by the experts in
minority protection issues as the most
important question for assessing the
openness of Croatian society. The
assessment of the situation in this area is
significantly better than in the issue of the
construction of supervisory mechanisms of
minority protection, and is at the level of the
average grade of minority protection in general
(grade 3.0).
In terms of the relationship of the majority
towards the minority, experts assess that the
greatest advance in the opening of Croatian
society was made in this segment. The
indicator of the progress made in the opening
up of society is often seen in the increase of
the level of tolerance of the authorities, the
public and the media towards the Serbs and
some other minority communities. In terms
of progress, indications of the establishment
of political responsibility are more often
stressed than the increase of tolerance
towards marginalised groups.
The relationship of the majority towards the minority is considered
by the experts in minority protection issues as the most important
question for assessing the openness of Croatian society.
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The average grade for the relationship of the
media towards minorities is somewhat better
than the assessment of the overall protection
of minorities. Not instigating hate against the
members of minorities in the media was
assessed with the average grade of 3.03.
The relationship towards women in terms of
protection against proclamations of hate was
assessed with a significantly higher grade,
3.73, and experts assess that members of
sexual minorities are protected against
instigations of discrimination by the media
(2.7). Progress over the preceding period can
also be felt in terms of differentiating between
instigating and tolerating discrimination and
proclamations of hate, the former of which
encourages “concrete” acts against minorities
or marginalised groups. National minorities
today are also more protected from
proclamations of hate in the media (3.27)
than is the case with members of sexual
minorities (3.03).
The public has recently been significantly
more sensitive to issues of discrimination. In
this sense, sensitivity for issues regarding the
discrimination of women are assessed with
the highest grade (3.33), whereas sensitivity
to the discrimination of persons with
disabilities is given a somewhat lower grade
(3.13), sensitivity to the discrimination of
national minorities is significantly lower (2.60),
while the public is least sensitive to the
discrimination of sexual minorities.
Social distance towards the Roma minority
is worrying and has been assessed with the
lowest grade among all the mentioned
indicators. The detachment of the majority
in relation to members of national minorities
in general is significantly lower (2.87), and an
important indicator is that the social distance
of the majority from the Serbs, who used to
be the national minority
that was most exposed to
proclamations of hate and
political discrimination, is
now nearly at the level of
that towards other national
minorities (2.47).
According to the experts’
assessment, the “caution” of the members
of the majority towards sexual minorities is
significantly higher than the social distance
towards national minorities. Experts give a
grade of 2.4 to the benevolence of the majority
towards establishing connections between
the minority and the state to which it belongs,
and a grade of 2.6 to the readiness of
members of the majority to become involved
in the activities of national minority
The average grade for the relationship of the media
towards minorities is somewhat better than the
assessment of the overall protection of minorities.
National minorities today are
also more protected from
proclamations of hate in the
media than is the case with
members of sexual minorities.
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organisations, which is a clear indicator of
the integration of the minority into society.
Experts assess the present readiness of the
state to become involved in campaigns which
aim at raising public awareness of minority
problems as even worse than the relation of
the general public towards national minorities
(the average grade is only 2.07).
The sensitivity of the public to instances of
discrimination of members of sexual minorities
is assessed extremely low by experts, who
give it a mark of only 2.03.
Conclusion
In dealing with the evaluation of the openness
of society, the segment related to the
protection of minorities was assessed by
experts as best, with an average grade of
3.0. It was precisely in the segment of the
protection of minority rights that experts also
recently observed a relatively large number
of positive indications of progress in the
opening of society  (91 out of a total of 408;
only in the area of progress in the public and
the media were there more positive indicators:
140).
The fact that the issue of the protection of
minorities and marginalised groups is in the
focus of expert interest is also evident
because at the same time the largest number
of negative indicators of an open society, or
of a closed society, was observed in the area
of the protection of the rights of minorities
and marginalised groups. Experts observed
as many as 92 negative phenomena.
The issue of the protection of national
minorities, which was assessed as the worst
in the previous period when assessing the
functioning of democratic institutions and the
consolidation of the democratic order, is now
becoming less of a problem. The issue of
the protection of marginalised social groups
has fared much worse.
In the previous period, the focus of interest
was on building a legal infrastructure for the
protection of minorities by the Constitutional
Act on the Rights of National Minorities.
Through the adoption of this Act and the
conducting of additional elections for local
sel f-government,  thus establ ishing
representation/proportional representation of
national minority members in representative
bodies and executive bodies of local and
regional self-government, the system of formal
protection of minority rights has been nearly
completed. However, the issue of
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implementing the instructive regulation on
the positive discrimination of members of
national minorities in employment in bodies
of state administration, administration of local
self-government, public services and the
judicial system still remains unresolved.
Neither public sensitivity nor sensitivity from
the legislator may be observed in this issue,
nor is there a feeling of sufficient engagement
of NGOs representing minority rights and of
political parties which represent minorities in
the exercise of this right through laws and
regulations.
Although the focus of expert interest is in the
relationship of the public towards minority
rights and their protection, the fundamental
problem, when dealing with the exercise of
minority rights, is the poor operation of control
and protection mechanisms, or even the lack
of such mechanisms at all. The greatest
improvement in the development of minority
protection has been achieved in terms of the
public, primarily the media, first in limiting the
space for proclamations of hate, and then,
in the gradual growth of public awareness of
minority issues. The positive processes and
progress achieved should be consolidated
in the future to become a strong trend rather
than merely sporadic hints. The greatest
problem of civil society still resides in how to
strengthen the mechanisms of minority rights
protection. While the NGO sector is relatively
strong in dealing not only with the protection
of the rights of national minorities but also
with marginalised groups, the general public,
and especially political circles, do not have
a feeling for the importance of building
protection mechanisms, nor a readiness to
offer any prompt or efficient response in the
event of the violation of the rights of the
members of minorities and marginalised
groups. What is particularly worrying is the
belief in the inefficiency of the justice system,
as a control mechanism, and in the lack of
impartiality in trials involving members of
minorities. The problem becomes additionally
complex through the high level of mistrust
that members of minorities have in the
neutrality of the justice system.
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Media
Zrinjka Peruπko
The position and role of the media in the
political and public life of the community is
an important indicator of the state of the
openness of society. The opportunities for
free discussions on any topic, important both
in the individual and in the collective life of
citizens and society, are essential for making
quality decisions, not only in the normative
democratic and media domains, but also in
t h e  e v e r y d a y  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f
citizens. Openness of public discussion,
which is in modern and complex societies
carried through and with the help of the
media, is necessary for ensuring normal social
change and development in a democratic
society. This makes it possible for decisions
to be taken on the basis of known information
and argumentation, and to change those
decisions which no longer serve the common
cause and which are not the wish of the
citizens. Openness of the media system is
closely linked to its pluralism and diversity,
which presupposes that different groups and
diverse and opposing ideas may participate
in the media and the public sphere. 
As we have defined open society as a civil
society where all citizens can take part in the
social sphere and participate in the public
sphere, and where they can freely discuss
any topic, it is clear that the role of the media
is transversal, i.e. broader than an analysis
of a single area of societal activity. On the
other hand, the role of the media is only one
part of the aggregate evaluation of the
communicative openness of society, and
therefore elements of this important segment
are also found in other areas of this research
project.
This study has shown that the glass of media
openness in Croatia is half-full (or half-empty,
if you wish). There is positive movement, but
with it, some unresolved problems have been
identified.
Methodological
digression for a better
understanding of the
accomplishment of this
analysis and the data on
which it is based
The analysis of media openness is based on
three types of
empirical data:
• The first group of data is based on
experts’ opinions collected by means of a
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questionnaire, and which represent answers
to closed-type questions, where the experts
had to rank the importance of a certain area
for media openness, and to rank the extent
of its application/presence in Croatia. Based
on this part of the opinions of experts (21)
who responded to this survey, in this report
we can construct an ideal model of openness
of society in the aspect of media in Croatia.
• The second part of the expert data is of
a qualitative type and pertains to answers to
the open questions on possible activities by
which media openness in Croatia could be
improved, and on the potential leaders or
protagonists of those activities.  
• The third group of data comes from a
public opinion poll, where, in the dimension
of media, the goal was to record the
understanding and readiness of citizens for
media openness.
On the basis of these three groups of
empirical data, we can obtain an insight into
how media experts in Croatia perceive an
ideal system of media openness, how they
evaluate the situation in Croatia with respect
to that ideal model, how Croatian citizens
understand media openness, and what their
opinions are on the subject. Considering that
this study in the dimension of media was
conducted on a relatively small number of
expert subjects, the results and the
interpretation are preliminary, indicative and
encourage further systematic research on
the subject matter in Croatia and in the
world. 
The initial definition of
media openness: the
meanings and the
explanation of criteria for
the dimension of media
The openness of society in the area of media
is defined according to five basic criteria:
independence and autonomy of the media,
media professionalism, openness of the
media market (absence of monopolies),
openness of media programmes and editorial
policies, legislation in the media system, and
effectiveness of civil society institutions.  
Each of these criteria embraces not only the
treatment of the media and the media system
by the state, but also the role of civil society
and the media itself in the development of
openness or closure. 
In the last decade, the question of media
independence has been one of the key
questions for the building of a democratic
media system in Croatia. As in other new
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
The openness of society in the area of media is defined according to five
basic criteria/areas: independence and autonomy of the media, media
professionalism, openness of the media market (absence of monopolies),
openness of media programmes and editorial policies, legislation in the
media system, and effectiveness of civil society institutions.
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prior to the democratic transition, the media
systems (mostly, except for some alternative
media) were part of the sphere of the state,
and not society, especially not civil society. As
we have initially defined transition as a process
of conquering civil society, in this context the
attaining of independence of the media in
the past was primarily connected with
independence from the state and
politics. This independence is reflected in
the absence of political or state/political party
influences on the editorial policies of the
media, particularly those of the major press
and public television media.  Media
independence today is gaining even wider
significance than political significance, and
the question of the owner’s (non-permitted)
influence on media editorial policies is ever
more present as a threat to achieving
independence. Naturally, the possibility of
complete independence of media institutions
from other institutional centres of power in
society, mainly economic, is disputable.  For
that reason, media professionalism,
understood as being respectful of the basic
ethical norms of the journalist’s profession
to publish and announce objective information
in an impartial and rational way, is an essential
element in the construction of a model of
media openness and in the assessment of
media openness. In today's European
societies affected by globalisation (Croatia
included), the power of the media is, or is
becoming, stronger than political power. That
is why the importance of media responsibilities
is  becoming ever  greater.  These
responsibilities include the journalists’ and
editors’ ability to make assessments, and
also relate to their level of education, as well
as their lack of conformism to political or
economic authorities.
Global trends in media concentration are
reducing the number of owners of global
media corporations which control all types
of media from sound carriers to the television
picture, books or radio programmes. Apart
from distribution, these companies control
(through stocks or different kinds of ownership
or supervision) both production and pre-
production in the media industries. On the
global level, a frequently-raised question is
how to offer protection from a different kind
of dependence, that of (over)powerful media
corporations. Therefore, in order to analyse
media openness, it is important to analyse
the openness of the media market, the
possibility for new players to enter that market,
and the absence of monopolies.  In fact, a
monopoly causes a closing up, especially in
the media system in which a variety of forms
of ownership and control are prerequisites
for the idea of pluralism (which is in fact
openness). Media openness, in terms of its
programmes and content,  means openness
to ideas that are different, to a richness of
views and political options, to minority groups
(in all forms, from ethnic to sexual), to social
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groups with specific needs, to civil society
and its organisations. This criterion shows
the readiness of the media to open up to
societal pluralism, which is undoubtedly a
characteristic of every modern democracy
and developed civil society. The effectiveness
of civil society in the sphere of media is also
incorporated in the criteria that reflect the
openness of the media system.  The criteria
for media openness reflect programme
openness, an ear for what is different and
diverse, and the way in which the media are
approached. The criteria for civil society
effectiveness refer to the influence of
organised civil society on social reality (in the
sense of influencing media legislation), the
freedom to organise and the freedom to act
(journalists’ unions in all the media), and the
possibility for civil society to control and
influence the media itself (as is the case in
HRT- Croatian public radio and television).
While the above-mentioned criteria reflect
the current situation of openness of society
and media, legislative criteria deal more with
the openness of the state/political sphere
and the quality of legislative solutions in the
media system. In a democratic society, the
state has the duty to provide a legislative
frame to ensure the undisturbed functioning
of the media, to ensure and guarantee their
independence, to protect the openness of
the media market, and ensure protection for
the journalists in carrying out their professional
tasks. Therefore, indicators in the area of
media legislation include transparency in
making decisions that affect the media
(including those of public legislative bodies
related to the procedures of obtaining radio
and television licences), the quality of
applicable laws, the openness of the
state/political sphere to the influence exerted
by the professional public in the construction
of a legislative framework, and the quality of
jurisprudence in claims made against the
media and reporters.
Each criterion is operationalised through a
given number of indicators in the form of
questions (from 3 for civil society to 21 for
media openness). For each criterion, one
question was devoted to the assessment of
importance and the empirical state of social
awareness of the criterion. In other words,
although legal acts are the bases that regulate
the  sys tem,  the  re l a t i onsh ip  o f
state/politics/owner is important, while media
activity itself isnecessary for openness; it is
the social climate or public opinion on a
certain issue that can sometimes be of crucial
importance in determining the direction of
societal development.  In this sense, when
dealing with the openness of the media,
without serious public support of tolerance,
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pluralism and non-violence in public dialogues,
etc., it is difficult to expect significant progress
in these areas. Naturally, a crucial point in
this situation is the relation between the social
climate/public opinion and the media and
others who define the public agenda (primarily
the political sphere, and in the ideal type it is
the civil society that participates). To date,
who has primary influence over whom in this
story has not yet been scientifically proven,
but it is obvious that there is a positive
correlation between the social climate and
the media agenda. 
The importance
of media for societal
openness
According to the opinion of all the experts
surveyed, the rule of law is the most important
dimension for the openness of society, while
economic freedoms and entrepreneurship
was labelled as the least important. The
media and media freedom are positioned in
fourth place on the scale of importance for
the openness of society, immediately after
transparency and the democratic quality of
political processes and education, while the
freedoms and rights of marginalised social
groups and the economy were ranked after
the media.  The differences between these
four areas are insignificant, so it would be
inappropriate to conclude that the media are
not given a fair share of importance.1 It is
characteristic (and expected) that experts
mostly evaluated their area as more important,
that is, they gave their area more importance
for openness on the whole than their area
was evaluated in the entire research. Within
the field of media and media freedom, experts
had relatively different evaluations; in fact,
the deviation in the evaluation of the
importance of the media system is the
greatest when compared to all other areas.2
Croatian citizens see media freedom as even
less important for complete openness, and
they place it in fifth position; the media was
better placed only than minority rights.  The
results show that 57% of the population
believe that media freedom is extremely
important for the overall openness of society.
(For example, the most important is the quality
of an educational system that is equally
accessible to all, and 72% find this to be
extremely important; next is democratic
political decision-making, followed by the
rule of law, economic freedom; last is minority
rights, which 39% of the subjects find
extremely important).
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Some media in Croatia should be
banned.
A state commission should be
established to oversee that the
media does not make public
something that may be against the
interest of the state.
Public, national television should
not take a critical view on the most
sacred cause in our society, such
as the War for Independence.
It is good that all major social groups
can express their views and
problems through the media.
It should be possible for all social
groups, including homosexuals or
Jehovah’s witnesses, to express
their views and standpoints about
various social issues
I do not agree
at all
Generally, I
do not agree
DO NOT AGREE AGREE I completely
agree
37,50 %
32,90 %
24,50 %
3,00 %
18,10 %
17,00 %
17,30 %
16,10 %
3,40 %
12,80 %
54,50 %
50,20 %
40,60 %
6,40 %
30,90 %
23,80 %
28,50 %
35,40 %
74,70 %
40,80 %
11,90 %
13,50 %
14,90 %
36,00 %
21,60 %
11,90 %
15,00 %
20,50 %
38,70 %
19,20 %
I mostly
agree
Table 1  - Degree of agreement with statements
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It is evident in the respondents' answers to
questions relating to openness and freedom
of the media that there is a large percentage
of those who think that it is right for all
significant social groups to be able to appear
in the media. The percentage of those who
would allow the same for marginal or minority
groups is much smaller. Citizens are mostly
against the idea of banning media, or having
the state control the media, although 28.5%
agree that the media should not publicise
anything that may be against the interests of
the state. This tells us that there is a
considerable percentage of citizens who still
do not accept the idea of an open
society. However, these results are only
indicative. To analyse the public’s standpoint
on these issues, more detailed research of
public opinion would have to be conducted.
The open media
model
By constructing criteria for the individual
dimension of social activity, which are included
in the analysis of societal openness, we have
also actually suggested elements of an ideal
openness of society as well as an ideal
openness of each individual dimension.
Based on the experts' assessments, we can
draw conclusions on the importance of each
individual dimension and criterion for societal
openness and for the openness of the specific
dimension.
What is most important for media system
openness is media autonomy and its
independence from political and economic
interests, professionalism and media
rationality, and openness of the media market,
that is, the absence of monopolies.  In
assessing the importance of these criteria
for media system openness, the assessments
by experts are in accord, that is, there is very
little deviation among experts, so we can
conclude that among the professional
community there is a high degree of
consensus that these three criteria are very
important for media openness.  Following
these, the most important is programme and
editorial autonomy, followed by the quality of
media legislation. Civil society efficiency is
considered the least important among the
suggested criteria that define openness of
the media system.  In the last three criteria,
deviations in assessments of experts are
somewhat greater, which shows that among
them there are more of those who give greater
importance to the role of civil society
institutions for media openness, or to the
quality of media legislation.3
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Figure 1 - The importance of all indicators of
media openness
1. Autonomy and
independence
2. Professionalism and
rationality
3. Absence of
monopolies and
equality
4. Media Openness
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
23
19
16
Arithmetic mean of assessment of importance (total points = 100)
5. Quality of media
legislation
6. Effectiveness of civil
society institutions
18
14
10
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Although the results of this study, which was
conducted for the first time, are only indicative
and may merely indicate trends, we can
nevertheless engage in a kind of interpretation
of our view of an ideal type of media openness
in Croatia. The most important criterion for
media openness in Croatia is believed to be
independence of the media from political and
economic interests,  inc luding the
independence of the main print media and
that of public and commercial television
stations.  Naturally, the possibility for media
independence is directly linked to the
advancement of political democratisation,
because media independence from the
political system depends firstly on political
will, and only then on the will of the media.
The second group comprises criteria that
deal with the media themselves.  This
suggests that the media (including their
professional organisations and associations,
such as Hrvatsko novinarsko druπtvo (the
Croatian Journalists’ Society) and Sindikat
novinara Hrvatske (the Croatian Journalists
Union), are a key factor in achieving media
openness.  The significance given to media
professionalism in Croatia, in combination
with independence which is ranked first,
could be interpreted in two ways.  Firstly, as
progress from the time when we expected
that legislative acts themselves would
satisfactorily shape the media system
(including objective reporting, readiness to
publish answers, including thoughts/ideas
coming from the other side, etc.). Secondly,
as a warning signal that the long-sought
independence and professionalism in the
media and are still not present (this will be
discussed in detail in the analysis of the state
of media openness).
Questions relating to the diversity and
pluralism of media in the evaluation of
importance fall somewhere in the middle.
According to the experts’ evaluations, the
openness of editorial policies, openness of
the media market and the absence of
monopolies are very close to one another in
terms of their significance.  Based on these
results, we might assume that in the future
greater significance might be given to these
two criteria, which is to say the question of
med ia  i ndependence  and med ia
professionalism will be less problematic. In
this way, increasing importance will be given
to the criteria of pluralism and media diversity
(which directly reflect openness for different
participants in the media system and for
various ideas that are discussed openly).
The last group comprises the quality of media
legislation and the effectiveness of civil society
institutions.In terms of interpretation, it is
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quite difficult to analyse these two criteria. In
assessing importance, we can assume that
there is awareness that the quality of
legislation is a necessary condition for an
open media system, although this is not
enough in itself. In interpreting the lowest
position of importance, the effectiveness of
civil society (although the differences on the
scale from 1-7 are very small, i.e., the
importance of civil society has an average
rank of 6.23, and the autonomy and media
freedom 6.3), we should take into
consideration the very high evaluation of the
social climate (6.38), i.e., how much the
general public really cares about the
effectiveness of civil society institutions in
relation to the media. Experts assume that
the public should place great importance on
the issue concerning how successful civil
society organisations in the media are.
The results of the experts' evaluations for the
area of media point to the importance of
individual criteria for media openness, and
show the importance of indicators for each
criterion. The indicators, which, for the
purposes of the study, were established as
statements that the respondents had to rank
on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the least
important, and 7 the most important, also
show society's expectations of the media
that actually exist in Croatia.4 Consideration
of these results reveals, for example, that in
Croatia it is not particularly important for
commercial television channels and the most
influential political weeklies to be independent
of political or economic interests, and that it
is not expected of them to pay more attention
to issues concerning the equality of ethnic
or sexual minorities or gender equality.5 How
much attention editors of commercial
television pay to the work of civil society
institutions is also considered as somewhat
less important. It is safe to conclude that
much greater participation in societal
openness (we could relate that to the social
responsibility of the media) is expected from
public television and the daily print media,
while commercial television and weeklies are
allowed  to stay in the sphere of entertainment.
It would be interesting to compare these
expectations/values with those of other
countries.
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The state of media
openness in Croatia
What we can conclude on the basis of the
data obtained is as follows. On one hand,
there is the experts' understanding of the
ideal type of media system openness (which,
by the nature of things, is related to the
empirical situation, meaning that only by
repeating this research in other countries will
it be seen whether the criteria for media
openness will rank similarly). On the other
hand, there are the experts  assessments of
the compatibility of the Croatian situation
with the desired ideal state.6
Considering, however, that this study was
conducted for the first time, it is difficult to
generalise on the comparative success in
achieving media openness in Croatia.
In evaluating the state of media system
openness in Croatia, the total mark for
individual criteria ranges from 3 to 3.6 (on a
scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents not
present at all in Croatia, to 7 which represents
widely present in Croatia). The best average
mark was given to the quality of legislation
in the media system, followed by media
autonomy and independence, while
professionalism and rationality share the same
grade (3.2). Also sharing the same mark with
each other are openness of the media market,
absence of monopolies and the effectiveness
of civil society institutions (3). However, we
are talking about average marks, while
deviations from the average are relatively
high, i.e. consensus among the experts about
the assessment of the state of media
openness is quite low (as opposed to relatively
high concordance in the assessment of the
importance of certain criteria we discussed
earlier). These data show that although there
is significant agreement about the expectation
of the role of media and its contribution to
societal openness, there is no consensus in
the evaluation of the state of media openness
and media freedom. We find the highest
disagreement in the question of media market
openness and the (non)existence of
monopolies, where differences in assessment
are as much as 54%, the highest of all criteria
in the entire study. Generally, in the field of
media, the degree of consensus on the
evaluation of the present situation is lower
than in other areas of the study.
Within some criteria, the average marks were
mostly between 2 and 5. The lowest marks
(between 2.0 and 2.9) were given to the
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independence of political weeklies and dailies
covering economic interest groups, the
development of investigative journalism, the
readiness of the weeklies to publish reactions
on the same page and in the same location
as the original text. Equally low marks were
given to the coverage by the media of minority
groups, or their equality, and of civil society
and its activit ies. Furthermore, the
independence of press distribution chains
was given a low mark, and in relation to other
indicators of openness, the quality and
effectiveness of independent institutions in
charge of market competition and the
readiness of executive power to engage in
preventing media monopolies and preserving
equality in market competitions received a
grade below 3.7 In the legislation  package
, the lowest marks were given to the possibility
to obtain licences for radio or television
broadcasting without a political lobby, and
to the quality of court practice in claims
against journalists, and the quality of the
criminal code in articles relevant to media
freedom. It is also indicative that there still
exists a tendency for the executive branch
to put pressure on the political media (the
average mark for this item is 4).
Experts gave best marks to HND (the Croatian
Journalists’ Society), whose independence
was marked with the highest average grade
in the entire media sample (5.41), followed
by the political independence of the largest
journalists’ union (grade 5.18). HND’s
economic independence, or its independence
from other interests, received marks from 4
to 4.9, and the independence of Croatian
radio television from certain economic or
interest groups (its political independence) is
marked with 3.71, the political independence
of commercial television stations, as well as
the impartial ity concerning election
campaigns, received marks above a solid
four. Objectiveness and professionalism in
reporting news programmes by public
television is also marked highly (4.12). The
general state of media freedom also received
a relatively high mark of 3.88.
In combining the assessment of importance
and the assessment of the state of affairs of
individual criteria for media openness, a
preliminary impression is gained about what
is important in Croatia for the openness of
the media system, and which elements
function better, and which do not function
so well. It appears that some of the
prerequisites for an open society are present
to a certain degree. The activities of
professional journalists’ associations (the
society and the union) and their political and
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economic independence areat the very top
of the positively realised indicators. This is
followed by the objectiveness, professionalism
and economic and political independence of
the public HRT (Croatian radio and
television). Considering the problems that
HRT had with independent and professional
journalism in the 1990s, this represents a
significant move forward. Since, in European
frameworks, the role of public television in
ensuring pluralism and diversity of media
content, programmes and ideas is one of
the basic factors of balance in increasingly
commercialised media systems, such a result
may offer positive expectations for the
development of a truly open media system
in Croatia.
The general state of media freedom and the
Media Act and the Electronic Media Act are
also among the first ten indicators within the
cross section of assessment of importance
and openness. This, however, does not mean
that experts consider further improvement
of these areas unnecessary.  
Similarly, experts have marked highly the
importance of the realisation of independence
and autonomy of the media as an asset in
the public sphere. There is no doubt that
serious improvement in overall social
development cannot be expected before the
values of an open society become part of
widely accepted social values. In the area
of media openness, it is precisely this
independence and autonomy that were
assessed as values already existing in the
public (and that is confirmed by the public
opinion poll), while some other values (for
instance, the need for effective action by civil
society, or market competition in the media
system) were poorly marked.
Conclusions and
recommendations
The last group of data to be analysed are
examples of open and closed societies
ident i f i ed  by  exper ts ,  and  the i r
recommendations for the improvement of
the present state of media openness.
In the examples of openness and closedness,
experts were not limited to the analysis of
their own areas, but also responded to
questions pertaining to other areas as
well. We observe that amongst the most
frequent answers in questionnaires and from
experts from non-media related areas are
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those about the growing influence and the
high-quality engagement of the public,
associations and the media. The higher
tolerance shown by the government, the
public, and the media towards Serbs, the
Roma, and other ethnic minorities or
marginalised groups is viewed as a positive
trend, but media reports on the minorities is
nevertheless considered inadequate. This
kind of evaluation can be linked to public
expectations of the media (experts' views),
where expectations are higher than what is
actually the case.
The positive role of the media is also
repeatedly mentioned in respect of disclosing
and reporting scandals, which have political
consequences, and therefore Government
sensitivity to public opinion is positively valued
in this respect. In the same manner, Minister
Æuæul’s resignation is repeatedly mentioned,
as well as the public and media support for
Helena Puljiz in the case of her being
interrogated by POA (Counter-Intelligence
Agency), the pre-empted direct deal with
Bechtel, etc. The active opinion of the media
in political cases and the increased political
independence of journalists, disclosure of
cases of corruption are also mentioned as
positive examples, in other words as
openness of the media and public
spheres. The treatment and interrogation of
journalists by the secret services in one
government after another are identified as a
negative example or as an indicator of a
closed society. In this, as in the other
examples mentioned, the distinction between
the public/media sphere and the state/political
arena is evident, so that in many cases the
negative moves of the government, which
are assessed as working against an open
society, are reflected in a positive light in the
public sphere in terms of open criticism and
information presented by the media.
Comments repeatedly show a positive
evaluation of HRT’s openness and its greater
independence from the government and
politics, and therefore indicate a higher quality
in reporting. Its independence in reporting
the election campaign is seen as an indicator
of opening, and in particular public resistance
to pressures on the editorial policy (examples
are Dnevnik (The Main News at 7.30), and
Zlikavci (a cartoon)). A negative mark was
given for removing the feature on Prime
Minister Sanader's acquisition of wealth from
the show Latinica in February 2005.  
The public debate on the opinion of the
Croatian Bishop Conference on human
reproduction was mentioned as an example
of openness, which experts consider as a
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sign of a strengthened public and also as a
mark of the influence of public debate on
politics. However, the influence of the church
on legislation in the same case was marked
negatively as an example of a closed
society.  
The influence of civil society organisations
on politics is also seen to be greater, and
therefore public debates are also assessed
positively. Also mentioned is the progress in
the prompt reaction by the government to
the display of fascist and Nazi symbols
(monuments), and predominant public opinion
which is against proclamations of hate and
the display of  such symbols and
monuments.  
In the recommendations for the improvement
of the present state, we can recognise several
groups of topics or areas that experts have
identified as important for the improvement
of openness in the media system. 
Recommendations and areas of improvement
for media openness: professional media
standards and improvement in the education
of journalists and editors; expansion of the
role of the civil society in media control in the
sense of ensuring that the media serve the
public interests; empowering the public
through the education of citizens (from pupils
and students to those who appear in the
media, including politicians) about the way
in which the media and its legislature operate;
reduction in monopolies in the print media;
improvement in the  transparency of owners
in the media; completion of the privatisation
process in the sphere of media (especially in
local electronic media which are partially
owned by local authorities); expansion of
media responsibility to publish denials;
abolishment of imprisonment for slander;
improvement in the quality of the news and
the entire media programme, and a reduction
of yellow journalism and sensational
journalism.
One area identified as important is the
improvement of journalists' educational and
professional standards, which would as a
result bring editorial policies to a desired level
of professionalism, objectivity and impartiality.
 The professional norm should be supported
as a goal and owners and politics should
influence editorial policies of the media as
little as possible.  Transparent media
ownership and control over trends in
monopolies should add to the quality of the
media programmes.
Generally, a higher and stronger role of civil
society in the public sphere is expected
through involvement in media programmes,
but also through media supervision.
The role of media associations and
organisations in the protection of freedom of
speech and of the press includes
strengthening the role of the Croatian
journalists’ society, while the idea of appointing
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a media ombudsman is proposed once again.
The growing commercialisation of public
television is assessed as negative, which
prompts the need for a quality improvement
in its programme for the purpose of becoming
a public service and completing the
transformation process from national to public
television.
The role of supervisory and regulatory bodies
(the programme council of HRT, the Council
for Electronic Media) in the domain of Croatian
media should be strengthened and improved.
 It should ensure quality, variety and pluralism
of programmes, and should ensure the better
representation of civil society.
1 We could conclude that the highest mark for the rule of law and legislation is a sign that Croatia is still in a
developmental stage, where both the rule of law and legislation are not inherently implied.
2 The arithmetic mean of the assessment of media importance by media experts is 18.9, with a standard deviation
of 6.441, which shows that experts had relatively different opinions on the importance of the media.
3 The variability of the evaluation of the importance of criteria for media openness ranges from 11% for professionalism
and rationality of the media, 12% for absence of monopolies and market openness, 13% for autonomy and
independence, 16% for media openness, 19% for the quality of media legislation, and 20% for civil society effectiveness.
The higher the percentage, the higher the number of various opinions, that is, the compatibility of opinions is lower.
The variability shown here pertains to answers to the question “estimate the importance of criteria for achieving ideal
levels of society openness”, with 1 being the least important and 7 being the most important.  The same question
was asked for all of the above-mentioned criteria/areas.
4 Awareness of this, theoretically, builds on the Croatian “normative media theory”, i.e. the set of expectations and
beliefs on the desired role of the media in society.  See Z. Peruπko »ulek, “Demokracija i mediji”, Zagreb: Barbat
1999, for the construction of normative media theories based on parliamentary discussion.
5 We must bear in mind that the differences in the ranking of importance are insignificant, that is, a difference of
about one mark from other significant issues.
6 Is there an ideal state of affairs, and where?  We cannot conclude that based on this study.  According to various
perceptions of media theory and various studies, no ideal open media system exists, and there are always topics
which are not discussed in the media.
7 Unfortunately, the question did not include the names of the institutions, so we do not know whether the subjects
were thinking of the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition or the Council for Electronic Media, or both
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Education
Tomislav Reπkovac
Openness in
education
There are several important assumptions in
this part of the study.
The first assumption is that education is one
of the generators of societal openness or
lack of openness in two ways. On the one
hand, the education system, as one of the
social sectors, can be more or less open and
can thus increase or decrease the openness
of society as a whole.
Similarly, the education
system has an impact on
the degree of societal
openness by promoting,
to a greater or lesser
extent, the values of an open or closed society
through the educational process, i.e. through
the content of curricula and methods of work.
Every system of education designs its final
product, education, at two levels. The content
of the first level is of a completely pragmatic
nature and relates to the usability and
usefulness of education in other subsystems.
In other words, in order for particular
subsystems (such as the economy, health
system, judiciary, trade and education itself)
and thereby the whole of society to function,
it is necessary to have a certain number of
people who can perform certain activities.
The quality of the education system at this
level is instrumental, i.e. identical to the
usability of its product.
However, together with this pragmatic level,
there is another level, of a completely different
nature. In particular, each system of education
promotes certain values on the basis of which
young people are educated to function in
society as a whole, but this time not as
experts in a particular profession, but as
members of the community. These values
are not manifested solely in the contents of
education, in the curriculum, but also in its
methods and organisational forms.1 The
degree to which this level of education is
different from the former one is seen most
clearly in the nature of its criterion of quality.
Here the criterion of quality has nothing to
do with efficiency, but only with the values
themselves, and the quality of the education
system is no longer instrumental, but intrinsic.
Put simply, at this level the system of
education is as good as are the values it
promotes.
This not only relates to indoctrination-based
systems of education of authoritarian
Education is one of the generators
of societal openness or lack of
openness.
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societies, but also to liberal democratic
societies. “In liberal democracy the state
undertakes to treat all its citizens as individuals
and all individuals should be treated equally.
However, in the developmental sense, human
beings are never primarily free and equal
individuals. Free and equal individuals, i.e.
human beings that perceive themselves as
such and act accordingly, are not found, they
are created… Of course, public education in
today’s liberal democracies has other goals
as well -primarily to create technical experts
and qualified workers that the modern
industrial economy needs. Still, the basic
political task of public education in liberal and
democratic regimes is the creation of citizens,
the creation of persons who see themselves
and others as free and equal individuals.”2
The second assumption is that education
itself can be open or closed. In other words,
certain characteristics of the education system
(goals, structure, curriculum, management
method, etc.) determine, to a greater or lesser
extent, the degree of openness of the
education system itself.
Finally, the third assumption is that
openness/lack of openness of education, as
well as its capacity to generate societal
openness/closure, can be identified in a
certain way. Namely, this study attempts to
d e t e r m i n e  t h e
degree of openness
of education by
determining to what
extent the six basic
criteria of openness are fulfilled by education.
A set of indicators is related to each criterion,
which determines the degree to which the
education system fulfils a certain criterion.
The criteria of openness of education that
the research uses are as follows:
1. Possibility of participation in education,
i.e. openness of the system to involvement
/ participation.
This implies: a) the ability of the system,
without discrimination, to provide education
for all citizens, independently of their
socioeconomic status, ethnic background,
place of residence, health condition or type
of educational needs; and b) the ability of the
system to meet all educational needs,
including specific/special ones.
2. Autonomy and efficiency. Autonomy is
defined as the ability to manage educational
institutions independently of political pressure,
and as the professional freedom of teachers
to implement the curricula.
Efficiency is the ability of the system to
adequately and sufficiently a) meet the
developmental needs of society; b) enable
Certain characteristics of the
education system (goals, structure,
curriculum, management method,
etc.) determine, to a greater or lesser
extent, the degree of openness of the
education system itself.
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Out of six selected areas which generate societal openness
(rule of law, politics, education, media, minorities, economy),
only rule of law was perceived as more important, whereas
education shares the second/third position with politics.
and stimulate personal development (self-
actual isation, creativity, freedom of
expression); c) achieve the educational goals.
3. Control and legality. Control primarily
refers to the control of the work of educational
institutions and teachers, including the system
of objective external evaluation and quality
control as well as the ability of users
(pupils/parents, students) to evaluate the
quality of the service provided.
Legality implies adequate legislative regulation
of the area and lawful activity of institutions,
including the suppression of corruption.
4. Pluralism. Pluralism is defined as
openness to difference. Pluralistic education
implies: a) pluralism within the system, i.e.
existence of various educational institutions
and curricula, possibility to select schools,
faculties and courses; b) a system which
promotes pluralism, i.e. its curricula and
methods promote understanding and
tolerance of cultural, ethnic, sex/gender and
physical differences.
5. Possibility and efficiency of public
discussion / dialogue refers to:
a) readiness and ability of the education
system to promote professional and laymen’s
public discussion on educational issues and
possible solutions; b) readiness of educational
institutions to participate in such discussions
by treating other participants as partners and
to take into account the results of such
discussions in the process of decision-
making.
6. Transparency and availability
of information.
Transparency implies primarily publicly
transparent (visible) work methods and
decision-making of state institutions, while
the availability of information relates to the
possibility of interested parties to obtain
correct and relevant information on education.
There are three key issues in this part of the
study: which characteristics should the ideal
education system have in relation to
openness; to what extent, according to the
opinions of the respondents-experts, is the
Croatian education system actually open;
and to what extent does the degree of the
openness of education affect overall societal
openness.
Regarding the final question, the results show
that the importance of openness of education,
according to experts’ opinions, is extremely
big. Out of six selected areas which generate
societal openness (rule of law, politics,
education, media, minorities, economy), only
rule of law was perceived as more important,
whereas education shares the second/third
position with politics.
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Figure 1 - Experts’ assessment of the importance of
the dimensions
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Description of the
ideal model
The description of the ideal model is made
on the basis of the analysis of experts’
answers to the question “which criteria, and
to what extent, should the education system
fulfil to achieve ideal openness”. The criteria
are: possibility of participation, autonomy and
efficiency, control and legality, pluralism,
possibi l i ty and eff ic iency of publ ic
discussion/dialogue, and transparency and
access to information. The degree to which
the education system fulfils a certain criterion
is identified by a set of indicators related to
a particular criterion. The experts were asked
to rank particular criteria according to
importance, and the results are shown in the
table:
The figure 2. shows that experts think that
the possibility of participation is the most
important criterion of openness of education.
Figure 2 - Experts’ assessment of importance of criteria
of openness of education
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The table shows that experts think that the
possibility of participation is the most
important criterion of openness of education.
On the one hand, this means that education
should be accessible to everyone, including
persons with special needs, persons of lower
socioeconomic status, members of national
minorities and persons from distant and less
developed regions. To put it differently, the
education system should be designed and
organised in a way that everyone can go to
school, no matter if they are healthy or in a
wheelchair, if they have or have not got money,
if they live in the centre of Zagreb or in an
isolated village in Lika, if they are Croatian,
Hungarian or Roma by nationality. In this
sense, the education system must provide
equality in access to education.
On the other hand, the results of the study
clearly show that access is a necessary but
not sufficient requirement. It is not enough
for education to be accessible to everyone,
it is necessary that it should be able to meet
the needs of various users to a similar extent.
This means that the education system should
be designed and organised so that it can
equally educate a middle-class child of
majority nationality with no developmental
difficulties as well as a child with special
needs, a blind child and a little Roma girl who
in the first class barely
understands the language
in which classes are taught.
in order to achieve openness, it is extremely
important for primary education to be available
to all citizens, no matter where their place of
residence is (6.78)3. In addition, it is highly
important for the system of education to be
able to remove the lagging behind of children
with unfavourable social status (6.59), for the
whole pupil population to have equal
educational conditions (6.52), for the system
of education to provide relevant knowledge
and experience to disabled persons with a
view to their successful integration in life
(6.48), and for school facilities to be physically
adjusted to disabled children (6.33).
Autonomy and efficiency are ranked second
on the scale of criteria. Autonomy in this
context implies expert/professional autonomy
of educational institutions in relation to politics
in the areas of management, design and
implementation of curricula. Efficiency of
educational institutions and the system as a
whole is their ability to achieve set goals.
It is quite expected that autonomy was ranked
high on the scale of criteria. The principle of
professional autonomy, freedom in
professional matters is extremely important
Efficiency of educational
institutions and the system
as a whole is their ability to
achieve set goals.
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because it allows the search for truth and
free discussion. This principle similarly reduces
the possibility of transformation of education
into indoctrination, which is a sort of ideal for
all closed, authoritarian societies, in which
the system of education is nothing but a
mechanism of reproduction of the governing
ideology, which owes its dominance
exclusively to political power.
However, what is relatively surprising4 is the
experts’ attitude in terms of the high level of
correlation between the efficiency of the
education system and its openness. Namely,
it is not hard to conceive of a system of
education whose efficiency would be relatively
low and openness relatively high. Similarly,
and perhaps even more easily, it would be
possible to conceive5 of an education system
of high efficiency but extremely low openness.
In any case, according to the results of the
study, the ideal education system would imply
autonomous universities (6.81), the high effect
of education on the development of freedom
of expression, self-actualisation and creativity
(6.70), independence of management
structures in educational institutions from the
centres of political power (6.59), de-
ideologisation of curricula (6.52), and the
efficiency of educational institutions in the
implementation of fundamental educational
goals (6.52).
The third criterion in importance is legality
and control. Legality here implies the
regulation of the education system by
adequate laws and the functioning of
institutions in compliance with these laws.
As for control, to a lesser degree it refers to
the control of the legality of work of
educational institutions and to a greater
degree to the quality control of educational
institutions.
Therefore, the results of the study suggest
that the ideal education system, in terms of
legality, should primarily and efficiently
suppress corruption in education (6.63) and
enable changes to be made of bad and low
quality regulations from the area of education
(6.52).
The results which refer to the importance of
qual i ty control are very indicat ive.
Respondents believe that it is highly important
for the education system to have developed
national parameters for assessing the quality
of work of educational institutions (6.41), that
in the procedures of official evaluation of the
quality of work of the teaching staff relevant
institutions should fully comply with the
prescribed criteria of evaluation (6.37), and
that students may evaluate the work of the
Legality here implies the regulation of the education system by
adequate laws and the functioning of institutions in compliance
with these laws.
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professor and the quality of studies (6.44).
The existence of a system of quality control,
which will prove to be even more important
in the part of the study which asks
respondents to suggest the most important
changes, is one of the key characteristics of
the ideal education system.
The fourth criterion in importance is pluralism
in education. Pluralism is here defined as
openness to difference and refers to the
readiness of the education system to include
different types of educational institutions,
programmes and methods, thereby allowing
users to have a choice, but also to raise
awareness of cultural, ethnic, world-view and
other differences, and stimulate tolerance for
them. Here, too, we can witness the dual
influence of education on societal openness;
by the mere pluralistic nature of the education
system on the one hand, and by the contents
and methods which promote openness to
difference and tolerance on the other.
According to the respondents’ opinions, the
ideal education system should, in educational
programmes and in the work of educational
institutions, stimulate tolerance of all types
of difference (6.78), by paying attention to
sufficient representation in educational
programmes of themes relating to sexual,
physical (6.41), and cultural and ethnic (6.33)
d i f f e rences .  I n
addition to that, the
education system
itself should be
pluralistic, allowing
for different educational programmes and
methods (6.41), and allowing students to
choose educational contents to a satisfactory
extent (6.37).
The fifth criterion is the possibility and
efficiency of public discussion in the area of
education. Here, we primarily mean
professional public discussion, discussion in
which all those who professionally deal with
education participate: relevant state
inst i tut ions, teachers, professional
organisations, NGOs, etc. The efficiency of
public discussion in this context means the
possibility to exert influence, by way of public
discussion, on decisions made by relevant
state institutions.
So, in an ideal situation, teachers would have
a possibility to initiate concrete changes in
the education system (6.59). Similarly, there
would be a high level of consultations of
professional organisations and other
organisations interested in the problems of
education in the process of passing laws
which regulate this sector (6.52), open
dialogue between relevant state institutions
Pluralism is here defined as openness
to difference and refers to the
readiness of the education system
to include different types of
educational institutions, programmes
and methods, thereby allowing users
to have a choice, but also to raise
awareness of cultural, ethnic, world-
view and other differences, and
stimulate tolerance for them.
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and interested professional organisations
(6.41), while representatives of organisations
of national minorities could participate in
designing educational programmes for
national minorities (6.33). In higher education,
students would be able to initiate concrete
changes for improving higher education (6.37).
2.6 The last and, according to the experts’
opinions, the least important criterion is
transparency and access to information. The
education system will fulfil this criterion
primarily if there is a
transparent system of
con t ro l  o f  wo rk  o f
educational institutions
(6.59) and certification of
textbooks (6.48). The public
should have access to
relevant information about
educational programmes
(6.56) and about the
educational results of the
pupil population (6.30),
whi le the Ministry of
Science, Education and
Sports should provide
information from its own domain to all
interested social subjects.
In brief, the ideal education system:
1. provides equality in access to education
and meets the needs of different users equally;
2. al lows professional autonomy of
educational institutions and to a satisfactory
degree achieves set goals;
3. compels educational institutions to act
lawfully, within the adequately regulated
legislative framework, with an adequate
system of quality control;
4. is open to difference, so that it is pluralistic
in itself and that it promotes tolerance to
difference;
5. enables professional public discussion
and takes into account its results in decision-
making;
6. makes decisions in a transparent way,
by allowing access to relevant information
on education to all interested parties.
The public should have access
to relevant information about
educational programmes and
about the educational results
of the pupil population, while
the Ministry of Science,
Education and Sports should
provide information from its
own domain to all interested
social subjects.
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Figure 3 - Ideal education system
in the sense of openness
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Evaluation of openness of education in Croatia
The evaluation of openness of the education system in Croatia was obtained by analysing
experts’ answers to the following question: “to what extent does the education system in
Croatia fulfil specific criteria of openness?” The criteria of openness are: possibility of participation,
autonomy and efficiency, control and legality, pluralism, possibility and efficiency of public
discussion/dialogue, and transparency and access to information. The extent to which the
education system fulfils a specific criterion is identified by a set of indicators related to a specific
criterion, on a scale of 1-7, where 1 means the criterion was not fulfilled at all and 7 that it
was fulfilled completely.
The extent to which a specific criterion was fulfilled
is shown in the table below:
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According to the experts’ opinion, the least
fulfilled criteria are the possibility and efficiency
of public discussion (2.39) and transparency
and access to information (2.62), followed
by control and legality (2.70), autonomy and
efficiency (2.72) and pluralism (2.86), while
the criterion of participation in education was
fulfilled in the highest degree (3.10). Generally
speaking, the degree to which certain criteria
are fulfilled is in the range from 34%
(transparency and availability of information)
to 44% (possibility of participation).
The criterion of possibility of participation in
education is fulfilled to a greater degree than
any other criterion. However, even here the
percentage to which this criterion is fulfilled
is only   44% (3.10 on the scale from 1 to 7).
This criterion, according to the experts’
opinion, is also the most important one. Its
importance is additionally highlighted if we
take into consideration the fact that, from the
last census, 40.37% of inhabitants older than
15 completed primary education, or even
less than that6.
As for specific indicators within this group,
we can observe an extremely weak presence
of indicators which show the ability of the
education system to provide adequate
education to disabled persons and persons
with special needs: the physical adjustment
of school facilities to disabled children is
extremely poor (2.04), the capacity of the
education system to ensure teaching
instruments and aids to children with special
needs is very low (2.58), just like its ability to
provide relevant knowledge and experience
to disabled persons, with a view for them to
be able to achieve successful integration in
life (2.96). In other words, the Croatian
education system, to a certain extent,
discriminates against disabled persons and
persons with special needs since they are
not able to exercise their right to education
to the extent that the majority population
does. Metaphorically speaking, this situation
is analogous to the situation
in which the first stair of the
school entrance is 3 metres
high, classrooms have no
blackboards or chalk, and
teachers teach first graders
the alphabet by writing
letters in the air with their
finger, while teaching is
done in one of the South
Chinese dialects.
One of the key reasons for this situation, both
at the normative (legislative) level and the
practical one, lies in the fact that this problem
The criterion of possibility of participation
in education is fulfilled to a greater
degree than any other criterion.
... we can observe an extremely
weak presence of indicators
which show the ability of the
education system to provide
adequate education to disabled
persons and persons with
special needs.
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is often solved in the humanitarian context
and not in the context of human rights.
Education of disabled children and children
with special needs is not a matter of one’s
good will and should not be left to
humanitarian activities of showbiz stars and
newspaper tycoons. Instead, education
should be perceived as their right and it
should therefore be the object of unconditional
state care.
The second evident problem, when it comes
to possibility of participation in education, is
the education of Roma children. The
availability of primary education to Roma
children is very low (2.74), while the
adjustment of primary education programmes
to their needs is even lower (2.15). It is
estimated that "about one third of Roma
children have never been included in any
form of education".7 It is difficult to provide
the exact percentage of Roma children who
complete primary education, since the facts
do not exist,8 but according to some
estimates it could be between 25 and 30%
(while the national average is 98%). If, apart
from that, we bear in mind the fact that a
relatively high number of Roma children attend
schools in segregated classes9 in which the
quality of teaching is significantly lower, it is
clear how the Croatian education system,
when it comes to participation of the Roma,
is highly exclusivist.
However, the ability of the education system
to provide equal conditions of education to
the overall pupil population is still evaluated
as relatively high (4.26), as well as the access
to education of all citizens regardless of their
place of residence (4.67).
The presence of pluralism in education was
evaluated by respondents, on a scale from
1-7, with 2.86. The explicit gap between the
importance and presence is seen in several
indicators. First of all, in two of the most
important indicators - promoting tolerance
toward all forms of difference (6.78) and
representation of topics which deal with
sexual and physical differences (6.41) - the
discrepancy between evaluated importance
and factual presence is extremely high.
Respondents evaluated the presence of
promoting tolerance toward all forms of
difference with 2.59, and the presence of the
representation of topics which deal with
sexual and physical difference with 2.74. It
is obvious that the education system is pretty
closed and insensitive to difference and that
to a great extent it perpetuates socially spread
stereotypes.10
The other two indicators with great
discrepancy between importance and
The availability of primary education to Roma children is very low,
while the adjustment of primary education programmes to their
needs is even lower.
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presence relate to the pluralism of the system
itself. According to respondents’ opinions, it
is very important to have a great number of
alternative educational programmes within
the system (5.67) and that pupils, to a
satisfactory degree, can choose educational
contents (6.37). Similarly, according to their
evaluation, alternative programmes are
underrepresented (2.48), and the possibility
for students to autonomously choose is very
small (2.37). Indeed, the Croatian education
system is extremely poorly diversified at all
levels. First of all, institutional pluralism is not
important. The differences between, say,
primary schools are almost nonexistent and
accidental and they are not a result of different
goals, educational philosophies or work
methods. This structural rigidity is a direct
consequence of curricular rigidity. Curricula
are not designed in a way that there is a core
curriculum at the central level and that the
remaining elements are left to the choice of
schools and pupils. Quite the opposite, all
schools of the same type must follow one
single curriculum, completely defined at the
state level. This certainly completely disables
any diversification of the offer, which then,
logically, eliminates all possibility to choose.
This is a very serious problem, because only
a diversified educational system can satisfy
evidently different educational needs. The
Croatian educational system is similar to a
restaurant which offers only one type of meat-
based menu, so that vegetarians can do
nothing but eat the side-dish and salad, and
leave the restaurant only a little bit less hungry
than they were when they came in.11
This type of rigidity is directly correlated with
an altogether specific and notoriously old-
fashioned concept of education, according
to which what should be standardised and
controlled is the educational process and not
the outcome of that process. In the Croatian
educational process everything is perversely
prescribed and standardised to the last detail:
what contents the teacher should work on,
what notions to use in doing that, the number
of tests pupils should take, how many grades
there should be and which
columns these grades need to
be written in. However, which
knowledge and competences
at the end of the educational
system pupils should acquire
is not mentioned in a single official document
pertaining to the Croatian education system.
This idea of educat ion has direct
consequences on autonomy and quality
control.
The Croatian education
system is extremely poorly
diversified at all levels.
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The degree of autonomy and efficiency, which
is the second criterion in importance
(immediately after possibility of participation)
was evaluated by respondents with 2.72 on
a scale from 1-7. The autonomy of institutions,
which is primarily perceived as independence
from political centres of power and political
pressure, is evaluated extremely low.
Educational institutions are still not protected
from the recruitment of politically-correct
principals (2.46), the independence of
management structures in educational
institutions from centres of political power is
still very low   (2.52), and curricula are still
not de-ideologised  (2.78). The degree of the
autonomy of universities was evaluated
somewhat more positively (3.59).
As for the second aspect of autonomy, the
possibility for autonomous action by teachers
and educational inst itut ions in the
implementation of educational programmes,
the situation is somewhat better (3.26).
However, we should note that in this area
there is a great legislative gap between tertiary
and pre-tertiary education. While universities,
i.e. faculties, have great authority not only in
the implementation, but also in the design,
of educational programmes, the situation in
secondary and primary education is
completely different. Primary and secondary
schools have no authority whatsoever by law
to design programmes.
In terms of the efficiency of the education
system, there is a striking discrepancy
between importance and presence of one
specific indicator. Namely, the high effect of
education on the development of the freedom
of expression, self-actualisation and creativity
of pupils is the second important indicator in
this group (immediately after the autonomy
of the university), whereas the degree of its
presence is evaluated with a mere 2.30
(presence of only two indicators in the group
was evaluated with a lower grade). What can
be inferred from this is that the education
system fails to achieve one of its basic tasks,
and that is to enable and stimulate the
personal development of pupils. Certainly,
there are numerous reasons for that, but the
complete lack of diversification of the system
is certainly one of them.
Two indicators which are the least present
are the freedom of primary school
programmes from “formal” contents (2.22)
and the efficiency of the education system
in educating Roma children (2.19).
As for the former, it clearly confirms that the
Croatian education system stems from the
already abandoned concept of information
based knowledge. Although in the last five
Educational institutions are still not protected from the recruitment
of politically-correct principals, the independence of management
structures in educational institutions from centres of political power
is still very low, and curricula are still not de-ideologised.
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years almost all education authorities have
stressed “a decrease of burden on pupils”
through “disburdening of the programme”12
as one of their priorities, no significant changes
have occurred, of course because no
significant change is possible within the same
conceptual framework. A significant step
forward would demand that the concept of
knowledge should be redefined in the
direction of competence based knowledge.
The inefficiency of the education system to
educate Roma children is a well-known fact.
The education system is so inefficient in this
area that it does not even dispose of basic
facts about its own inefficiency,13 but the
chances are that estimates according to
which the drop-out rate is so high that only
about 25 and 30% of Roma children complete
primary school and according to which at
the moment there are no more than 200
Roma children in the secondary schools of
the Republic of Croatia, are unfortunately
pretty accurate.
Control and legality are the criterion which is
ranked third in importance, whereas the
factual degree of control and legality in the
education system was evaluated by
respondents with 2.70.
The most important index within this group
is the inefficiency to suppress corruption in
education (6.63), the degree of which was
evaluated with a very low grade, 2.38. In
other words, there is no efficient mechanism
for suppressing corruption in education. This
result is quite different from the results
obtained by research conducted by
Transparency International Croatia,14
according to which the perception of the
degree of corruption in education, especially
in pre-tertiary education, is relatively low.
According to the perception of 71.3% of
respondents, corruption is spread and very
spread in the health care system, 69.5% of
respondents feel that way about the judiciary
and 54.2% about faculties, whereas only
22.5% of respondents fell that way about
primary and secondary schools.
It seems that the regulation of the education
system at the legislative level is not perceived
as being especially problematic: all three
indexes relating to it are significantly more
present than the others. So, the quality of
laws regulating primary and high education
and science are evaluated with 3.27, or 3.69,
while regulations referring to the education
of national minorities are evaluated with 3.84.15
However, the biggest problem in this area is
quality control. The most drastic discrepancy
between the importance and presence of
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the index may be seen in the degree of
development of rational parameters for the
evaluation of the work of educational
institutions: the importance of this index is
very high, 6.41, while its presence is extremely
low, only 1.89. This result is not surprising.
Quite the reverse, it is a logical consequence
of the fact that in the Croatian education
system, at any level, there exists no, not even
the least reliable, system of quality control of
educational institutions. The lack of
institutional autonomy in combination with
the lack of quality control directly generates
a situation in which the degree of
accountability of educational institutions
toward its users and the public is extremely
low, just like the possibility to intervene in an
efficient way in order to increase the quality
of work.
This problem is related to two additional
indexes whose presence is evaluated as very
low: the possibility of parents and pupils to
evaluate the work of teachers in primary and
secondary schools (1.67) and the possibility
of students to evaluate the work of professors
and the quality of studies (2.33). As odious
as the idea that pupils, parents and students
have a say about the quality of work of
teachers and professors may seem, we
should not forget that the education system,
just like, for example, the health care system,
provides a certain kind of public service and
that it is completely legitimate that its users
should be able to evaluate the quality of this
service.
Transparency and availability of information
is the criterion whose relevance is evaluated
relatively low: on the scale of the importance
of the criterion of openness of the education
system, it was ranked one from last. It is
ranked in the same position in the degree of
its presence in the education system, because
the factual presence of this criterion was
evaluated with 2.62.
Two indicators with the greatest discrepancy
between the degree of importance and
presence, but also with a very low degree of
presence in absolute terms, are the existence
of the transparent system of the quality of
work of educational institutions (1.93) and
the existence of a transparent process of
approving/certifying textbooks (2.04). The
first indicator was already discussed in the
previous section, so that at this point it is
enough to state that the lack of a transparent
system of quality control evidently generates
a closed education system. We have to add
that the indicator directly related to this one,
i.e. the familiarity of the public with the
educational results of the pupil population,
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is also evaluated very low (2.19). This is also
completely logical, because if there is no
system of quality control, and here we are
talking about controlling the quality of the
educational product (determination of the
educational achievements of pupils), then it
is quite expected that the public knows
nothing about the nonexistent results of the
nonexistent quality control.
In relation to the inexistence of a transparent
process of approving/certifying textbooks,
the results of the study simply confirm the
problems with which the (mainly) professional
public has been preoccupied for quite some
time. One part of the participants of the
discussion has pointed out that there are no
explicit criteria for the certification of textbooks
and that the existing legislation is very bad.
An additional problem in the whole story
about textbooks is (the real and potential)
conflict of interest of textbook authors who
are at the same time employees of the Ministry
of Science, Education and Sports, or of the
Institute of Education.
Finally, the criterion which, according to the
results of this study, is the least fulfilled by
Croatian education is the possibility and
efficiency of public discussion (2.39). One
part of the problem is obviously a result of
the reluctance of competent state institutions,
in the process of law making, to consult
professionals and other organisations
interested in the problems of education (2.26),
as well as the general lack of dialogue
between state institutions and professional
organisations (2.26). The possibility of
teachers to initiate concrete changes is
extremely small (2.33), as well as the degree
of teacher involvement in the process of
preparing draft laws in the area of education
(2.41). It is evident that state institutions,
primarily in the Ministry of Science, Education
and Sports, have not yet developed
awareness of the need to involve all
stakeholders in the decision-making process,
despite the fact that there is a series of
conceptual and pragmatic reasons for that.
To sum up, the Croatian education system:
1.  is not able to equally satisfy the needs of
different users, thus discriminating against
disabled children, children with special needs
and Roma children, who are in other aspects
one the most vulnerable parts of the
population. At the same time and to a much
greater extent, it is able to provide equal
conditions of education to all pupils,
regardless of their socioeconomic status and
place of residence;
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2. is not open to difference, since it does not
promote tolerance of difference, nor does it
itself enable pluralism of educational
philosophies, institutions and programmes,
including the possibility to choose;
3. does not provide the autonomy of
educational institutions in relation to the
centres of political power. In addition, it is
highly inefficient in the education of Roma
pupils, but generally it is inefficient in its
possibility to stimulate personal development;
4. does not know any system of quality
control, whether of the work of educational
institutions or educational achievements, in
which the whole area is regulated by relatively
inadequate laws;
5. decision-making is not transparent and
relevant information is not sufficiently available
to the interested parties;
6. does not stimulate professional public
discussion and especially does not take into
account its results in decision-making.
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POSSIBILITY AND
EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC
DISCUSSION:
DOES NOT STIMULATE
EXPERT PUBLIC
DISCUSISONS, IGNORES
THEIR RESULTS
PARTICIPATION:
DISCRIMINATION OF
DISABLED CHILDREN,
CHILDREN WITH
SPECIAL NEEDS AND
ROMA CHILDREN
AUTONOMY AND
EFFICIENCY:
DEPENDENCE ON
POLITICS, COMPLETE
INEFFICIENCY IN
STIMULATING PERSONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND IN
THE EDUCATION OF ROMA.
TRANSPARENCY AND
AVAILABILITY OF
INFORMATION:
NON-TRANSPARENT
DECISION-MAKING,
INSUFFICIENT
AVAILABILITY OF
INFORMATION
PLURALISM:
IT DOES NOT PROMOTE
TOLERANCE, DOES NOT
ENABLE CHOICE
CONTROL AND LEGALITY:
INADEQUATE
REGULATIONS,
NON-EXISTENCE OF
A SYSTEM OF QUALITY
CONTROL
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE CROATIAN
SYSTEM OF
EDUCATION IN
TERMS OF ITS
OPENNESS
Figure 4 - Characteristics of the Croatian system
of education in terms of its openness
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Recommendations
The proposal of recommendations is based
on the analysis of an ideal model of education
system in terms of openness, the analysis of
the evaluation of the degree of openness of
the Croatian education system, and on the
basis of recommendations formulated by
experts in a separate part of the questionnaire.
1. To radically increase the efficiency of the
education system in the education of disabled
persons and persons with special needs. To
eliminate physical barriers in educational
institutions, to equip educational institutions
with adequate facilities, to adapt educational
programmes so that disabled persons and
persons with special needs can obtain relevant
knowledge and experience necessary for
successful integration.
2. Radically increase the efficiency of the
education system in the education of the
Roma. To enable all Roma children a free
two-year preschool programme, to dismantle
segregated c lasses and introduce
programmes of assistance in learning. To
introduce a preferential quota for the
enrolment of the Roma in secondary schools
and universities.
3. To change curricula and textbooks so
that they present all kinds of difference in a
realistic and tolerant way.
4. Diversify the education system, enabling
a selection of different educational concepts
and programmes.
5. In primary and secondary education
change the structure of curricula so that only
one part should be defined at the central level
(core curriculum), while the formation of the
remaining part should be delegated to
schools.
6. In primary and secondary education
change the structure of curricula so that
elective courses are introduced.
7. To change regulations and practice to
enable a higher degree of work of educational
institutions.
8. Deregulate the teaching process and
introduce a rational and transparent system
of quality control in education.
9. Allow students, pupils and their parents
to evaluate the work of teachers and
educational institutions.
10. Make decision-making processes,
especially the process of certifying textbooks,
transparent and, as far as possible, public.
11. Allow all interested parties to obtain
precise and relevant information on the
education system and educational institutions
in a simple way (education web portal).
12. Initiate, organise and support public
discussions in which, on a partner basis, all
stakeholders in education will participate. To
take into consideration the results of these
discussions in making all important decisions.
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The results of the survey of the economic
dimension of the openness of society show
that Croatia still has the characteristics of a
closed society. Only 10.9% of respondents
from the sample of the general population
identify an open society with a society “...
which has no borders, in which there is
completely free movement of persons, goods
and capital,” and a large majority of
respondents from that sample advocate strict
restrictions in economic relations with foreign
countries.  On the other hand, an analysis of
expert opinion shows that out of six offered
social dimensions (politics, minorities, law,
education, the economy and the media) the
economy was rated as the least important in
defining an open society.
This work is an attempt to analyse the principal
results. We will try to assess the dimensions,
causes and consequences of such attitudes.
In the first part of the paper, we define the
perspective of the interpreter. The lens to a
certain extent gives shape to the image we
see, so for a correct understanding of the
text the reader should be aware of the
perspective of the values from which this text
was written. In this way, the text will be better
understood, and the critical analysis behind
it will be more valid. The second part of the
paper presents in detail the most interesting
results. The third part discusses their causes
and consequences, while the fourth part
draws conclusions.
On the Perspective of the
Interpreter
In an economic sense, an open society is a
society with a functioning free market. The
term often causes confusion. The advocating
of an open or free market is sometimes
incorrectly interpreted as advocating abstract
spontaneity in social and economic relations,
in which selfishness and hedonism receive
legitimacy which is superior to any collective
feeling, and the profit motive is set on a
pedestal of the highest social value.
Sometimes it is said that the proponents of
the idea of the free market consider that
spontaneity produces the best possible social
order without the influence of the collective
will (of the state). Hence this idea is wrongly
identified with abstract and vague concepts
such as anarchy, “the invisible hand”,
unscrupulous capitalism, or economic
Darwinism.
1 1 0
The results of the survey of the economic dimension of the openness of
society show that Croatia still has the characteristics of a closed society.
In order to avoid a chaos of terms, from the
start the following position should be stated:
naïve and dangerous faith in the fact that
pure spontaneity may create an ideal society
is as dangerous as striving to label any
advocacy for the functioning of an open or
free market as advocacy for an unattainable
ideal model. Each reasonable definition of
the economic dimension of openness (and
advocating it) has to start from several facts
which mark the real functioning of the modern
national and global economy. Frederich A.
Hayek had in mind the dimension of reality
mentioned above when he wrote:
“It is important not to confuse opposition to
this kind of planning and a dogmatic laissez-
faire attitude. Liberals advocate the best
possible use of the powers of market
competition with the aim of harmonising the
efforts of an individual. This argument does
not defend the situation as is. The liberal
attitude is based on the belief that competition
is the best way of directing individual efforts
where it may emerge. This attitude does not
deny, but stresses, that a good functioning
of the market competition system requires a
well designed legal framework, and that the
existing and inherited legal rules are not
devoid of serious deficiencies. This does not
deny that in conditions in which it is not
possible to create the conditions necessary
for market competition we have to resort to
other ways of managing economic activities"
(Hayek, 1944: 36).
So, the idea of the free market is not the
exclusive ownership of a dogmatic laissez-
faire. A true free market rarely emerges
spontaneously, because the markets are
rooted in existing social institutions. This
means that the functioning market reflects
the inherited family, political and other relations
of power. Finally, the distribution of power
generated by the market itself may sometimes
reduce the efficiency of its functioning (e.g.,
monopolies). Therefore, the efficient
functioning of a free market almost always
entails social effort in designing and
implementing the corresponding regulation.
There are also situations where the free
market cannot emerge, so society sometimes
has to use other means of articulation of
economic activities, such as state intervention
and hierarchical (central ly-planned)
organisation.1 However, before passing a
definite conclusion that the market has to be
replaced or limited by another means of
coordinating economic activity, several
important questions need to be answered
(Hayek, 1944: 37):
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1. Have the economic subjects enjoyed
freedom in purchasing and selling goods or
services at any price for which they could
find a partner for exchange?
2. Have the economic subjects enjoyed the
freedom of producing, selling and buying
anything that can be produced, sold and
purchased?
3. Has entry into relations of exchange been
the same for all under the same terms and
conditions?
4. Have individuals or groups prevented the
free entry into relations of exchange by open
or hidden violence?
If the answers to the first three questions are
“no”, and the answer to the fourth question
is “yes”, then the solution to the problem
may lie not in the restriction or suspension
of the market, but in an effort towards
improving its functioning: increasing the quality
of market information, preventing violence
inspired by interest which is pursued with the
aim of limiting entry into the market, etc. The
response to the question about why this is
the thing that should be done is outside the
domain of the narrowly understood economy.
Such a response stems from philosophy,
history and an analysis of the state. For
instance, Friedman (1962) saw freedom and
competition as a counterbalance to the
thriving role of the state which is intrinsically
prone to spreading its authorities and
bureaucratic controls over resources, and as
the protection of individuality and diversity
from which the progress of civilization stems:
“Columbus did not set out to seek a new
route to China in response to a majority
directive of parliament, though he was partly
financed by an absolute monarch ...no one
[of those mentioned] opened new frontiers
of human knowledge and understanding ...
in response to government directives. Their
achievements were the product of individual
genius, of strongly held minority views, of a
social climate permitting variety and diversity”
(Friedman, 1962: 15).
What do we get if we try to apply those
abstract principles in the real world? In it are
entangled tensions among national borders,
politics and geopolitical relations of power
on one hand, and cultural and economic
tendencies of globalisation on the other. In
such a world, is not the liberal argument a
great trick for the naïve who, by accepting
it, are caught in the trap of a “new world
order” which is by no means either open or
just? Or is this argument just “opium for the
people”, which fails to see what neo-Marxists
call the new, aterritorial capitalist empire
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(Hardt and Negri, 2000)? From this
perspective it is fully legitimate to provide a
warning that the world is not organised
according to the model of an open society.
If we adopt those tenets, and let us admit
that it is possible to find arguments for them
as well, the question emerges about how to
define “openness” in such a world and, more
concretely, how to define the “open market”
and the “open society” on the
level of a state, and how to
assess the attitudes of people
towards openness in terms of
values? I f  “open” means
“consumed”, “uni f ied” or
“uniformed”, then it may make
sense to be economically closed
towards the world. Particularly
if thereby openness “inside” and
global cultural and economic
diversity are preserved.
If the interpretation presented
above were relevant, we would
have a serious problem with the
interpretation of the attitudes of
closedness/openness. If closure “towards
the outside” in the brave new world represents
a prerequisite for (a) internal openness and
(b) preservation of global cultural and
economic diversity, then the attitudes about
openness/closedness cannot be interpreted
on a linear two-dimensional scale. This could
represent a serious methodological problem
in interpreting the results of this study.
Economic theory and policy know numerous
examples in which the described way of
thinking is translated into concrete economic
policy measures. The so-called “infant industry
argument” starts from the fact that domestic
industry, in its initial phase of development,
needs to be protected from stronger
competition from abroad until it can “stand
on its own feet” sufficiently well to fight in the
open, global market. The offshoot of this
argument is also the topical thesis on limiting
the sale of real estate to foreigners because,
allegedly, its value is currently underrated, so
domestic owners sell their property almost
for nothing, probably unaware that in several
years they will be able to sell the same
property at considerably higher prices. A
similar argument also permeates discussions
about the privatisation of banks and
telecommunications.
Although they are very open, these theses
face several logical problems. The proponents
of such positions as a rule do not explain
how the restrictions will lead to the desired
result, but imply that the desired result
If “open” means “consumed”,
“unified” or “uniformed”, then it
may make sense to be economically
closed towards the world.
The so-called “infant
industry argument” starts
from the fact that domestic
industry, in its initial phase
of development, needs to be
protected from stronger
competition from abroad
until it can “stand on its own
feet” sufficiently well to fight
in the open, global market.
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degenerates towards a kind of a mystic
automatism. It is generally not explained how
and why the protection of domestic industry
will be conducive to its development; how
such industries will stop being eternal
beneficiaries of implicit and explicit state
subsidies at the expense of taxpayers; how
the formation of powerful interest groups and
lobbies around them will be prevented; and
when the day will come when somebody will
proclaim that those industries are ready for
global competition without the assistance of
the state. It is not explained how the state
can be prevented from misusing (for who
knows how long) its influence over banks
and from directing money into failed projects.
Translated into the current problem of real
estate, the question emerges about how the
wealth of our people, without the opening
up of the economy and its integration into
the global economy, will grow so much that
in five, ten or fifteen years no one has the
need to sell real estate or that those who
want to sell it will earn more from it than they
would today.
Due to the lack of theories and, more
importantly, concrete empirical evidence
about the impossibility of avoiding the
deviations of state intervention indicated
above, pragmatic liberalism represents a
useable norm or benchmark for evaluating
the economic dimension of the openness of
society. If it turns out that the functioning of
the market inflicts real damage on the
community and if it is proved that a form of
restriction or replacement of the market by
another social coordination mechanism may
rectify the operation of the market, there is
no dogmatic argument for defending the free
market to the last breath - particularly in the
light of the functioning of the global economic
system. However, naïve axioms such as “the
loss of control over banks means the loss of
national sovereignty”, “in globalisation the
big fish eat the small fish”, “it is better for the
foreigners to have money and we the real
estate than the other way round” and “cottage
cheese and cream” are nothing more than
signals which invoke collective emotions, but
which do not lead to concrete and useable
recommendations for conducting economic
policy. Logical and articulated theories about
why and how restrictions and closedness
may lead to wellbeing are missing, and so
are the concrete recommendations about
the measures and mechanisms which need
to be activated in order to attain the declared
ob j ec t i v es .  I f  t he re  we re  such
recommendations, they could be discussed.
So, everything boils down to fighting ghosts,
where it is the general public that gets hurt
If it turns out that the functioning of the market inflicts real damage on the community
and if it is proved that a form of restriction or replacement of the market by another
social coordination mechanism may rectify the operation of the market, there is no
dogmatic argument for defending the free market to the last breath - particularly in the
light of the functioning of the global economic system.
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most, that is most confused and scared, and
whose attitudes waver like leaves swaying
in the wind. Perhaps citizens rationally feel
the danger of opening up too quickly, but
the intellectual and political elite does not
succeed in presenting this danger to citizens
in its real dimension. Instead of explanations
and objective assessments of this danger,
everything comes down to a barrage of
emotions set off by a sequence of triggers,
which arouses tremendous fear of openness,
and which is partially registered in this study
as well.
Returning to our initial definition of the free
market, we will understand more easily why
in this study the following list of four indicators
of economic openness were selected (the
order of enumeration shows the order of
importance attributed by the polled experts):
1. Control and lawfulness
2. Equality in market competition
3. Autonomy and efficiency
4. Possibility of participation in market
competition
Control, lawfulness, the possibility of
participation and equality of chances are in
no collision with an efficient free market. On
the contrary, to a great extent they represent
the prerequisites for its sound functioning.
The highest rank given to control and
lawfulness and the lowest rank to the
possibil ity of participation in market
competition indicate that Croatia still suffers
growing pains in the context of the
development of a free market. It is not easy
to distinguish whether the respondents
advocate control and lawfulness in the sense
in which their role was defined by Hayek, or
whether this is actually a manifestation of
paternalistic mentality and an invitation to the
state to act in those places and at those
moments even where and when it is not
necessary. Also, the lowest ranking of the
possibil ity of participation in market
competition may also be explained as an
underestimation of the role of concrete factors
of entrepreneurship, innovations and
launching new projects and firms, in
comparison with the somewhat more abstract
factors of control, lawfulness, autonomy and
efficiency. We will try to show in this paper
that, based on the survey of experts, it is
very difficult to draw definite conclusions
about openness/closedness, and the
changes in these aspects, because the
att itudes presented are sometimes
contradictory.
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Results
In addition to the fact that only 10.9% of
respondents from the sample of the general
population identify an open society with a
society “... which has no borders, in which
there is completely free movement of persons,
goods and capital,” even more worrisome is
the fact that only 17.6% of the respondents
either do not at all, or mostly do not agree
with the ban on selling Croatian companies
to foreigners. While 17.7% of respondents
do not know what to think about this ban,
as many as 17.9% mostly agree, and 46.8%
fully agree with a total ban on selling Croatian
companies to foreigners. As can be fully
expected, similar results are obtained in the
case of the protection of domestic production
and preferences given to domestic firms over
foreign ones in state public tenders. Such an
attitude of the general public may be
interpreted as a preference for a closed
society when it comes to international
economic issues.2
Research into the opinion of experts enables
more detailed insight to be gained into the
perception of an open/closed society. The
following table indicates the recommendations
for increasing the economic openness of
society which were most frequently indicated
by the polled experts from economic areas.
All recommendations appear two or more
times among the 92 recommendations
provided by 21 experts:
The highest rank given to control and lawfulness and the lowest
rank to the possibility of participation in market competition indicate
that Croatia still suffers growing pains in the context of the
development of a free market.
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Table 1 - A Review of Frequent Recommendations
RecommendationsNo. Number ofRepetitions of
Recommendation
s in 92 Options
Frequency in %  (Number
of Repetitions as a Share
of the Total Number of
Recommendations)
Greater expeditiousness and independence
of the judiciary in resolving economic cases1
Simplifying and lowering the cost of the
procedure of establishing companies2
5 5,4%
5 5,4%
5 5,4%3 Protection of market competition andelimination of monopolies
4 Defining sectoral development strategies andtheir professional, depoliticised implementation 3 3,3%
Preparation of a national
development plan and strategy5 3 3,3%
6 3 3,3%Fight against the grey economy
7 3 3,3%More efficient judiciary and depoliticisingof operations of public companies
8 2 2,2%Reducing taxes in order to increasecompetitiveness
9 2 2,2%Depoliticising of state subsidies tocertain companies
10 2 2,2%
11 2 2,2%
12 2 2,2%
Consumer protection
Protection of creditors
Improvement of registries of business
entities and ownership (on line)
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The  mos t  f requen t l y  men t i oned
recommendations belong to, let us say, “hard
core” recommendations for the improvement
of economic openness. The surveyed experts
understand very well the importance of the
legal, judicial and information (registration)
infrastructure for the functioning of the open
market. There is a certain dilemma with regard
to recommendations 4 and 5, which deal
with development plans. The correlation
between development plans and the
increasing openness of society is not clear,
even if the implementation of those plans are
conducive to an increase in output and social
wellbeing (which is not necessarily the case).
However, we cannot a priori exclude the
possibility that various forms of development
strategies might contribute to openness if
they included incentives for improvement in
the functioning of the open market.
A review of the areas rated as the most and
the least important for the economic
openness of society reveals a similar picture.
The table below shows the average ratings
provided by all the experts (not only those
related to the economy) for certain measures,
i.e., indicators of openness. It is evident from
the review of 10 areas or indicators with the
highest ranking of importance that the
greatest importance is attributed to
encouraging market competition, the block
of legal issues  (competence and efficiency
of the judiciary, protection of rights, anti-
corruption), and independence and
depoliticising. However, looking at 10 areas
or indicators with the lowest rankings, it
seems unusual that among them there are
as many as three areas which represent an
important component in encouraging market
competition (the rare occurrence of exclusive
contracts, the rare occurrence of price wars
and dumping, the rare occurrence of price
discrimination) and another three areas which
are extremely important for market
competition (low costs of registration of
property, low costs of establishing enterprises,
and availability of information on transactions
with associated persons). We can conclude
that there is a logical discrepancy between
the high ranking of the importance of
encouraging market competition when it is
defined and presented as an abstract idea,
and the low ranking of its importance when
it is presented in a concrete form. This
discrepancy can be explained by the lack of
knowledge of the concrete content of the
notion of protection and encouraging market
competition in the sample of all experts.
The surveyed experts understand very well the importance
of the legal, judicial and information (registration)
infrastructure for the functioning of the open market.
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Table 2 - Ten Highest and Ten Lowest Ranking Areas
Significant for the Economic Openness of Society
10 Highest Ranking Rate of Import. Std. dev.
Highly developed core institutions which regulate the freedom of
market competition 0,16,79
Competence of judiciary to process criminal offences
in the area of economic crime 0,16,74
Efficiency of the judiciary in processing criminal offences
in the area of economic crime 0,16,74
High level of development of protection of rights and ownership 0,146,63
Good regulation and practice of public procurement 0,146,61
Independence of the work of private entrepreneurs
from political influences
0,166,53
Independence of public enterprises from political influences 0,186,53
Efficient anti-corruption in the economy 0,196,53
Neutrality of state and inspection services in law enforcement 0,186,47
Efficient regulation of the protection of creditors 0,186,47
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10 Lowest Ranking Rate of Import. Std. dev.
Low frequency of violation of other components of the Labour Act 0,195,58
Low costs of registration of property 0,295,47
Rare occurrence of disallowed exclusive contracts and similar practices 0,425,39
Rare occurrence of "price wars" and dumping practices 0,375,39
Availability of information on transactions with associated persons of
companies whose securities are listed on the stock exchange 0,325,37
Low costs of establishing companies 0,345,32
Possibility of employing foreign workers in jobs
related to "skills in short supply" 0,345,26
Rare occurrence of price discrimination 0,425,06
Efficient encouragement of export activities of companies
by competent state institutions
0,425,05
Availability of information on salaries and other perks of
directors of public enterprises 0,334,95
Poor knowledge of concrete conditions and the importance of competition may also explain
the lowest ranking of importance that the experts gave to the area of the economy in defining
and attaining an open society. However, this does not have to be either the only or the most
important reason. In Croatia, the social groups (e.g. of the entrepreneurial elite) which would,
independently of the government, promote a free market and open society are obviously
weak. The weakness of such groups may also very well be the reason for the low ranking of
importance given to the economic areas for attaining openness in society.
1 2 0
Efficiency of the judiciary in the processing of criminal offences in the area of economic crime
Competence of the judiciary in processing criminal offences in the area of economic crime
Efficient anti-corruption in the economyIndependence of public enterprises from political
influences
Short time required for entering real estate into the court register
Highly developed core institutions which regulate the freedom of market competition
Efficient regulation of the protection of creditors
Transparency in the process of the privatisation of state enterprises
Readiness of competent state institutions to accept specific suggestions by associations of
experts
Frequent evaluation of social developments and benefits of legal solutions which regulate the
area of the free market
If we attempt to put these areas in order to indicate more clearly the priority areas which need
to be tackled in order to increase the openness of society, then the areas of recommendations
look as follows:
1. Increasing the efficiency, independence and competence of the judiciary and the protection
of creditors
2. Increasing transparency in the process of privatisation, and depoliticising the management
of public companies
3. Strengthening and ensuring the development of the Croatian Competition Agency
4. Deepening the dialogue between the private and public sectors.
It can also be seen that experts do not attribute great importance (and neither do they see
particularly big problems) in the part related to international economic openness. An analysis
of the part of the questionnaire where experts ranked the importance and evaluated the
achievements in specific areas shows that the areas of importance for international economic
openness ranked quite low:
Ten Areas in which the Difference between the
Importance and the Assessment of the Achievements
is the Greatest
The surveyed representatives of the professional elite
rightly perceive Croatia as an internationally open
country, so they do not attribute great importance and
do not see great problems in these kinds of issues.
1 2 1
Subject of ranking Order in the List of
74 Topics
Assessment of
Importance
Equality of conditions for investment for domestic and foreign investors 6,3912
A customs system which does not discriminate between individual
market participants 6,0534
Favourable conditions for Greenfield investments 5,9539
Possibility of employing foreign workers in activities related to
“skills in short supply” 5,2671
Table 3 - Ranking achievements of importance for
international economic opennes
The conclusion about the low ranking of topics related to international openness should be
taken with some reserve, since questions related to the freedom of the internal market
predominated in the questionnaire, so that it was not structured in a manner to enable separate
consideration of the problems of the freedom of the internal market from considerations of
the problems of international economic openness. However, if the conclusion about the low
ranking of the problem of international openness is correct, we need to try and explain it. Two
hypotheses may serve as a possible explanation:
1. The surveyed representatives of the professional elite rightly perceive Croatia as an
internationally open country, so they do not attribute great importance and do not see great
problems in these kinds of issues.3
2. The surveyed representatives of the professional elite systematically underestimate the
importance of international openness and have reservations about an open, global economy.
The only way to continue with a relatively qualified discussion concerning this problem is to
attempt, through identified cases of increasing openness or closedness, to recognise the
extent and the kind of importance attributed to topics related to the international openness
of the Croatian economy. In terms of methodology, such a continuation is questionable,
The surveyed representatives of the professional elite
systematically underestimate the importance of international
openness and have reservations about an open, global economy.
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because we are monitoring the indicators of
the change in closedness/openness which
were pointed out by experts from the area
of the economy (21 of them), whereas the
data in the table above pertain to the whole
sample of experts. Yet, even with
methodological reservations, observations
may be interesting.
Each expert was requested to describe three
events which may be considered to be
indicators of increasing openness, and three
events which may be considered indicators
of increasing closedness. A total of 53
indicators of increasing openness and 54
indicators of increasing closedness were
collected (some experts did not fill out all
three options). As many as 9 or 17% of the
indicators of increasing openness cited by
experts are related to the accession of Croatia
to the EU. The examples most frequently
cited were: acquiring candidate status,
consensus about the negotiation team and
harmonisation of legislation with EU standards.
As far as other indicators of increasing
openness are concerned, there is a great
dispersion of statements which are mostly
not related to the area of the economy. Among
other indicators of increasing openness,
economic experts most frequently quote the
following: the outcome of the presidential
elections, the Puljiz case and the resignation
of Minister Æuæul.4 If we subtract from 53
indicators the 9 related to EU accession,
among the remaining 44 indicators another
14 “pure” economic indicators can be
recognised: reducing the tax burden through
a mini-tax reform, privatisation of agricultural
combines - PIKs (Belje and Vrbovec), building
business premises, construction of
motorways, emergence of new telephone
operators, cancellation of the tender for the
construction of the section of the motorway
that had been awarded to Bechtel,
encouraging foreign investments in the
municipality of Dugopolje, Greenfield
investments of the firm Caledzonia,
suspension of dubious privatisations,
establishing a consumers’ association and
the enactment of the Consumer Protection
Act, privatisation of banks, beginning to
regulate the relations in the construction
industry, and the road show of the Minister
of the Economy. For another couple of
indicators it can be said that they are related
to the economy in the broader sense:
revealing dubious actions of the land registry
department of the BraË court, establishing
the “one-stop shop”, the commencement of
the reform of the education system, and more
public information about the Lenac case.
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Monitoring the indicators of increasing
closedness shows another interesting fact:
the same events represent a sign of increasing
openness for one group of experts, whereas
for another they represent a sign of increasing
closedness. This was so with the “cases” of
Puljiz, Bechtel, Æuæul, Lenac and Match-
telecom / Tele 2 (granting a concession to a
third mobile operator). Among 54 indicators
of increasing closedness, those “cases” are
mentioned in as many as 14 examples (26%).
Abusing the position of interpreter, I would
say that the occurrence of scandals, and
even their increasing number, at our level of
development of democracy and market
economy, could better be interpreted as an
indicator of increasing openness than as an
indicator of increasing closedness. We can
interpret this as increasing openness because
suspicious and disputed acts of the authorities
come sooner under the magnifying glass of
the general public, which requires more and
more information about such cases. In the
long run, this could lead to a correction of
the disputed procedures. Of course, the
media and the general public are not infallible
and they cannot pass ultimate judgment. The
lack of competence, insufficient information
and considerable room for manipulating
information generally create “interference”
when it comes to the potential to disclose
the actual scandal (and not one which is not),
and to its comprehensive presentation to the
general public and forming an opinion about
it, as objectively as possible.
Among the remaining 40 indicators of
increasing closedness of society, the following
were cited two or three times: the Gotovina
case, the Druæba Adria case, low
environmental awareness, slowness of court
proceedings, pressures of vested interests
in the work of the Energy Regulatory Council
and the Telecommunications Regulatory
Council and the problems with public
procurement (MORH, Bechtel). Among the
remaining indicators of increasing closedness,
only four are related to the area of public
finance (postponing the reduction of VAT,
increasing veterans’ rights, increasing
pensioners’ rights by introducing a new
pension increase calculation formula,
continuation of subsidising technologically
obsolete production), and another four pertain
to relations in the area of market competition
(weakening of small suppliers, increasingly
longer terms of payment to small suppliers
by large chain stores, refusing to issue a
concession for ferry transport to a private
firm, and prolonging the terms of payment
by the Croatian Institute of Health Insurance).
Three statements pertain to the area of
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banking and finance (surrendering banks to
foreigners, the disinclination of banks to invest
in companies, and the introduction of new
monetary and foreign exchange restrictions
by the Croatian National Bank).  They indicate
ambivalence in the attitude towards foreign
investments in banking. The spectrum of the
statements not mentioned is quite wide and
pertains mainly to non-economic topics.
As in the previous examples, we conclude
that wider social topics are reflected in
references to indicators of increasing
closedness by economic experts. Economic
topics in the narrow sense are in the minority.
It is very difficult to say whether such a result
comes from the fact that the surveyed
economic experts mostly engage in wider
social topics, or whether they rationally
perceive that economic openness depends
on other dimensions of social openness to
which they, correctly, attribute much greater
importance.
The Causes and
Consequences of the
Presented Results
The study shows that the economic
dimension of the openness of society in
Croatia is given comparatively low
significance. An explicit ranking of the
importance of individual areas for the
openness of society by all the surveyed
experts point to this conclusion (the economy
was ranked as the least important), as does
the listing of indicators of increasing openness
and closedness by the economic experts
themselves (where concrete economic topics
are in the minority, and wider political topics
in the majority). There are two possible causes
of such a result. First, the surveyed experts
do not sufficiently value the importance of
the economic sphere (freedom of the market)
for the openness of society, because neither
through education nor through life experience
have they met sufficiently convincing proof
to indicate such a connection. Another option
is that the experts rightly perceive the
dominance of other social spheres over the
economic one when it comes to their
significance for the openness of society.
It is possible that both factors had an effect
The omnipresent state has remained the main characteristic of economic relations, so
experts correctly perceive that the concrete influence of the economy (reflected through
subsidies and aid to companies, public procurement, etc., in the narrow sense, and
also through the functioning of the judiciary in the broader sense) is still much more
significant for the openness of society than the relations on private markets.
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on the result. In support of the first option is
the fact that in education programmes at
faculties of economics, in academic
discussions on economic policy, and in
economic policy itself and its presentation
and interpretation in the media, a clear
articulation of the liberal and anti-liberal
attitude is avoided. The concepts and policy
of privatisation and liberalisation are often
confused, and many privatisation failures are
equated with failures of the market, so that
both the theories and the concrete examples
which show how an efficient market leads to
desirable social impacts are largely unknown
(although they do exist).5 In support of the
latter option is the heritage of the state’s
running of the economy (centrally-planned
economy) which in the 1990s was
transformed into a heritage of high taxes and
big state spending (in comparison with other
countries). The omnipresent state has
remained the main characteristic of economic
relations, so experts correctly perceive that
the concrete influence of the economy
(reflected through subsidies and aid to
companies, public procurement, etc., in the
narrow sense, and also through the
functioning of the judiciary in the broader
sense) is still much more significant for the
openness of society than the relations on
private markets.
The same causes can explain another two
attitudes: one about the smaller share of
concrete economic topics among the
indicators of increasing openness and
closedness of society, as well as the one
about the dominance of political and legal
topics in the “top 10” of the most important
factors of economic openness in which the
evaluation of performance is in relative terms
the weakest (as a reminder, those are:
competence, independence and efficiency
of the judiciary and the protection of creditors,
transparency of privatisation and depoliticising
the management of public companies, and
setting up a dialogue between the public and
the private sectors). According to these
results, Croatia is still largely a closed society,
because it is fighting the internal infrastructure
problems of building an efficient and free
market economy (e.g., loosening the grip of
the state and its administration, and increasing
the quality of public services, such as the
judiciary) rather than the concrete economic
issues which come into focus only when the
basic systemic issues are resolved. From this
perspective it is wholly logical that 9 out of
53 indicators of increasing openness are
related to EU accession and harmonisation
of (the long awaited) legislation, whereas only
one indicator is related to the privatisation of
PIKs and reducing the tax burden. We may
say there is a deficit of concrete indicators.
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Consequently, the results of the poll of the
sample of experts show an ambivalence of
attitudes (the attitude towards the banks and
scandals, which some explain as indicators
of increasing openness, and others as
indicators of increasing closedness), and
sometimes their inconsistency (the
importance of the protection of market
competition ranks high when it is defined in
abstract terms, but when
defined in a concrete form,
the rank of importance is
very  low) .  A lso,  the
importance of topics related
to international economic
openness is ranked very
low, whereas particularly for
this dimension of openness
the result is disastrous in
the sample of the general
population, which opposes
any sale of companies to
foreigners. Such an attitude
has very probably emerged
as a consequence of a
small number of cases where privatisation
to foreign partners has been implemented
without previous liberalisation and regulation
of the market. Such may be the case, for
instance, with the privatisation of HT, where
the monopolist annuity in fixed telephony has
only (partially) been transferred from the state
to private (foreign) hands.
If the hypothesis that aversion to foreign
investments was the result of several such
privatisation episodes is correct, we arrive at
an interesting conclusion: leading a policy
which does not take into account the basic
principles of the free market and open society
leads in the long run to the general public’s
aversion to these principles, which can create
major problems in running all aspects of
policies focused on international integration.
The general public, and partly also the
professional elite, differentiate insufficiently
between the concepts and policy of
privatisation, liberalisation, and the open
market, and equating them makes it
impossible to identify the sources of political
errors and prolongs the confusion. The
observed result only builds upon the long
observed consequences of the non-
transparent privatisation policy (©tulhofer,
2000). The greatest importance attributed to
control, lawfulness and the judiciary in the
building of an open society probably still
represents more a reaction to the frustration
of privatisation than an expression of general
understanding of the importance of the legal
infrastructure for the functioning of a free
market.
The general public, and partly
also the professional elite,
differentiate insufficiently
between the concepts and
policy of privatisation,
liberalisation, and the open
market, and equating them
makes it impossible to identify
the sources of political errors
and prolongs the confusion.
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Conclusion
In an economic sense, Croatia has the
features of a partially closed society. This is
evident from the small number of respondents
who identify an open society with a society
“... which has no borders, in which there is
completely free movement of persons, goods
and capital,” and from a great aversion to
selling companies to foreigners. The greatest
importance attributed to the issues of control,
lawfulness and the judiciary arises largely
from the demands for the correction of
mistakes in privatisation in the past, and not
from an understanding of the importance of
a suitable legal infrastructure for the
functioning of a free market. Consequently,
in Croatia the realm of freedom is just being
conquered, and this has not yet affected the
area of international economic relations. On
the internal front this process has begun, but
it is still mainly focused on the influence of
the state in the economy, whereas the
relations on the private markets are not the
focus of attention. Among the indicators of
increasing openness and closedness, wider
economic and non-economic topics
dominate, while there is a comparatively small
number of more narrowly defined economic
topics, such as those related to taxes, state
expenditures and the unequal power of
market competitors, which are perceived as
indicators of the openness or closedness of
society. Finally, the experts assessed that the
importance of economic issues for the
openness of society is the lowest of the six
areas, which means that in Croatia there are
(still) no actors in the economic sphere to
stimulate the opening of society. Instead of
the entrepreneurial elite actively pursuing the
idea of a free market, in Croatia there is a
dominant model of reaction to the state which
is overly large and interlaid with various
interests, whereas freedom and the open
society are mostly defined through reaction
to corruption and clientelism which are profiled
through the processes of privatisation and
public procurement required by the state.
The future development of this study should
allow for a methodologically clearer special
analysis of international and internal aspects
of the openness of society; in addition to the
general population and professional elite, the
study should also include a representative
sample o f  respondents f rom the
entrepreneurial elite, so that their attitude
towards an open society can be examined,
as well as their perception of the level of
openness/closedness of Croatian society
and the potential to become in the future, as
a strong interest group, proponents of the
idea of a free market and open society.
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Rule of Law
Ksenija TurkoviÊ
Introduction
The rule of law is often considered one of
the key components of a democratic society,
an instrument by which it is ensured that the
actions of those in power are in the public
interest, that every individual and social group
may have their freedoms and rights protected,
and that they may accomplish their individual
and group goals and interests. Various
theoreticians have pointed out that the rule
of law contributes to the improvement of
stability,1 freedom,2 efficiency,3 utility,4 formal
justice5 and substantive morality.6 From the
moment the Republic of Croatia gained its
independence, the rule of law has been a
kind of litmus test of the social and democratic
development of Croatia. Therefore the rule
of law in this study is recognised as one of
the important indicators and generators of
an open society, or, alternatively, a closed
society.
The rule of law is an extremely difficult concept
to define. Its definition and meaning have
been the subjects of innumerable scholarly
discussions. There are great differences
among the British, American, French and
German understanding of the concept of the
rule of law. Traditionally, there has been a
theoretical clash between two concepts of
the rule of law: positivist and substantive.
According to the so-called positivist
conception, rule of law implies the fulfilment
of certain formal criteria related to the
enactment and application of the law,
irrespective of the ends that a specific law
serves, whereas the so-called substantive
conception largely equates the rule of law
with the notion of justice. In Croatian legal
circles, the positivist conception of the rule
of law still prevails. However, nowadays, many
understand the concept of the rule of law
more widely than both the traditional positivist
and substantive conceptions. Relying on a
centennial tradition, this body of opinion
bases the idea of the rule of law on the fact
that any exercise of power, private or public,
should be limited by the law. From this, two
basic requirements of the rule of law are
derived: a) the requirement to limit official
power - that civil servants may act only in
line with stable regulations clearly defined in
advance, which limit their discretion and
thereby prevent tyranny and arbitrariness,
and b) a requirement for the laws to be
accessible and clear to those to whom they
refer, so they can adjust their behaviour.
Therefore, it is considered that the rule of law
relies on how and what kind of laws are
enacted, the separat ion of power,
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independence of the judiciary, the apolitical
nature of the judiciary, judicial control of
executive authorities, access of citizens to
the justice system, etc.7 This study started
from this wider concept of the rule of law, so
the degree of an open society in the area of
the rule of law was measured by six criteria:
a) quality of legislation; b) efficiency of the
judicial system; c) availability of legal protection
for all citizens; d) independence of the
judiciary; e) quality of the control of the work
of the judiciary and f) confidence of citizens
in the judiciary.
The study was conducted on a group of 125
experts, out of whom only 8 were from the
area of law, and with a random and
representative sample of 1500 citizens of the
Republic of Croatia over 18 years of age.
Experts and citizens filled out two different
questionnaires, each having separate
objectives. The objective of the questionnaire
filled out by the legal experts was to create
an open society index in the area of the rule
of law, and to see the extent to which the
current situation in terms of the rule of law
affects the level of openness of Croatian
society. On the other hand, in the survey of
citizens we draw conclusions on the
importance given by citizens to the rule of
law in attaining an open society, and to what
extent, actually, the very concept of the rule
of law is understandable to them. Given that
the sample of experts is extremely small (only
8), the results of the study should be taken
with great reserve, except perhaps in cases
where there is concordance in the
assessment of the importance and evaluation
of specific items.
The data are presented in this report in four
chapters. The first chapter deals with the
perception of both experts and the general
population on the importance of the rule of
law for attaining openness of society. The
second chapter explains the five criteria
whereby openness in the area of the rule of
law was measured in the study. The third
chapter describes on the basis of the results
of the study the ideal model of the rule of law
in an open society (what is more and what
is less important for attaining openness in
the area of the rule of law). The fourth shows
the situation in Croatia in terms of openness
and lack of openness of society in the area
of the rule of law and tries to explain the
biggest deviations from the ideal model.
The importance of
the rule of law for the
openness of society
Experts and citizens in the survey were
requested to assess the overall importance
for “openness of society” of specific areas
(the rights of minorities and marginalised
groups, the education system, the rule of
l a w,  e c o n o m i c  f r e e d o m s  a n d
entrepreneurship, the media, and the
democratic quality of political processes).
The rule of law is often considered one of the key components of a democratic society,
an instrument by which it is ensured that the actions of those in power are in the public
interest, that every individual and social group may have their freedoms and rights
protected, and that they may accomplish their individual and group goals and interests.
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Figure 1 - Assessment of the Importance of the Rule
of Law According to the Assessments of Various
Groups of Experts
Out of all six indicated key dimensions of societal openness, the rule of law was rated as the
most important by the experts.8 Out of a total of 100 points for the importance of these areas
for the overall openness of society, law on average received 24 points.9 Interestingly, each of
the six groups of experts divided according to their basic fields of expertise rated the rule of
law as the most important dimension for the attainment of openness of society (see Figure
1). This is not surprising since the rule of law is to a great extent one of the prerequisites for
the attainment of openness of the other key dimensions.
The rule of law was rated as the most important
dimension for the attainment of openness of society.
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However, the assessment of the importance
of the rule of law also has the biggest standard
deviation (8.454), which means that there
were relatively large differences among
individual experts in the assessment of the
rule of law for the openness of society. The
assessment ranged from 5 to 51 points,
which was the largest range in the
assessments of all the areas. The biggest
differences in the assessment of the
importance of the rule of law for the openness
of society were among experts in the media
(5-50) and experts in minorities (10-50).
Surprisingly, experts in minorities attributed
such a different importance to the rule of law,
since it is specifically the openness of the
rule of law which is extremely important for
the exercise of minority rights. This may reflect
disappointment in the functioning of our legal
system in terms of the protection of minority
rights.
According to the assessment of citizens,11
the rule of law ranks third in terms of
importance for the attainment of an open
society, behind a high quality education
system that is equally open for all, and
democratic political decision-making, and
before economic rights and freedoms,
freedom of the media, and the rights of
minorities (see Figure 2).
Consequently, there is disagreement between
experts and the general population in ranking
the importance of the rule of law in attaining
the ideals of an open society. Such ranking
of the areas by citizens might reflect the
feeling that our society is not really in the true
sense a democratic society in which authority
and the creation of law would come from the
bottom up, from the citizens themselves (the
so-called “ascending” model of creating law),
consequently serving as a strong mechanism
in the hands of citizens to influence social
developments, but are imposed from the top
down (the so-called “descending” model).
Therefore citizens, being unable to affect
more strongly the process of the rule of law,
and being sceptical about the real relevance
of what they think, give advantage in attaining
the ideals of an open society to education
and the democratic quality of the political
process itself, and attribute lower importance
to the law itself, as if they hope that the
educated elite and democratic quality of the
political process will ensure the rule of law.
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Figure 2 - Assessment by Citizens of the Importance
of Social Areas for the Overall Openness of Society
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Transparency
of political
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The study indicates that a certain, quite
substantial, number of citizens still does not
understand the concept of the rule of law
and that further intensive work on raising
public awareness in that sense is necessary.
As many as 30.5% of citizens believe that
the secret services must have the right to
interrogate someone if they are sure he or
she is guilty; only 58.6% of citizens firmly
believe that, if the President of the country
asks for a person to be sentenced, the judge
does not have to honour such a request;
only 27.6% of citizens believe that citizens
should have the right to do whatever occurs
to them except for the things which are clearly
forbidden by law (although the word “clearly”
The study indicates that a certain, quite substantial, number of citizens
still does not understand the concept of the rule of law and that further
intensive work on raising public awareness in that sense is necessary.
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can be misleading here). The results of those
three questions show that there is still a
strong influence of the communist past where
authority with no separation of power was
dominant and where the law was not the
only source of determining the limits of the
freedom of citizens.
Criteria for the Openness
of the Rule of Law -
Meaning and
Explanations
The degree of an open society in the area of
the rule of law was measured by using six
criteria: a) high quality legislation; b) efficiency
of the judicial system; c) availability of legal
protection for all citizens; d) independence
of the judiciary; e) quality control of the work
of the judiciary, and f) confidence of citizens
in the judiciary. Each of these criteria was
operationalised in a questionnaire with
approximately 10-20 items, and the
respondent had to indicate for each item its
importance for ideal societal openness and
to assess its status in Croatia. In this way,
data were obtained for the assessment of
the importance of each of the six criteria and
a number of items related to each of those
criteria for the implementation of the rule of
law, as well as the assessment of the situation
with regard to individual criteria in the Republic
of Croatia, and also with regard to each of
the items for a specific criterion. This section
looks at each of the criteria separately.
Quality of Legislation
The famous Fuller’s list of the necessary
characteristics of the rule of law requires
legislation to be general, accessible to all,
non-retroactive, understandable, consistent,
stable, enforceable, and possible to be
complied with.12  These are mostly
requirements related to the manner of
enactment of laws and the quality of drafting
laws. It is specifically those requirements that
are the very basic core of the rule of law.
They mainly correspond to the positivists’
conception of the rule of law. Therefore, this
study also started from the assumption that,
in order to attain the rule of law, and thereby
openness of society through the rule of law,
what is important is a) the very manner of
the enactment of laws (their timely enactment,
the possibility of all stakeholders to influence
the enactment of laws, the access of the
public to draft laws and the conducting of
public debates on these drafts, leaving
enough time from the passing of the law to
its implementation so that citizens can
The famous Fuller’s list of the necessary characteristics of
the rule of law requires legislation to be general, accessible
to all, non-retroactive, understandable, consistent, stable,
enforceable, and possible to be complied with.
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become familiar with the content of the law,
the preparation of detailed explanations of
draft laws for the purpose of their easier
interpretation later), b) the quality of laws (the
provisions should be written in a clear
language, understandable to all, they should
be specific and should not leave legal
vacuums or room for various interpretations,13
adequate resources should be provided for
the implementation of the law and control
mechanisms for its implementation should
be envisaged, as well as sanctions for lack
of compliance, the laws should not be too
strict and they should not limit the freedom
of citizens unduly, they should regulate all
important areas of life and comprehensively
regulate the area they are intended for) and
c) stability of laws (requirement not to change
the laws frequently).14
In addition, the requirement that the rule of
law limits discretionary powers of government
presupposes that courts have the authority
to decide on the issues of public interest.
Therefore, courts in legal systems abiding by
the rule of law need to be empowered to
have control of compliance of the laws with
the Constitution, human rights and other
laws, and control of the discretionary powers
of the executive branch. This is only partially
measured by items such as compliance of
the law with the Constitution,
with the requirements for the
protection of fundamental
human rights, and the mutual
harmonisation of laws. Consequently, it would
be good to introduce as a separate item in
the questionnaire, here or in relation to the
criteria measuring efficiency of the judicial
system, the readiness of the courts to initiate
before the Constitutional Court the issue of
constitutionality of specific regulations
(Croatian courts are still very reluctant to
assume such practice, and in fact they hardly
ever do it) and to control the work of executive
bodies.
Access of all Citizens to Legal Protection
It is important for the openness of society
that all citizens in practice may enjoy legal
protection and equality before the court and
the law. The study measured equal access
to legal protection through the following items:
the simplicity of the procedure for initiating
court proceedings, the availability of good
quality free legal assistance for citizens, the
alignment of attorneys’ and court tariffs with
the purchasing power of citizens to enable
them to afford legal protection, the intelligibility
of the laws and availability of information
brochures on the rights of citizens, the prompt
reaction of the State Attorney’s Office and
It is important for the openness
of society that all citizens in
practice may enjoy legal
protection and equality before
the court and the law.
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the Ombudsman in the event of a violation
of rights, equal treatment of citizens by judges
and the State Attorney’s Office and their non-
yielding to public pressure, and that laws are
not discriminatory towards certain groups.
Traditionally, access to legal protection in this
form was not considered a component of
the rule of law. However, in the last few years
it was specifically the access of all citizens
to legal protection that has become an
important element in the “export” of the rule
of law to transition countries.
Quality Control of the Work
of the Judiciary
The control of the quality of work of the
judiciary (the courts, state attorneys, attorneys
and public notaries) is also important for
openness in the sphere of the rule of law.
There are several ways to control the quality
of work of the judiciary (appellate review, civil
and criminal responsibility, professional
responsibility - abiding by codes of ethics,
impeachment, etc.). This study concentrated
on control through the evaluation of the work
of judges and prosecutors, the system of
their promotion, accountabi l i ty and
sanctioning misuse and poor quality work,
control of corruption, supervision by the
Ministry of Justice of the work of courts (this
form of control is very questionable from the
aspect of separation of power, regardless of
the existence of “checks and balances”, and
is actually contrary to the concept of the rule
of law, so it should be omitted from the
questionnaire), abiding by codes of ethics,
and transparency of the work of judges and
prosecutors.
Efficiency of the System
In the last twenty years or so, the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights with
regard to the right to a hearing within a
reasonable time referred to in Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights has
changed the perspective on the efficiency of
the judiciary and raised awareness that the
efficiency of the judiciary is one of the
prerequisites for the implementation of the
rule of law and that the legal security of
citizens, as well as the equality of citizens
before the law and the court, greatly depends
on the efficiency of the judiciary. The indicators
of efficiency in this study were the duration
of the court proceedings, the possibility of
manipulating the duration of proceedings,
the frequency of the occurrence of the statute
of limitations, the efficiency of communication
between courts and the administration, and
also the efficiency of the work of supporting
staff, the regular and efficient execution of
court decisions, the existence of alternative
The control of the quality of work of the judiciary (the courts,
state attorneys, attorneys and public notaries) is also
important for openness in the sphere of the rule of law.
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dispute resolution models, the prompt work
of investigation judges, the quality of work of
the State Attorney’s Office (the high quality
preparation of a case, obtaining sufficient
evidence, equal treatment of all cases, treating
cases seriously).
Independence of the Judiciary
Nowadays, it is the independence of the
judiciary that is considered one of the most
important elements for the implementation
of the rule of law - if the judiciary is not
autonomous, it cannot control executive
authorities. The independence of the judiciary,
on one hand, implies the independence of
courts from the influence of parties (primarily
indicating that there is no corruption; therefore,
the indicator of the low occurrence of
corruption in courts, which in the
questionnaire is part of the control of the
quality of the work of the judiciary, should
really be in the part related to the criterion of
the independence of the judiciary), executive
authorities and “immunity” of courts to various
kinds of pressures: political, public, and
interest groups. However, we have to be
aware that it is impossible to isolate the judges
completely from the influences of society and
that this, in the long run, would not even be
advisable, since their decisions should be
consistent with the prevailing social values -
- otherwise the majority in society would not
see any sense in complying with these
decisions.
On the other hand, discussing the
independence of the judiciary implies the
recruitment and promotion of judges,
prosecutors and other judicial employees
exclusively on the basis of their expertise and
quality of work. Regardless of the importance
attributed to expertise when appointing
judges, the political opinion about the
candidate and his or her prior behaviour
always has a certain bearing. There are
attempts to compensate
for this by awarding
judges tenure for life or
by their election by
citizens for a fixed
term.15
The independence of
lecturers at the faculties
of law also has a great influence on the rule
of law and openness of society in terms of
the rule of law. Professors not only educate
future judges, state attorneys and attorneys,
but also greatly affect the creating of the
laws. Indeed, they are often their main
creators. Moreover, the articles and books
they publish not infrequently affect the
If the judiciary is not
autonomous, it cannot control
executive authorities.
Professors not only educate future
judges, state attorneys and
attorneys, but also greatly affect
the creating of the laws. Indeed,
they are often their main creators.
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decisions (rulings) of judges. Therefore their independence from political influences is very
important for the implementation of the rule of law and openness of society in that segment,16
so I propose that the independence of professors from political influence be introduced as
one of the indicators of the implementation of openness of society within the rule of law.
The Ideal Model of an Open Society in the Area of
the Rule of Law
Legal experts assessed the importance of each element within the area of the rule of law
(quality of legislation; efficiency of the judicial system; availability of legal protection for all
citizens; independence of the judiciary; quality control of the work of the judiciary, confidence
in the judiciary) for attaining an ideal degree of societal openness on a scale from 1 = “the
least important” to 7 = “extremely important.” According to the calculation of the arithmetic
mean of responses of all 8 legal experts, the most important thing for attaining the ideal degree
of openness of society is to ensure the independence of the judiciary, followed by, in order
of importance: access to legal protection, efficiency of the judiciary, confidence of citizens in
the judiciary, high quality legislation, and the control of the work of the judiciary
(see Figure 3).
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Figure 3 - Assessment by Legal Experts of the
Importance of Specific Elements within the Rule of
Law for the Openness of Society
Quality of legislation
Confidence of citizens
in the judiciary
Efficiency of the
judiciary
A vailability of legal
protection
5,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 6 6,2 6,4
Autonomy of the judiciary
Law
6
6
6,3
5,9
Control of work of the
judiciary
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5,8
LAW expresses the arithmetic mean of the assessment of the importance for openness of
all items of the rule of law (the sum of all items divided by the number of items). The rest are
arithmetic means of the assessment of importance of specific elements within the rule of law
for attaining the ideal degree of openness of society on a scale from 1 = “the lest important”
to 7 = “extremely important”
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According to the assessment of experts, in
terms of the importance for attaining an ideal
openness of society, independence of the
judiciary stands out, whereas control of the
work of the judiciary stands out in terms of
its relative lack of importance. Such an
assessment should not be surprising, since
control of the work of the judiciary represents
a kind of challenge for the preservation of
the independence of the
jud ic iary,  and i t  is
considered that specific
forms of control of the
judiciary actually interfere
with and diminish its
independence. Moreover,
courts in the Republic of
Croatia tend to assess
their work extremely
positively, and among
professionals there is a
certain resistance to
introducing various forms
of control, which is most frequently justified
by the need to ensure the independence of
the judiciary. Such views are probably partially
reflected in the results of this study, so the
independence of the judiciary and quality
control of the work of the judiciary are on
opposite poles of the scale of importance. It
would be interesting to see how citizens
would assess these elements in terms of
their importance for attaining societal
openness (unfortunately, this was not done
in this study and, although statisticians stress
that this would be comparing like with unlike,
it still appears that this should definitely be
included in future studies). I suppose that
citizens would perceive the control of the
work of the judiciary as far more important
for attaining openness than the legal experts.
The remaining four elements came close
together in the assessment of their importance
for attaining an ideal openness of society.
At the end of the whole study the legal experts
were asked to assign 100 points to six
elements in the area of the rule of law
according to how important, in their opinion,
a specific element was for the overall
openness of society. In response to that
particular question, experts attributed the
greatest importance to the quality of legislation
(see Figure 4).
Courts in the Republic of Croatia
tend to assess their work
extremely positively, and among
professionals there is a certain
resistance to introducing various
forms of control, which is most
frequently justified by the need to
ensure the independence of the
judiciary.
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Figure 4 - Importance of all the Criteria
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This might lead to the conclusion that among
experts there is a consensus about the lowest
importance of control of the quality of the
work of the judiciary for the openness of
society. However, particularly in the
assessment of the importance of the quality
of the work of the judiciary, both in answer
to the first and second question, there was
great variability among the eight legal
experts.17 This means that the experts did
not agree among themselves about the
importance of that element. I suppose that
the differences in assessments were to a
great extent a consequence of the
professional circles of the experts (judges,
prosecutors and professors most probably
valued this criteria quite differently).
A comparison of the responses to the two
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questions indicated
above show a strikingly
different assessment of the importance of
the “quality of legislation” for the openness
of society (compare Figures 3 and 4). This
difference might possibly be explained by the
fact that, in response to the first question,
legal experts concentrated more on the effect
of a specific element (criterion) on the
openness of society and that, in providing
ratings, they were under the influence of the
items which they had just rated within a
specific element (criterion). In response to
the second question it seems to me that the
experts concentrated more on the elements
(cr i ter ia )  which contr ibute to the
implementation of the rule of law, and not so
much on their importance for the openness
of society. A number of the items relating to
the quality of laws are actually traditionally
considered as the most important elements
of the rule of law. This tradit ional
understanding of the rule of law is still
dominant in the Republic of Croatia. Even
so, it is far narrower than the notion used in
this study. It appears that this might be the
reason for the greatest importance being
attributed to the quality of legislation in
answers to the second question.
If we had a bigger sample of respondents,
it might be good to pay attention to the legal
circle they come from (whether judges, state
attorneys or professors). It is possible that
some (the judges) might place higher value
on the independence of judiciary, and others
(the professors) on the quality of the legislation.
Assessment of the
Situation of the Rule of
Law in Croatia
Legal experts were asked to assess each
item within a certain element of the rule of
law in terms of the situation in Croatia on a
scale from 1 = “is not present” to 7 = “is
markedly present.” Since only 8 legal experts
filled out the questionnaires on the basis of
the interpretation of this material, it is not
possible to make generalisations about the
situation in the country, or draw conclusions
on the implications of those results for future
work. Still, even the results of such a small
sample encourage reflection and are worth
considering.
According to the assessments of legal
experts, the situation in the country in the
area of the rule of law is extremely poor in
terms of the efficiency of the judiciary and
confidence of citizens in the judiciary:18
According to the assessments of
legal experts, the situation in the
country in the area of the rule of
law is extremely poor in terms of
the efficiency of the judiciary and
confidence of citizens in the
judiciary.
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Figure 5 - Assessment of the situation of the rule
of law in Croatia
Arithmetic mean of all the items of the specific elements (the sum of responses to all items
divided by the number of items within a specific element) rated on a scale from 1 = “not
present at all” to 7 = “markedly present.”
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the judiciary
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Such an assessment of the experts regarding
the situation of the efficiency of the judiciary
is consistent with the study of the European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
(CEPEJ), carried out recently.19 Also, some
surveys conducted in Croatia indicate that
citizens have low or no confidence in Croatian
courts, mostly due to the length of the
proceedings.20 Legal experts rated the
following as particularly problematic within
the efficiency of the judiciary: frequent
occurrence of the statute of limitations due
to the inefficiency of the courts, irrationally
long duration of court proceedings, frequent
remanding by a higher-instance court to a
lower-instance court for the reopening of
proceedings due to errors, and the lack of
models of alternative dispute resolution. They
proposed a number of changes necessary
to increase the efficiency of the judiciary,
including the introduction of mediation, the
establishment of smaller specialised and
thereby more qualified courts, revising laws
to speed up court proceedings, the need to
introduce performance-based salaries or
incentives, drawing up a systematic,
comprehensive and realistic action plan for
the reform of the judicial sector, increasing
the professionalism of public administration
and increasing the capacities of local
government and self-government. In relation
to the need to increase confidence in the
judiciary, the following are proposed:
intensifying the sanctioning of illegal behaviour
such as unlawful building, strengthening
control mechanisms of the rule of law system,
and accelerating the process of transition
from a communist system of values to the
system of values of western democracies.
According to the assessment of experts, the
independence of the judiciary was the most
important element in the ideal model of an
open society in the area of the rule of law,
whereas there is quite a poor assessment of
the situation in Croatia in terms of the
independence of the judiciary. Therefore,
Croatia should pay a great deal of attention
to further strengthening the independence
of the judiciary, both by strengthening
independence from the influence of executive
authorities, political pressures, vested
interests, and through the recruitment and
promotion of judges and other judicial
employees exclusively on the basis of their
expertise and quality of work.
The situation in Croatia in terms of access
to legal protection is rated somewhat better
than the situation in terms of the
independence of the judiciary, but still quite
bad. Overly high attorneys’ tariffs were rated
Croatia should pay a great deal of attention to further strengthening the
independence of the judiciary, both by strengthening independence from
the influence of executive authorities, political pressures, vested interests,
and through the recruitment and promotion of judges and other judicial
employees exclusively on the basis of their expertise and quality of work.
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as particularly problematic, as well as the
lack of printed material about various rights
of citizens, the slowness of the reactions of
the State Attorney’s Office in the event of the
violation of someone’s rights,21 unequal
treatment of cases in the State Attorney’s
Office as a result of power or age, and the
yielding of judges to public pressure in cases
which attract great public interest.
The best rated was the situation related to
the quality of laws and the quality control of
the work of the judiciary, but here again the
ranks were below the mean value. Actually,
if we take a close look at some items rated
within the quality control of the work of the
judiciary, except for corruption (which was
rated as relatively low) and the passing of
decisions irrespective of the reputation of the
lower-instance court judge whose decision
is being considered, the situation is quite
poor. The system is not transparent,22 there
is no adequate evaluation of judges, there
are no clear criteria for promotion, and neither
is quality the basic criterion for promotion,23
there are no sanctions for poor performance,
responsibility is not taken for one’s own work,
and the code of ethics of the profession are
not sufficiently developed. One of the
proposals to improve the quality control of
judges’ work was to tie the system of rewards
to performance. This could, for instance, be
done through the introduction of end-of-year
bonuses which would be awarded on the
basis of a performance assessment.
As far as the quality of enacting laws is
concerned, the situation in Croatia is weaker
in terms of the manner of enacting laws (the
biggest problems are: insufficient possibility
of interest groups to affect the enactment of
laws, draft laws are not sufficiently available
to the general public,24 not enough time is
allowed for public debate on the draft laws,
insufficiently good explanations are provided
when draft laws are prepared, sufficient funds
are not provided for their implementation)
than in terms of their quality (where the biggest
deficiencies are in the lack of mutual
harmonisation of laws and the excessive
number of legal vacuums). In their responses
to the questionnaire, the experts (and this
does not only relate to legal experts)
mentioned the following recommendations
for the improvement of the quality of
legislation: faster enactment of essential laws,
preventing laws from changing too frequently,
the implementation of the principle of the
separation of power, increasing the quality
of the enactment of laws (transparency of
the consultative process, application of
European nomotechnical standards), greater
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influence of and more consultations with
relevant professionals when laws are enacted,
including those who implement the laws in
practice.
However, despite such a negative picture of
the situation in the area of the rule of law,
experts quote some examples which show
that in this segment some moves have been
made towards greater openness of society.
For instance, in May 2004 strategic guidelines
for the reform of the judiciary were made,
which are supposed to contribute to
increasing its efficiency. Both the courts and
the State Attorney’s Office set as one of their
respective priorities a reduction in the backlog
of cases. Confidence in the judiciary was
strengthened through the demolition of illegally
built houses in the zone below Sljeme near
Zagreb and in Dalmatia, court proceedings
against Ljubomir »uËiÊ, the former
ambassador to Belgium, for domestic
violence, acquittal in the case of the Severina
lawsuit, the quashing by the Supreme Court
of the Republic of Croatian of the judgement
of the first-instance court acquitting eight
former members of the military police of
charges of war crimes over civilians, mostly
of Serb nationality, in the Lora military prison
in Split in 1992. Emphasis was made of the
independent position of the Constitutional
Court in comparison with the previous period.
Several disciplinary and criminal proceedings
against judges were conducted for abuse of
office. Ongoing is the work on the draft Courts
Act, which should provide for clear criteria
for the promotion of judges, requirements for
the permanent education of judges, and
assessment of judges’ performance. All this
contributes to enhancing the quality control
of the work of judges, but also their efficiency.
In spite of these positive examples, the rule
of law comes immediately after transparency
of institutions in the assessment which
evaluates whether there was an improvement
or deterioration in that sphere (only 12 experts
out of 68 who responded to that question
thought there was an improvement).
Conclusion
Due to a small sample of experts, relevant
conclusions cannot be made on the basis of
this study about how far the rule of law is
established in everyday social life, how far
individuals and social groups may exercise
their rights and protect their interests and
implement their initiatives through legal
institutions, about the most important
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problems that the legal system faces, and
which steps need to be undertaken for the
situation in this area of social life to improve.
Nevertheless, this study has pointed to some
problems and possible solutions. However,
the real importance of this study is that it has
helped identify items in the area of the rule
of law which are useful for measuring the
openness of society.
The following general conclusions may be
drawn from the study with regard to forming
an open society index in the area of the rule
of law:
1. elements (criteria) within the rule of law
are well selected
2. each element (criterion) should be
assessed through the same number of items
or an approximately equal number of items
3. items should be set either as a
measurement of lack of openness or as a
measurement of openness, otherwise the
result obtained by multiplying the importance
with the evaluation does not make real sense
4. sometimes within an element (criterion)
some items fully or almost fully overlap, so
the questionnaire should be “purified” in that
sense (e.g. item 1.12 “laws do not provide
for adequate sanctions for the breach of
some provisions” and item 1.15 “laws have
been enacted for which control and
sanctioning mechanisms have not been
secured”. Item 1.12 is actually already
included in item 1.15).
5. some items are not so important for the
rule of law, and some are even contrary to it
(e.g., the possibility of control of courts by
the Ministry should be omitted from the
questionnaire).
With regard to the situation in Croatia, the
study indicated the need to further improve
all elements of the rule of law, particularly the
efficiency of the judiciary and strengthening
the confidence of citizens in the judiciary.
Furthermore, it indicated that the awareness
of citizens of the significance of the rule of
law is still not high enough and that intensive
efforts should be undertaken to increase that
awareness.
The open society index is an original and
very interesting idea. It should be further
developed and improved. It will have a
considerable significance in comparative
analyses of the openness of various societies
and in finding out the most sensitive points
and the best mechanisms of combating the
lack of openness of an individual society. For
the success of the study, through the use of
this index, it is very important for respondents
to understand the notion of open society and
the elements which compose it, so these
notions in the questionnaire should be defined
in a simple and understandable way.
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Transparency and the Attained
Degree of Democracy in Political
Processes Nenad Zakoπek
With the so-cal led th i rd wave of
democratisation,1 which surged through all
post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe,
not only did the number of democratic
regimes in the world increase, but there also
emerged comparative studies of democracy,
of discourse on its various characteristics,
as well as hypotheses as to its genesis and
how it should be maintained. In this context,
on one hand, there emerged a need to
differentiate between various notions of
democracy and to create typologies - in the
broadest sense, as related to democratic
regimes - which would also encompass a
whole array of transitory or mixed regimes
to be found in so-called damaged or defective
democracies.2 Such typologies and elaborate
criteria of democracy resulted, on the other
hand, in attempts to express the quality of
democracy numerically and thereby make
comparisons of various democratic regimes
easier to handle. Synthetic indexes of the
degree of democratic development in a
democratic society and the realisation of
human rights aim to achieve this goal. The
best known such index is compiled by the
American organisation Freedom House and
has become the principal reference not only
for numerous scientists, but also for political
actors and for decision makers in international
politics. The Bertelsmann transformation
index, which measures progress made by
transitional regimes, is of a more recent date,
but is similar to the Freedom House index.3
It is in this light, in my judgement, that the
open society index should be seen. The
project can be compared to some already
existing indexes of the attained degree of
democracy, but it is at the same time more
ambitious and comprehensive as it also aims
to embrace those social spheres which have
not been covered by other studies. Even in
a more conceptually complex index, however,
the political aspect would be of major,
possibly of paramount, importance, which is
to say quite simply that in transitional societies
like that of Croatia politics plays a greater
role than it normally does in more advanced
democratic societies typified by powerful
economic institutions and forces, and by a
variegated and autonomous civil society.
Political processes in transformational
societies condition the forming of relevant
forces and institutions, redistribute economic
resources, and have an impact on the
changes and adjustment of political culture
and civil society. Hence, changes in the
political system determine the degree of
openness, or lack of openness, in a society.
We should bear these remarks in mind before
we commence interpreting the collected data.
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Dimensions of openness,
lack of openness in a
society; relationship
between politics and five
other dimensions
On the basis of a preliminary discussion of
the open society project committee, six areas
or dimensions of social life were deemed
instrumental for societal openness: politics,
the status of minority groups, the rule of law,
the educational system, the economic
system, and the media. Through a survey of
experts, data were obtained showing the
relationship between different dimensions of
social life with regard to the influence they
have on the degree of societal openness.
 Clearly set apart as the most important
dimension is the rule of law (average value
of 24.1), for it seems to have as much as 50
percent more influence than any of four other
dimensions of roughly the same degree of
importance: politics (16.8), education (16.6),
the media (15.8), and status of minorities
(14.7). The dimension with the least influence
on the openness of society, according to
experts, is the economic system (12.2). The
degree of influence it exerts on social life,
compared to the cluster of four better ranked
dimensions, is one third weaker, and,
compared to the rule of law, is weaker by
half. Such rankings of the six dimensions of
social life deserve a brief comment.
In spite of the introductory thesis on the
importance of the political sphere in
transitional societies, the primacy given by
experts to the rule of law is hardly surprising.
The transition from an autocratic to a
democratic system took place in post-socialist
societies of Eastern Europe in conditions
which were very specific and considerably
different from the conditions which could be
found in different epochs and different parts
of the world:4
• A high degree of democratic involvement:
a general right to vote as a self-evident
standard (including women's right to vote),
a relatively low institutional threshold for
gaining entry into representational bodies
(proportional electoral systems or combined
systems with an important proportional
segment), a relatively high degree of education
of the population that allows for broad
participation and understanding of political
processes.
• Simultaneity of essential transitional
processes: a simultaneous transformation
from an autocratic to a democratic system,
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from a centrally planned to a free market
economy, and oftentimes the creation of a
national state. In such conditions, political
and social elites have access to considerable
economic resources which they may use so
as to achieve particular goals. Then there are
the challenges of populism and clientelism,
which may bring into question the transition
into democracy and may potentially pose a
threat in the shape of various semi-
authoritarian transitional regimes.
• The process of building nation states are
burdened with conflicts which can be resolved
only by building strong and legitimate
institutions (which will, among other things,
regulate the relationships of ethnic minorities
and minorities).
Al l these characterist ics imply that
constitutional deficiencies and deficiencies
in the sphere of legality and the rule of law
are the main obstructions to a successful
democratic and economic transition5 and
that they endanger the attainment of a
satisfactory degree of societal openness in
other studied dimensions as well (the media,
minorities, education). The study at hand has
recognised this circumstance. It is indicative
that the rule of law has not only been defined
as the most important dimension in the
general sample, but also in each of the six
subgroups of the general sample: in no
sphere of interest have experts given
precedence to their personal sphere of
interest over the rule of law.
On the other hand, something should be said
about the not particularly high rating of the
economic dimension of societal openness.
One may assume that the economic
dimension would be held in much higher
esteem in a society with a developed market
economy (and perhaps in a transitional society
with a very liberal economy, like that of
Estonia). Putting the economic dimension in
last place is probably the result of a specific
socialist inheritance, or of path-dependency:
not the economy, but the legal state,
democratic politics, the pluralistic media,
institutional protection of minorities and an
open educational system are by and large
perceived to be the preconditions for an open
society. The economy has in transitional
societies been principally marked by a
predatory brand of capitalism and is therefore
perceived as a threat to social openness.
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Aspects of the attained
degree of democracy and
transparency of politics
There are six specific indicators of the attained
degree of democracy in the sphere of politics:
degree of participation and vertical openness,
degree of  contro l  and openness,
transparency/access to information, degree
of responsibility, degree of autonomy, and
professionalism and rationality. The first
indicator, democratic participation, is one of
the central criteria of the attained degree of
democracy, as well as one of the central
issues relevant to the theory of democracy.6
One does not speak here merely of ensuring
formal preconditions for democratic
participation, but of establishing numerous
channels and procedures so that citizens
may effectively become involved in political
processes, on both the national and local
level. In politics it is the second indicator, the
degree of control and legality, which may be
seen as the counterpart to the rule of law
dimension on the social level. This indicator
encompasses, on one hand, those
constitutional and legal institutions which are
responsible for limiting power (ranging from
strictly respecting the division of power to
establishing the institutes whose responsibility
would be to monitor the work of potentially
repressive state apparatuses), and, on the
other, culturally valuable and behavioural
prerequ is i tes of  a  democrat ica l l y
institutionalised policy (absence of corruption,
responsible political elites, legal safety). The
t h i r d  i n d i c a t o r ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f
transparency/access to information, is related
to the existence of civil public life as an
important component of democratic politics
- whereby one is to assume that citizens and
the media have the ability to monitor political
officials and institutions, that they possess
relevant information and that all decision
making processes within state bodies on all
political levels are made transparent. The
fourth indicator, the degree of responsibility,
describes the degree of responsiveness of
state organs and political officials regarding
citizens' wishes. On one hand, the fourth
indicator assesses the extent to which the
state is at the service of its citizens, and, on
the other, the degree of responsibility attained
by political elites. The fifth indicator, the
degree of autonomy, has essentially to do
with the functioning of the division of power,
with the system of checks and balances and
inter-institutional control; and, in a broader
sense, along with aiming to diminish the
importance of partisan politics in public
institutions, with the degree of independence
attained by the public administration as well
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Table 1 - The importance of indicators of various
aspects of openness in the political sphere
Mean SD Median Min Max
The degree of participation and
vertical openness
14,50 4,54 15,0 10 25
The degree of control and legality 23,17 6,28 20,0 18 25
Transparency,
access to information 18,42 3,82 20,0 10 25
Degree of responsibility 16,08 2,87 15,0 10 20
Degree of autonomy 15,67 4,56 15,0 5 25
Degree of professionalism
and rationality
12,17 2,69 10,0 10 16
as with the political independence of the most important social institutions (the media, institutions
of organised interest). Lastly, the sixth indicator, the degree of professionalism and rationality,
has to do with the ability of political elites and citizens to overcome their prejudicial beliefs and
forsake their short-term interests while making political decisions or participating in public
debates. It is important to mention that there is no strict separation between the six indicators,
but that they interweave and are partially interfused: for instance, some questionnaire items
related to the independence of key state organs (5th dimension) are also an important
institutional foothold for the realisation of control and legality of political processes (2nd
dimension).  
The importance of certain indicators as established through the survey of experts is shown
in Table 1.
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The inter-relation between different criteria
of openness of political processes is in
keeping with the previous assessment of the
six dimensions of societal openness, which
puts an accent on the dimensions of legality
and rule of law. Within the political dimension,
such institutional and other instruments as
would ensure legality and control over political
elites claim a one-sided primacy in relation
to other dimensions. The ranking of these
criteria - access to information, responsibility
and autonomy - is to a large measure the
result of a lack of confidence in the activities
of political elites and of a generally held
conviction that the prevention of the abuse
of power and the ensuring of democracy
may only be reached by establishing solid
institutional control mechanisms, transparency
in the work of political bodies and high public
awareness. The low ranking of the degree
of participation in and the vertical openness
of the political system dimension might, to
some extent, come as a surprise, but this
can be explained by the already posited
hypothesis that the democratisation of post-
socialist societies takes place in conditions
of maximum democratic openness and
participation (no single social group is denied
their right to political participation, as was
often the case in the early days of western
liberal democracies), and the main political
problems are the abuse of power, feebleness
of public institutions and the accumulation
of non-transparent political and social power.
Finally, the fact that the professionalism and
rationality criterion is ranked last is at least
partially a consequence of the absence of
sufficiently elaborate measuring instruments,
a fact which should not be dismissed in the
course of the final evaluation of this study.
The ideal model of
democratic,
transparent politics
The six criteria of openness of political
processes are made operational through a
number of measuring instruments, or
questionnaire items: the greatest number of
items is encompassed by the participation
and vertical openness criterion (20), and the
smallest number by the criteria of autonomy
on one hand and professionalism and
rationality on the other (8 each). The research
results also confirm that there exists an
imbalance between measuring instruments:
in each of the criteria, the degree of
importance of various items varies
considerably. Table 2 shows the arithmetic
mean of each item.
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Table 2 - Arithmetic mean of the indicators of
openness in the dimension of politics
Mean
Participation and vertical openness 5,93
Control and legality 6,93
Transparency, access to information 6,18
Responsibility 5,84
Autonomy 5,67
Professionalism and rationality 5,67
It can be seen that the ranking of the six
indicators of political openness on the basis
of the average importance of various
questionnaire items is somewhat different
from the previously shown ranking of the six
dimensions. The first two criteria, that of
cont ro l  and lega l i ty  and that  o f
transparency/access to information, also
came first and second respectively, but
coming third is the participation and vertical
openness criterion (previously ranked fifth in
the order of importance), while the autonomy
and professionalism and rationality criterion
share the last, fifth place. This disparity,
however, is of no paramount importance as
far as the interpretation of the inter-relations
of the six criteria of the political openness
index is concerned, for it simply manifests
the inaccuracy of the measuring instruments
or the inadequacy of some of the items used
in the questionnaire (which have accordingly
been labelled as being less important).
Nonetheless, this should be kept in mind
while evaluating the thus conducted study
or while considering how to improve the
questionnaire.
Let us now look into precisely which criteria
(questionnaire items) in each of the six criteria
were evaluated as the most important (on a
scale from 1 to 7).
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In the participation and vertical openness
dimension the situation is as follows:
• There is a general readiness of key political
institutions to act in a democratic fashion
6.58
•  Can citizens viably realise their interests
by having recourse to institutions of local
government?        6.50
•  Existence of institutional channels for the
efficient forwarding of citizens' suggestions
6.33
•  The general social climate supports the
request of the general public that it be granted
a right to participate in political processes
6.33
• Towns and municipalities have enough
authority and can palpably influence /improve
the quality of life of its citizens  6.25
• The state consults with the local and regional
government while making decisions relevant
to the functioning of the local government
6.25
What do these rankings show? A portion of
the most important criteria of the attained
degree of democracy has a direct relationship
with the elements of political culture and
behavioural patterns: the attained degree of
democracy of political elites, a social climate
that would stress the importance of political
participation and is ever in search of
mechanisms which enable citizens to take
part in political life. The other portion of criteria
is related directly to the preferred institutional
channels of participation, on both the local
and national level, that is, to those
mechanisms which ensure the efficiency of
the local government as well as its influence
on the national government as far as
questions of local interest are concerned.
In the criteria of control and legality, the
highest ranked items are as follows:
• The general social climate continually insists
on control over political processes 6.83
•  Efficiency of mechanisms which control
the work of the state administration 6.75
• Quality control over the work of secret
service agencies 6.67
•  Efficient fight against corruption arising
from abuse of political function 6.67
• There is no corruption in the civil
service                      6.67
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•  There is no corruption in local government
6.67
A general social climate which would
continually exert public pressure on political
officials and demand that they be controlled
has been deemed the most important factor
in the control and legality criterion. Other top
ranked items also received very high marks
(the average mark of every single one of them
is very close to the maximum mark, like that
of every single preceding item). These include
state administration and secret service control
mechanisms. Equally highly ranked is the
absence of corruption in political institutions
on both the national and local level.
In the criterion of transparency and access
to information the following items were
deemed the most important:
• The existence of independent and well-
informed political public media 6.75
•  A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously insists on
the transparency of the political decision
making process 6.58
•  Important social and political decisions are
not made behind closed doors, away from
the public eye 6.50
• Journalists experience no difficulty in
obtaining information from relevant state
bodies 6.50
•  Citizens experience no difficulty in obtaining
information from relevant state bodies
6.50
• Journalists and citizens experience no
difficulty in obtaining information from local
government bodies 6.33
• Citizens may monitor the most crucial
decision making processes 6.33
A type of social climate benevolent to requests
that political processes be made transparent
is again very highly ranked, and the only
higher ranked item has to do with the
independence and informedness of the
media. All other highly ranked items are
related to various aspects of transparency in
the activity of political elites and the
accessibility of information on both the
national and local level.
In the criterion of political responsibility, special
accent has been placed on the following
prerequisites of social openness:
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• A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously  demands
that principal actors in public life act in a
responsible manner             6.45
                
• The state administration is efficient in
providing services for its citizens 6.25
• The Government is at the service of its
citizens, and behaves accordingly 6.25
• Government officials and members of
parliament are ready and willing to resign in
the event of ethical transgression which is
not subject to legal prosecution 6.17
• Members of parliament conduct their work
seriously and responsibly 6.17
Here it is apparent that the highest average
marks given to the importance of indicators
of responsibility in politics are lower than in
the preceding dimensions. The accented
items have to do with the general social
position towards responsibility, with defining
the state administration as a public service
for citizens, and with the presence of a type
of political ethics whose objective it is to set
the guidelines for the activities of the political
elite.
In the autonomy criterion most items are
highly marked, in the following manner:
• Independence of the judiciary from the
Government 6.75
• Political independence of the Constitutional
Court 6.75
• Independence of the most influential political
media 6.75
• Independence of the Government and the
Parliament from certain
groups' special interests 6.42
• A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously insists on
the autonomy of actors in public life
6.27
• Independence of the state administration
(civil service) from the ruling political party or
coalitions 6.25
The items which are shown here are relevant
to the autonomy criterion. They are very
heterogeneous: on one hand they encompass
the questions of division of power and mutual
relationships between the three branches of
Government, while on the other they have a
bearing on the independence of the media
and the state administration from partisan or
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political influence.
Lastly, the criterion of professionalism and
rationality was deemed considerably less
important than the rest of the indicators of
societal openness. For this reason only two
top ranked items will be mentioned here.
They describe political actors' general
capacity for long-term planning and their
ability to rise above partisan and ideological
divisions.
• Readiness of the parliamentary majority, in
specific situations, to take into consideration
arguments made by the opposition 6.17
• A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously demands
that political life be conducted in a more
rational manner 5.75
                                   
Research Results: State
of Affairs in Croatia
 
By way of introduction, I should like to mention
that I shall not, in presenting the assessment
of various dimensions of the attained degree
of democracy and transparency of political
processes in Croatia, use the synthetic value
of individual items, which is arrived at by
multiplying the importance mark by the state
of affairs in Croatia mark.7
Tables 3-8 evaluate the six criteria of the
attained degree of democracy and
transparency of political processes. Apart
from paying attention to the row containing
each item’s average mark, attention should
also be paid to the rows which list the
standard deviation from the arithmetic mean
(SD) and the rows containing each item’s
minimal and maximum mark - from which it
is apparent that expert assessments may
vary a great deal. The final evaluation of this
study should perhaps delve more deeply into
this.
 
1 6 3
Mean I SD Mean E SD Min Max
1) General readiness of key political institutions
to act in a democratic fashion 6,58 ,51 3,33 ,98 2 5
6,50 ,67 2,67 ,89 1 4
2) Can citizens feasibly realise their
interests by having recourse to local
government institutions
6,33 ,89 3,50 1,62 2 63) Existence of institutional channels forefficient forwarding of citizens' suggestions
6,33 ,65 3,42 1,24 2 6
4) The general social climate in support of the
request of the general public that it be granted
a right to participation in political processes
6,25 ,62 2,83 1,03 2 5
5) Municipalities and cities have enough
authority and can palpably influence/improve
the quality of life of its citizens
6,25 ,75 2,50 ,67 2 4
6) The state consults with the local and regional
government while making decisions important
for the functioning of the local government
6,25 ,75 2,33 ,65 1 3
7) The number and quality of public debates
about new laws is of general or higher
importance
6,17 1,03 2,33 ,65 2 4
8) Citizens’ conviction that they can personally
influence the course of political events
IMPORTANCE REALITY
Table 3 - Evaluation of the most important items in
the criterion of the degree of participation and vertical
openness
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Table 4 - Evaluation of the most important items in
the criterion of the degree of control and legality
Mean I SD Mean E SD Min Max
6,83 ,39 3,42 1,08 2 6
1) A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously insists on
control over political processes
6,75 ,45 2,33 ,49 2 3
2) Efficiency of mechanisms which control the
work of the state administration
6,67 ,49 1,92 1,00 1 43) Quality control over the work of secret service
agencies
6,67 ,65 1,92 ,67 1 34) Efficient fight against corruption
related to political function
6,67 ,49 1,83 ,83 1 35) There is no corruption in the civil service
6,67 ,49 1,58 ,67 1 36) There is no corruption in local government
6,50 ,52 3,33 1,07 1 57) Strict respect for division of power
6,50 1,00 2,33 ,65 1 38) Efficiency of the legislative branch in
overseeing and controlling the executive branch
6,42 ,51 2,83 1,27 1 69) Efficiency of civilian control over the military
6,42 ,51 2,83 1,47 1 610) Efficiency of civilian control over the police
6,33 ,65 3,58 1,31 2 611) Quality control over the functionof the public media
6,33 ,78 2,33 ,78 1 4
12) Top ruling party officials and political
parties have no informal immunity from
legal persecution
IMPORTANCE REALITY
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Table 5 - Evaluation of the most important items in the
criterion of transparency and access to information.
IMPORTANCE REALITY
Mean I SD Mean E SD Min Max
6,75 ,45 3,75 1,48 1 6
1) The existence of the independent and well
informed political public media
6,58 ,67 3,33 1,07 2 5
2) A general social climate where the general public
intensively and continuously insists on the
transparency of the political decision-making process
6,50 ,67 2,58 ,90 1 4
3) Important social and political decisions are
not made behind closed doors, far from the
public eye
6,50 ,52 2,92 1,31 1 64) Journalists experience no difficulty inobtaining information from relevant state bodies
6,50 ,67 1,92 ,90 1 45) Citizens experience no difficulty in obtaininginformation from relevant state bodies
6,33 ,49 2,58 1,00 1 4
6) Journalists and citizens experience no
difficulty in obtaining information from local
government bodies
6,33 ,78 2,75 1,06 1 57) Citizens may monitor the most crucialdecision-making processes
6,25 ,87 4,17 1,03 3 68) Transparency of the political decision-making process in the Parliament
6,25 ,62 2,67 1,23 1 59) Simplicity, reliability and transparency ofvoting in the Parliament
6,17 1,40 1,67 ,65 1 310) Public accessibility, accuracy and reliabilityof data related to financing of election
campaigns
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Table 6 - Evaluation of the most important items in
the criterion of the degree of responsibility
Mean I SD Mean E SD Min Max
6,45 ,69 3,45 1,04 2 5
1) A general social climate where the general public
intensively and continuously demands that principal
actors in public life act in a responsible manner
6,25 1,48 2,25 ,75 1 32) State administration is efficient in providing
services for its citizens
6,25 ,75 2,75 1,22 1 43) Government is at the service of its citizens,and behaves accordingly
6,17 ,94 1,75 ,75 1 3
4) Government officials and members of parliament
are ready and willing to resign in the event of ethical
transgression which is not subject to legal prosecution
6,17 ,94 2,75 ,87 1 45) Members of parliament conduct their work
seriously and responsibly
6,00 1,41 2,58 ,67 2 46) Local government institutions and
administration are efficient
6,00 ,74 2,17 ,83 1 37) Political parties have a genuine interest infulfilling pre-election promises given to voters
6,00 ,85 2,58 1,73 1 6
8) The Prime Minister is ready to take full
responsibility for ethical and political
transgressions of his cabinet ministers
IMPORTANCE REALITY
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Table 7 - Evaluation of the most important items in
the criterion of the degree of autonomy
Table 8 - Evaluation of the most important items in the
criterion of the degree of professionalism and
rationality.
Arith. Mean SD Arith. Mean SD Min Max
6,75 ,45 3,50 1,78 2 61) Independence of the judiciary from the
Government
6,75 ,45 4,00 1,65 2 62) Political independence of the Constitutional
Court
6,75 ,45 3,83 1,47 2 63) Independence of the most influential political
media
6,42 ,79 2,67 1,15 1 5
4) Independence of the Government and
Parliament from certain groups' special  interests
6,27 ,79 3,08 1,00 2 5
5) A general social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously insists on
the autonomy of actors in public life
6,27 ,62 2,33 1,15 1 5
6) Independence of state administration/civil
service from the influence of the ruling political
party or coalitions
IMPORTANCE REALITY
Arith. Mean SD Arith. Mean SD Min Max
6,17 ,83 2,25 ,87 1 4
1) Readiness of the parliamentary majority, in
specific situations, to take into consideration
arguments made by the opposition
5,75 1,14 2,83 ,72 2 4
2) General social climate where the general
public intensively and continuously demands
that the political life be made more rational
5,67 1,61 2,92 1,08 2 63) Stability of the state administration
5,67 1,44 3,08 1,08 1 5
4) When making important political decisions, to
what extent is the Government motivated by doing
good in the long run and to which extent by the
prospect of re-election?
IMPORTANCE REALITY
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Mean
1) Degree of autonomy 3,16
2) Transparency/Access to Information 2,84
3) Degree of Participation and Vertical Openness 2,82
4) Degree of Professionalism and Rationality 2,61
5) Degree of Control and Legality 2,46
6) Degree of Responsibility 2,35
Table 9 - Average marks given to the six criteria of
the attained degree of democracy and transparency
of politics in Croatia
Table 9 presents an overview of average
marks of the six indicators of the attained
degree of democracy and transparency of
politics in Croatia. As seen, the highest mark
has been given to the criterion of the degree
of autonomy, for the most part thanks to
relatively high average marks given to the
independence of the judiciary, the
Constitutional Court and the media. The
degree of responsibility criterion received the
lowest mark; the one given to the criterion
of the degree of control and legality is not
much higher. The final average mark given
to the political openness criterion - the six
indicators being given equal treatment -
stands at 2.71. The final average mark given
to the political dimension, as based on all
the used items, stands at 2.6 and must be
considered as very low and unsatisfactory,
for it is lower than the average mark given to
any one of the other dimensions
encompassed by the study. One may
therefore claim that politics is the principal
agent responsible for the lack of openness
in Croatian society.    
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Negative and positive
examples from Croatian
politics, and suggestions
for improvement
Apart from marking the political dimension,
the experts who were surveyed also listed
some negative and some positive examples
related to events in recent Croatian political
history. Furthermore, they suggested some
measures to increase the openness of
Croatian society. There was a significant
amount of dispersion over a gamut of
examples and suggestions related to the
three questions at hand. In the depiction of
the answers, similar answers were grouped
together so that the fact that there was a
certain consonance of expert opinion - both
in the choice of positive and negative
examples and (to some extent) the
suggestions for improvement - may come to
the forefront.
The following examples were listed as the
most negative and are based on events in
the recent period that have diminished the
degree of social openness in Croatian society.
1. Abuses of secret service agencies
(mentioned 6 times).
2. Inadequate election legislation, which
includes the law on financing election
campaigns, and insufficient supervision of
the application of the said law; violation of
the electoral procedure in the recent
presidential election at some Diaspora polling
stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (mentioned
six times).
3. Dubious decisions made in a non-
transparent manner by leading government
politicians (3 times).
4. The Parliament’s inability to control in an
effective way conflict of interest which some
members of the political elite seem to be
guilty of, and to enable investigative
committees to function properly.
5. Meddling of the Catholic Church in the
issues of upbringing and sexuality.
The first four examples are in tune with the
previously shown marks which demonstrate
that Croatian politics is falling into deficit:
insufficient control mechanisms over activities
of political institutions and political elites, bad
laws or failure to apply laws. The fifth example
is quite specific and clearly a result of a fear
that this new commitment of the Catholic
Church in the sphere of upbringing might
endanger the thus achieved level of
secularisation of state and society.
The following recent events were listed as
being the most positive:
1. Positive changes in the media: in relation
to political and social elites, the media have
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assumed a more pronouncedly controlling
role; higher competition in the media market
(6 times).
2. Resignations of government officials,
including Minister Æuæul, as a result of public
pressure and criticism. (6 times)
3. More frequent public criticism of the
conflict of interest which some members of
the political elite seem to be guilty of (twice).
4. The fact that the Druzba Adria project
and its negative ecological consequences,
as a result of involvement of the media and
civilian activism, has become a matter of
public debate (twice).
All the positive examples mentioned above
are instances of the successful controlling
role played by the media and the public,
which may lead to improvement at different
levels.
The most important suggestions for urgent
reforms and improvements listed by the
experts who were surveyed contain the
following recommendations:
1. Ensure a higher degree of openness of
Parliament and Government, as well as other
state organisations (the state administration,
various state agencies), towards citizens (7
times).
2. Reform the election legislation and the
law on financing election campaigns (6 times).
3. Improve the work of the media, ensure
a higher degree of responsibility among
editors and journalists, strengthen competition
in the media market (5 times).
4. Ensure the application of the law on the
right to access of information, increase the
availability of information related to all political
processes and the work of state organs at
all levels (4 times).
5. Adopt a new law on political parties; this
should increase the attained degree of
democracy and transparency of party
activities (4 times).
6. Improve control over the work of state
officials and politicians, especially in regard
to issues related to conflict of interest and
prevention of corruption (3 times).
7. Reform the public administration (3 times).
Conclusion
In conclusion, we may single out a few
important points that characterise the findings
of this pioneer research study in the field of
societal openness in Croatian politics. First,
one may say that the feebleness of Croatian
institutions requires a prudent development
of institutions - primarily in view of
strengthening the rule of law. The most urgent
steps need to be taken in the following
spheres of political life: electoral legislation,
the way in which parties are organised,
financing election campaigns, and public
administration.
Second, Croatian political institutions and
political elites are insufficiently open to the
public and seemingly incapable of responding
to initiatives coming from civil society. It can
also be said that Croatian political elites do
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not have enough political responsibility, which is particularly visible in the issue of conflict of
interest, as well as in their lack of readiness to act in tune with the principles of political
responsibility. It is therefore imperative that an attempt is made to strengthen the system of
checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches of the Government; the
same is necessary in the case of institutions of independent civil control. Proper critically-
oriented media involvement and the participation of citizens in controlling the work of political
elites may be the answer.
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The influence of the Catholic Church on the
policy of reproductive and sexual rights and
health from the beginning of 2004 to March
2005 Marina ©krabalo and Hrvoje JuriÊ
Introduction: defining
topic and aims
This study deals with the influence of the
Catholic Church in Croatia on the formation
and implementation of the policy of
reproductive and sexual rights and health. It
has been selected on the basis of the
assessment of experts in defining the Open
Society Index, since this issue is particularly
illustrative in understanding the closing of
society during 2004 and at the beginning of
2005. The influence of the Church is evaluated
as a negative one in the questionnaire in
terms of the perceived rigidity of attitudes of
the Church towards human sexuality and
reproduction, its excessive influence on state
institutions, and its discriminatory effects on
different social groups (single women, sexual
minorities, and untraditional families).
It is not surprising that most of the experts’
responses, regardless of their professional
interests, referred to the attempts of the most
powerful religious institution in Croatia to
affect the societal and state regulation of
sexuality. It should also be kept in mind that
this is a particularly sensitive sphere where
there is contact and tension between the
sacred and the profane, the private and the
public, and pleasure and responsibility. Two
universalistic paradigms meet in this context
of time, society and location - sexual and
reproductive rights on the one hand, and
Catholic sexual morality on the other hand.
The manner in which they are expressed,
contrasted and transformed into formal and
informal rules shows the complexity of the
changes of Croatian society, and the
contradictions and discomforts of its
democratisation and modernisation.
The aim of this case study is to describe and
identify the characteristics of the influence
that the Catholic Church has had on state
policy in relation to human sexuality and
reproduction, especially relating to the topics
which were in the focus of public discussion
in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 - the
right to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy,
the right to medically assisted fertilisation,
the right to sexual education/information and
training, and the equality of sexual minorities.
In the opinion of the experts, this influence
has been particularly significant for those
events which are conducive to the closing of
society. The conclusion also gives
recommendations leading to an increase in
societal openness in the context of shaping
and implementing this policy by keeping in
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mind the role of the Catholic Church. The
study is based on a comparative analysis of
official statements and documents of
representatives of the Church, state
institutions and other stakeholders in the
public debate, on an analysis of media articles,
as well as on additional semi-structured
interviews and consultations with participants
in the public debate.1
In this study, the Catholic Church in Croatia
is understood as an institution with a suitable
structure and hierarchy, and not as a
community of Catholic believers.2 Those civil
society organisations which rely on the public
support of the Catholic Church in their public
activity were also taken into account, in
addition to official bodies, such as the Croatian
Bishops’ Conference (CBC), individual
representatives of parishes and bishoprics,
journals, and professional institutes.
Since the comprehensive understanding of
policies relating to reproductive and sexual
health and rights is not directly referred to in
the domestic legislation which regulates,
through a number of different laws and
programmes, specific aspects of sexual and
reproductive health and rights, this study is
based on the definitions of these terms as
referred to in the 2002 European Parliament
Resolution on Sexual and Reproductive
Health and Rights,3 produced on the basis
of the WHO and the Programme of Action
of the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo,
and the Beijing Platform for Action of the 4th
World Conference on Women of 1995, which
the Republic of Croatia also undertook to
enact and implement.
The Holy See also participated in the shaping
of these international programmes and thus
partially supported the Programme of Action
of the ICPD and the Beijing Platform for
Action, with some reservations in writing4
which relate to the right to abortion, the use
of condoms as a means to prevent HIV/AIDS,
the definition of an extramarital couple
(heterosexual community) and the definition
of gender outside the biological binarity of
sexes. The Holy See has the status of
observer at the UN, and has ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in
1990, and the Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1969.
It has a significant effect of advocacy in the
UN, and some critics require that its position
be made equal to the position of other
religious communities, without the right to
vote.5
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The main features of
the Catholic Church's
activities in Croatia
Activities of the Catholic Church in Croatia
are necessarily rooted in the universal dogma
and largely in the Catholic Church's global
policy, which is a natural result of the Church's
hierarchical make-up. However, the
distinctiveness of the situation in the Republic
of Croatia lies in socio-political circumstances
by means of which the Church has a more
favourable position for spreading influence
in the social sphere and for the shaping of
public policies than it has in countries that
are generally considered as examples of a
highly developed democracy. Other relevant
factors related to this are the statistical
dominance of professed Catholics, who,
according to the 2001 Census, make up
87% of the Croatian population; the level of
development of democratic institutions, and
the level of democracy present in the public
dialogue and political processes. In this sense,
the situation in Croatia can be compared to
the situation found in countries such as
Poland, Ireland, and (often overlooked) Italy.
The main foothold for the Catholic Church's
privileged status in Croatia (often evoked by
advocates of the legitimacy of the Church as
a political actor) is in the statistical dominance
of professed Catholics and the importance
of the Catholic faith for the overall shaping
of the Croatian cultural heritage, national
identity and statehood. The Holy See's foreign
policy clearly shows that it considers Croatia
to be a friendly country, even an ally in the
preservation of Europe's Catholic identity,
particularly if we take into account the Pope's
view that former Eastern European countries
may in fact be the principal forces in the
restoration of Christianity and Catholicism.6
This may be illustrated by strong political
support the Church gave to Croatia during
its struggle for independence in the break-
up of former Yugoslavia, by the fact that the
Vatican was one of the first states to formally
recognise Croatia, and by the fact that the
Pope visited Croatia 3 times during his
pontificate (ranking Croatia in the top 17 out
of 133 countries which the Pope visited). All
this may shed light on the recent statement
made by the apostolic nuncio Francisco
Javier Lozano, (in June 2004 on Radio
Vatican), that Croatia was the most Catholic
country in Europe:
He stated that he “does not know any other
country in which the public listens to the
Church as much as it does in Croatia, even
Activities of the Catholic Church in Croatia are necessarily rooted in
the universal dogma and largely in the Catholic Church's global policy,
which is a natural result of the Church's hierarchical make-up.
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in regard to social issues.” He took the
discussion regarding the non-working Sunday
as an example of “the Church defending
workers' rights from unbridled interests of
profit- seeking parties and consumerism”.
According to Lozano, bishops and parish
priests openly defend family rights and the
institution of marriage. They raise awareness
of “the demographic problems and the drastic
decrease of the birth rate, as well as
awareness that the population is fast
becoming older and older”. These priests’
public appearances are aimed at “defending
life and newborn children”. “People listen to
the Church, which is reflected in the country's
legal set-up. Politicians (even those who are
in disagreement, but particularly those
nostalgic about the former communist
system), being aware that the Church is close
to the people, both in the cities and rural
areas, industry and agriculture, within the
context of the family circle and in society in
general, ought to have this in mind at the
time of the elections. I believe I am not wrong
when I say that Croatia is the most Catholic
country in Europe today”, nuncio Lozano
concluded.7
As far as the description of the Church's
influence on Croatian society is concerned,
the papal nuncio is right. Nowadays, the
Church is involved in a
series of major public
debates, ranging from the
issues of increasing
poverty and social injustice
(the initiative on banning
w o r k  o n  S u n d a y ) ,
environmental protection and sustainable
development (opposition to Croatia's
involvement in the Druæba Adria project), to
the questions related to human sexuality and
reproduction, and occasionally even to
corruption and injustice within governmental
structures. In this sense, Cardinal BozaniÊ’s
1997 Christmas epistle on the “sins of the
structures” has acquired renowned status,
as did the criticism levelled at the government
in 1998 and 1999,8 which coincided with the
period of the strengthening of opposition to
Tuman's regime. There is, in 2005, a
resurgence of criticism of corruption. The
Church has been, in this recent period, a
fervent promoter of the pro-European
orientation, which is in accordance with
regional and global politics of the Vatican and
the Pope himself. The reaction of the public
to this is multiform, depending on the level
of popularity of a particular topic and on the
attitude the Church has adopted. The greatest
ambivalence and departure from the Pope's
teaching occurred in connection to the
The main foothold for the
Catholic Church's privileged
status in Croatia (often evoked
by advocates of the legitimacy
of the Church as a political actor)
is in the statistical dominance
of professed Catholics and the
importance of the Catholic faith
for the overall shaping of the
Croatian cultural heritage,
national identity and statehood.
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peacemaking process in post-war Croatia.
CBC, and particularly Cardinal BozaniÊ, are
active in promoting inter-religious dialogue,
while the Church, at least up to the moment
of Cardinal BozaniÊ’s recent pro-European
Easter Epistle, mainly kept quiet on the
importance of processing war crimes
committed by Croats.9 Some bishops and
priests had also made rather right-wing
statements. An exception to this was the
Church's proactive attitude towards the
preservation of a unified Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its condemnation of the
evictions that took place in the first half of
the 1990s.10 Also, the Church has not shown
any noticeable effort in systematically guiding
local priests and laypersons in post-war areas
towards peace-building within their parishes,
and such exceptions as the Franciscan
Institute for Peace or the autonomous
Croatian Caritas cannot be taken as proof
that the Catholic Church has any kind of
peace-building policy in Croatia.
As sociologist Sran Vrcan pointed out,
Croatian society is significantly different from
societies of many other, traditionally Catholic,
European countries. In his view all these
countries are displaying “a trend of
individualisation, detraditionalisation and
decollectivisation in the decision-making
process, as well as a trend of double religious
pluralisation” - the “external” type, which
refers to the increasing number of major
religions present in European societies, and
the “internal”, which refers to individual
strategies and approaches to religion. In
Croatia, however, the process seems to have
been reversed, which is visible in the
increasing number of professed Catholics
and “the renewed congregation of people in
the Church's institutions, rather than
elsewhere”. The process continues to be
followed by the “sacralisation of the national”
and the “nationalisation of the sacred”. Still,
there is a noticeable gap in the number of
declared and practising Catholics, and it is
questionable to what degree the Pope's
vision of Europe as “the civilisation of love
and peace” can be put into action in Croatia.11
The democratisation of Croatian society,
which gained momentum and expression at
the change of the Tuman regime in 2000,
led to the articulation of interest positions
which began to openly question the Catholic
Church's attitudes and requirements, so that
the Church, regardless of the statistical
domination of Catholics and regardless of its
power, has been facing the increasing
challenge of providing a rationale for its
demands.12
Nowadays, the Church is involved in a series of major public debates, ranging from the
issues of increasing poverty and social injustice, environmental protection and sustainable
development, to the questions related to human sexuality and reproduction, and
occasionally even to corruption and injustice within governmental structures.
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The main distinction between the position of
the Catholic Church and other religious
communities and institutions, as well as other
subjects which belong to the domain of civil
society, is to be found in the definition of its
status, which was determined by a series of
international agreements signed by the
Republic of Croatia and the Holy See13
between 1996 and 1998. Also, there is no
time limit on these agreements.14 According
to Article 140 of the Croatian Constitution,
international agreements are an integral part
of Croatia's internal legal system and take
precedence over national laws. The
agreements regulate the following matters:
cooperation in the field of education and
culture, including the teaching of Catechism
in pre-schools, primary schools and
secondary schools; the “appropriate”
approach to be taken by the Church in dealing
with the media; preservation of cultural
heritage; provision of Catholic guidance in
the military; restitution of nationalised Church
property; and state financing of the Church's
institutions and employees. In 1999, the
Croatian Government concluded the
implementation of the Agreement on Catholic
Catechism in state schools and of religious
education in state pre-school institutions.
The legal force of the provisions contained
in these bilateral agreements is equal to that
of all the international human rights protection
conventions that the Republic of Croatia has
ratified, including those relevant to the
protection of reproductive and sexual rights
- the European Convention on Human Rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on Children's Rights. Here,
however, the General Declaration on Human
Rights, as well as other international charters,
such as the UN Millennium Declaration, has
less legal power than the agreements
concluded between the Republic of Croatia
and the Holy See.
The legal status of all other religious
communities in Croatia, regardless of the
degree to which they are structured, is
inevitably inferior to that of the Catholic
Church. The Catholic Church is the only
religious institution which is also an
international legal entity in the Republic of
Croatia, which is in contradiction with Article
41 of the Croatian Constitution.15 The law on
the legal status of religious communities (NN
83/2002) defines these communities' legal
status and regulates the issues of
governmental support, tax breaks, founding
of schools and the introduction of religious
education in schools (when it is requested
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by parents), for all those
communities which have
signed an agreement with
the Government.16 In 2002,
the Government entered
into special agreements
with 10 other religious
communities, including the
Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic
community, and enabled them to have their
own religious education in state schools,
direct recognition of church marriages, state
financing of salaries and pensions for priests
and monks, and religious guidance in the
military. Therefore, the position of 39 religious
communities in Croatia is markedly different
depending on whether or not the Government
has offered them the aforementioned
agreement, whereby the smaller religious
communities have been put in a less
favourable position.17
Article 3 of the Act on the Legal Status of
Religious Communities also contains
provisions which define the impermissible
forms of religious communities’ activities,
such as the spreading of “intolerance and
pre jud ice towards other  re l ig ious
communities, their members or other
citizens”, as well as any activity which defies
“the legal make-up and public morals”, or is
“harmful to either life and health or other
rights and freedoms of its members and other
citizens”. So far, these provisions have not
been touched upon in the discussion of
religious communities’ public activities, but
it was important to note that the given law
contained the said legal safety mechanism.
In 2000, the Catholic Church, in accordance
with the provisions of the international
agreement between Croatia and the Holy
See, also signed an agreement with Croatian
Radio Television (HRT), whereby it gained 10
hours of regular television coverage each
month. This means that events organised by
Catholic Church receive roughly 60 times
greater overall media coverage than those
of any other religious community.18 In addition,
the Catholic Church is the only religious
institution which has founded its own private
media sector - Croatian Catholic Radio, the
Catholic Information Agency (IKA), and over
30 Internet websites.
Although varying levels and varying intensity
of (government) regulations in its dealings
with different religious communities show
that religious communities in Croatia are not
given equal treatment (as guaranteed by
Article 41 of the Croatian Constitution), the
behaviour of the Constitutional Court is
The Catholic Church is the
only religious institution which
has founded its own private
media sector - Croatian
Catholic Radio, the Catholic
Information Agency (IKA), and
over 30 Internet websites.
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indicative of the silent acceptance of this
inequality. On the only occasion this matter
was ever looked into, the Constitutional Court
declared its own lack of authority on the
matter, referring to Article 128 of the
Constitution and the fact that the Constitution
does not explicitly state that the Court is
authorised to assess the congruence between
internat iona l  agreements and the
Constitution.19 The failure to question a
situation where one institution or interest
group has a protected social position or
where one religious community is privileged
in comparison to others is of great significance
for the understanding of the Church's role in
the discussion of reproductive and sexual
rights in the context20 of Croatian society.
State institutions, as well as individuals within
these institutions, are to a certain and limited
extent obliged to adhere to the requirements
of the agreements concluded by the Republic
of Croatia and the Vatican, but it has been
shown that their special regard for the Church
in fact exceeds their contractual obligations.
The following conclusion can be reached
here - the weaker the mechanisms of
democracy and institutions of democratic
power are, the stronger the 'invisible' influence
is - whereby the system itself becomes more
porous and vulnerable to this kind of influence.
Although such influence cannot be
documented (except indirectly), its existence
cannot be denied either.
The situation described above is true not
only of state institutions, but also of those
institutions that shape the public opinion -
the media. The Catholic Church's direct
influence is primarily present in the media
which declares itself Catholic, but it is also
present in the media whose editorial policy
(usually defined as “pro-
Croat ian” or  “nat ion-
building”, such as Hrvatsko
slovo) is of a definably
Catholic orientation. The
examples of the media
consistently questioning the
role of the Church in society
are very rare (one such
example is the weekly Feral
Tr i bune ) ,  and ,  more
importantly, which is most
apparent in the Catholic
media space - the critical Catholic magazine
Puls ceased to exist after its publisher, Glas
Koncila, withdrew its support - after the
publication of the said magazine’s third issue
- at the beginning of 2004. It should be
pointed out that a superficial analysis of the
media coverage of the public debate on
State institutions, as well as individuals within these institutions,
are to a certain and limited extent obliged to adhere to the
requirements of the agreements concluded by the Republic of
Croatia and the Vatican, but it has been shown that their special
regard for the Church in fact exceeds their contractual obligations.
...the weaker the mechanisms
of democracy and institutions
of democratic power are, the
stronger the 'invisible'
influence is - whereby the
system itself becomes more
porous and vulnerable to this
kind of influence.
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reproductive and sexual rights in the course
of 2004 and 2005 suggests that major
national daily and weekly newspapers -
Jutarnji list, Vjesnik, Novi List, Slobodna
Dalmacija, VeËernji list, Globus and Nacional
- gave quite a bit of media space both to
Church representatives and opponents of
the Church's views on these matters, but
that the Church then increasingly started
describing its treatment by the secular media
as prejudiced and negative.21
Finally, the Catholic Church's 'visible' and
'invisible' influence can be detected at other,
'lower' levels of social l ife - in civil
organisations, local communities and among
individuals, such as parishes, professional
Catholic associations of doctors, journalists
and teachers, Catholic family centres and
initiatives for the increase in the birth-rate,
the Organisation for Holistic Sex Education
- Teen STAR, or the neo-Catechumenic
movement. Independent civil initiatives based
on Catholic and Christian values do not
receive much media attention and mainly
deal with inter-religious dialogue and the
promotion of peace. Unfortunately, this study
will not focus on the influence of the Church
on initiatives for social organisation undertaken
by Catholic citizens, but only on the activities
of those organisations which were directly
involved in the public debate on reproductive
and sexual rights and health in 2004.
The Catholic Church and
the policy of reproductive
and sexual rights and
health in Croatia
Such initiatives and activities of the Catholic
Church in Croatia concerning the said topics
should be seen in the light of the Vatican's
global policy on ethical and legal regulation
of human sexuality and reproduction, which
is unambiguous, consistent and transparent.
The Church advocates the protection of
human life from the moment of conception
and thereby promotes the banning of
abortion, which is considered to be a form
of murder punishable by excommunication.
The Church approves sexual activity only
within the context of a heterosexual marriage
based on mutual understanding, love and
the desire to have children. The Church
considers mechanical and chemical
contraceptives as obstructions of the natural
process of potential conception, which makes
the withdrawal method the only one which
the Church sees as ethically justified for family
planning and the prevention of sexually
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transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Its
view on homosexuality is that homosexuality
is an incomplete and not fully mature sexual
orientation - although which, all flaws aside,
does not mean that homosexuals should be
discriminated against.22 The sin of
homosexua l i ty  is  the pract ice of
homosexuality, so homosexuals who are
Catholic are told to practise sexual abstinence.
There are Catholic retreats for homosexual
members of the Catholic Church everywhere
in the world.23
In the last 15 years, the Church has been
consistent in this field of activity in Croatia as
well - in terms of the attitudes and
requirements which it has promoted - but
the intensity of these attitudes and
requirements seems to have grown in the
last couple of years, even in comparison with
the period between 1992 and 1998, when
Church influence on the government was the
strongest. It may be assumed that the key
difference between the current activities of
the Catholic Church and its activities during
the 1990s lies in the manner in which the
Church understands and perceives its
relationship with political power centres -
whereas from the beginning of the 1990s up
until the end of Tuman’s regime the Catholic
Church was one of the main creators of
national politics, relying on nationalism as
well as on Croatian Catholic traditionalism,24
the Church now sees itself in opposition, or
as a factor in that aspect of the opposition
whose task it is to prevent political and ethical
pluralism and liberalism from gradually
assuming control.
In the light of this assumption it is not
surprising that during the 1990s the Catholic
Church made only one strong appeal -
Cardinal KuhariÊ's letter to the Croatian
National Parliament in May 1992, in which
he urged for a ban on abortion, restrictions
on contraceptives and the introduction of
religion-based sexual education in schools.25
Due to a negative public response, Cardinal
KuhariÊ’s initiative did not result in the
changing of the law. Such an outcome was
influenced by yet another factor - a total
failure of a joint international and national
effort in the implementation of the first national
programme for demographic restoration,
championed by don Ante BakoviÊ, a radical
proponent of an equally radical national policy
for an increase in the birth rate. The National
Programme for Demographic Restoration,
which was in effect from 1996 to 2000, was
Croatia's only official document ever to define
life as starting at the moment of conception,
but its measures for an increase in the birth
The Church approves sexual activity only within the
context of a heterosexual marriage based on mutual
understanding, love and the desire to have children.
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rate were never implemented due to a
shortage of funds. Still, the measure did affect
public opinion: it promoted the traditional role
of the woman as housewife, traditional family
values, and a systematic resettlement of
ethnic Croats to those areas in Croatia which
were affected by the war.26
The most important, and often the least
noticeable negative consequence on
reproductive rights that has come out of the
“partnership” between the Church and
Croatian Democratic Union’s (HDZ) regime
in the 1990s has been
the disappearance of
the  Const i tu t iona l
provision of 1974 on a
person’s right “to free
cho ice  i n  hav i ng
children, which can only
be limited in order to
protect his/her health”,
and the passing of a
very general provision
which stated that “every
human being has the
right to life”.27 In the long
r u n ,  t h e  s e c o n d
provision made room for
the legal redefining of when and where human
life begins, mostly through public debates
and arbitrary interpretations, as was the case
in 1996 when the organisations for the
increase in the birth rate sought the abolition
of the law on abortion on the grounds that
it was unconstitutional and out of tune with
the National Programme for Demographic
Restoration.
Until now the Church has never directly
questioned the constitutionality of abortion,
mainly because it has been shown that the
population, despite the influence of the former
regime and the Church, resists the
retraditionalisation of family l ife and
reproductive rights. According to the latest
research, from March 2004, 65% of the
population, regardless of gender, support
women's right to abortion, 73% support
women's right to birth control, and almost
93% think sex education should be taught
in schools even if it includes information about
the condom as a means of protection against
HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.28
The new momentum the Church has gained
in the promotion of its concept of reproductive
policy is surely a result of and a response to
a noticeable change of policy in regard to
sexual minorities and the establishment of
efficient institutional mechanisms for the
protection of gender equality. Croatia's
attempts to join the EU have directly affected
the process, as have the activities of feminist
groups and a more efficient proliferation of
Until now the Church has never directly questioned the constitutionality
of abortion, mainly because it has been shown that the population,
despite the influence of the former regime and the Church, resists
the retraditionalisation of family life and reproductive rights.
...65% of the population,
regardless of gender, support
women's right to abortion, 73%
support women's right to birth
control, and almost 93% think
sex education should be taught
in schools even if it includes
information about the condom as
a means of protection against HIV
and other sexually transmitted
diseases.
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sexual minorities, which since entering the
public domain 2 years ago have succeeded
in changing over 10 laws, including the
introduction of the institution of same-sex
union into the Family Act, in 2003. It is
therefore hardly surprising that in 2002 the
Croatian Bishops' Conference (CBC) came
out with new guidelines for pastoral care for
marriage and family,29 and that, during the
Pope's third visit to Croatia, in June 2003, it
also published a pastoral epistle entitled
“Family - the path of the Church and the
People”:
“The consumer mentality and the all-pervasive
individualism distort the idea of the human
being and neglect man as a social being.
This has influenced the general understanding
of marriage and family, marital and sexual
morals, and the legislation concerning
marriage and family. This endangers not only
the stability of marriage and family, but also
the nation's social and economic existence.
Therefore it is obvious that the family needs
help from all sides. Strengthening the family
is the only way to recover the threatened
aspects of social and church life, and this is
exactly what the Holy Father points out to in
a number of documents”.30
In July 2004, Croatia was visited by the
President of the Papal Council for Family,
Cardinal Alfonso Lopez Tujillo, who, as was
reported by IKA, focused on the importance
of social and political involvement of Catholic
families in response to the increasing
relativisation of the notion of traditional family
that is taking place across Europe:
“Laws are imperfect, bad, sometimes they
even factually deny the existence of family,
as is the case with the sad fact of recognising
the so-called 'factual' unmarried or
homosexual couples. This is in fact a
destruction of the family as well as an attempt
to replace it with an alternative'. The Cardinal
invited families to organise themselves better
within different movements and organisations,
which is one of the main strategies of the
Church as put forth in the Family Rights
Charter, which could help the Church acquire
a certain political status in the positive sense
of the word. This way it can help the society,
enter into dialogue with politicians and
legislators, and inspire and empower others”.31
The intensity of Church initiatives in the sphere
of reproductive and sexual rights in the course
of 2004 and 2005 shows that the
implementation of the Catholic Church family
policy is in full swing, and CBC has managed
to mobilise its own institutions, the academic
community, professional Catholic associations,
the media and civil society organisations,
The intensity of Church initiatives in the sphere of reproductive
and sexual rights in the course of 2004 and 2005 shows that the
implementation of the Catholic Church family policy is in full swing...
1 8 6
creating in the process a well-connected
network of actors who communicate directly
with practising believers through parish
activities. They are present in their own as
well as other public and private media, and
accordingly communicate with declared
Catholics, with the general public and
decision-makers. Also, by directly lobbying
and participating in the advisory bodies of
the Government, they exert a direct influence
on legislative processes.
On the other hand there is a degree of
interaction among the interrelated academic,
expert, non-governmental and media actors,
including some state institutions for the
protection of human rights. This “war of
positions” is in fact a dynamic conflict between
various worldviews and political ambitions,
in which the attitude and the behaviour of the
government and the public are of crucial
importance. As the analyses of public
discussions will show, the government is torn
between the problem of performing the role
of the party responsible for ensuring the
implementation of laws on one hand, and the
fact that the existing legal system is such as
it is (unstable) on the other, and in
consequence assumes the role of neutral
moderator in a fierce public debate. The
attitude of the population is, however, much
more complex and multifaceted, and it is
necessary to distinguish between those
attitudes and types of behaviour that people
merely proclaim and those that are real. It is
also important to distinguish between public
and private attitudes and types of behaviour.
The Catholic Church
activities concerning
the right to abortion
In Croatia, abortion is legal according to the
law from 1978,32 which has not been changed
in the meantime, except that the expenses
of the procedure must now be paid by
women. A significant decrease in the number
of abortions from 1990 to 2003 (the total
number of all registered terminations
decreased by 4.3 times in this period, and
the number of induced terminations
decreased by 6.5 times) coincides with a
significant decrease in the number of
newborns, although the number of abortions
is still higher.33 This trend should be seen in
the context of a significant decrease in the
number of abortions in Eastern European
countries, which includes other ex-Yugoslav
countries in the period since 1975, particularly
in the last 15 years. The researchers primarily
attribute this to that fact that contraceptives
and education on reproductive health have
been made more available.34
Since in the last 15 years there was in Croatia
no significant expansion of reproductive health
prevention programmes, experts and feminist
activists believe that this decrease in the
number of abortions is not entirely realistic,
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but that it reflects the increasing auto-
censorship of health institutions, which fail to
report performed abortions in accordance
with the regulations of the Croatian Institute
for Public Health, tolerate individual doctors'
refusals to perform abortions and even silently
boycott the performing of abortions, while
the market for illegal abortions keeps
growing.35 In addition, the quadruple increase
in the share of “other abortions” from 8.6%
in 1990 to 28.2% in 2003 is very indicative.
The danger that official data on abortion might
be incorrect and unrealistic was pointed out
at the end of 2003 by Dr Darko MilinoviÊ, a
member of HDZ and one of the potential
candidates for the position of Health Minister
at the time.
Although without proof, it is beyond doubt
that Catholic and pro-life activists' efforts
have greatly influenced the change in the
social climate. Hospitals and doctors have
become more hesitant about performing and
documenting induced abortions, and pro-life
pamphlets are available in surgery waiting
rooms. Still, the change of public attitudes
has not been so drastic as to bring the
relevance of and respect for the existing
legislation into question.
By regularly condemning abortion in sermons,
particularly on the Feast of the Assumption
in 2004 and the Day for Life on 6 February,
2005, the Church came into the focus of
public attention twice - only in 2004. At the
beginning of the year, a public scandal
emerged over a parent's complaint that the
American documentary Silent Scream (1983)
had been shown during a Catechism lesson
in the 6th General-programme secondary
school in Zagreb. The documentary contained
scenes of foetus curettage at a later stage of
pregnancy, and it also became known that
the film had for decades
(in socialism as well)
been sporad ica l l y
screened in educational
institutions, without
being a part of the
curriculum. In response
to a widespread protest
in the media, the
Minister of Science,
Education and Sports,
D r a g a n  P r i m o r a c
urgently summoned the
Assessment Board which concluded that the
film was unsuitable as educational material.
Before the Board even made its final decision,
the Minister informed Cardinal Bozanic by
phone that the film was unsuitable, with which
the Cardinal concurred. The Board’s
conclusions were presented to the
Government, and a memorandum was sent
out to the schools on March 2, 2004. This
concluded the case, but the media reaction
stimulated a discussion of State influence on
Catechism in schools and of the responsibility
that the Church should have towards
students.
Although without proof, it is
beyond doubt that Catholic and
pro-life activists' efforts have
greatly influenced the change in
the social climate. Hospitals and
doctors have become more
hesitant about performing and
documenting induced abortions...
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The person who was especially prominent
in the media at the time was don Anton ©uljiÊ,
the head of IKA and secretary of the CBC
Press Office. In the interview he gave to
Vjesnik on 5 March, he stated his belief that
religious fanaticism should be prevented from
exerting any kind of influence on the teaching
of Catechism. He also expressed concern,
however, that the screening of the film and
consequent commentary might have been
used by the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
for political propaganda purposes. He also
commended the Minister for nurturing
dialogue, and added rhetorically: “Ultimately,
it could, of course, always be argued that no
one has the right to meddle with the contents
of Catechism, even the Catechism taught in
schools, apart from the Church itself”. Don
©uljiÊ, as well as one of the Glas Koncila
columnists,36 criticised the media for being
prejudiced in their reporting, which had been
aimed at condemning Catechism and the
Church, as well as for not including teachers
of Catechism in the discussion. The
authenticity of a survey conducted by Jutarnji
List, according to which 70% of the students
saw the fi lm, was also challenged.
Furthermore, Glas Koncila criticised the
Minister for humouring the media and for
founding the Board, which prevented the
National Catechesis Office from becoming
involved in finding a solution to the problem.
Although the Silent Scream scandal did not
contr ibute anything to the general
understanding of the position of the Church
and its authority on abortion, the whole affair
was quite indicative of Minister Primorac's
style of governing - and later the
Government's as well - the Minister acted
as an arbiter and left the decision as to the
film's suitability to a “group of experts”,
meanwhile checking it with a high-ranking
Church official if the decision was acceptable.
The Minister's approach to this case
produced a positive response from the for
the most part secular public, which welcomed
the film's withdrawal from schools, but this
also pleased Church officials who were happy
that the Minister did not himself directly decide
on the film's unsuitability. It is not surprising
that the Minister did something similar in the
recent heated public discussion on sex
education in schools.
While in the Silent Scream scandal the Church
found itself criticized by the public, and
indirectly by the Ministry of Education, at the
end of the year it organised an event which
received a lot of media attention. After the
making of announcements in the middle of
November, on 16 December representatives
of six religious communities - Catholic,
Orthodox, Islamic, Evangelical, Baptist - made
their first joint statement. Their statement,
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entitled “Human life is a gift from God”,
contained their shared attitudes on the issues
of conception, transfer and preservation of
human life - “from conception to natural
death”, and focused on questions related to
abortion, and medically assisted fertilisation
and biogenetics. The statement was aimed
at “improving the understanding of particular
issues and better legal regulation of the
same”. Nowhere in the text is it specifically
requested that abortion be banned, but the
entire society, particularly the media and
educators are called on to get involved in the
shaping of public opinion in accordance with
a recognisably religious worldview:
“Our joint statement to the public is made in
good faith, in the hope it will be met with
understanding, acceptance and support. In
Croatia most people declare themselves as
religious and say that they belong to a religious
community, so the communities themselves
rightfully expect those who are responsible
in our society to keep in mind that Christianity,
Judaism and Islam all rest on the belief that
God gave life to man and  that He is the only
one who has to right to take it away. In a
time when the 'civil isation of death'
phenomenon is being discussed more
frequently in our country as well, we invite
everyone, particularly representatives of the
media and educators, but also any members
of the Croatian society who can influence
the public opinion in any way to assist in the
creation (individually and jointly) of a general
climate which will be friendly and positively
inclined toward having children and towards
human life in general”.37
A lot of media attention was given to an
almost imperceptible unification of religious
communities, but, as Professor Puhovski
observed, this happened over an unsuitable
aim - to influence the legislation on the issues
of health and human rights. In different
national media the statement was interpreted
as a call for a ban on abortion, and this view
was shared by the women's organisation
B.a.b.e., which called for the creation of a
“citizens’ alliance” to oppose the “ecumenical”
one. Feminist theologian Grünfelder pointed
out the lack of involvement of religious
communities in the creation of good and
efficient prevention strategies. The detrimental
effect that a ban on abortion would have on
women's health was also pointed out. SDP
parliamentary representative AntiËeviÊ
stressed that the state must not yield to the
requests of religious communities, as that
would go against the principle of separation
of church and state. The Jewish community
denied having participated in the preparation
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of the statement and said that the statement
opposed a legal ban on physiologically and
psychologically justified abortion.
The importance of this statement is that,
unlike Cardinal KuhariÊ’s 1992 letter to the
Parliament,38 it shows that religious
communities are aware of the spreading of
democracy in Croatia and that even churches
have to take public opinion into consideration
if they wish to influence the legislation. In
addition, the statement was written in an
affirmative tone and avoids confrontation with
dissenting opinions, while the pre-Christmas
and pre-election timing of the joint appearance
of the six religious communities suggests
that the public reaction to the statement had
been taken into serious consideration.
Although it is difficult to assess the influence
this initiative might have exerted on the
presidential candidates' public attitudes on
abortion, it was obvious in the presidential
debates that HDZ's candidate and Deputy
Prime Minister had a hard time expressing a
clear opinion on abortion, and instead of
offering her personal views she quoted HDZ's
opinion on the protection of life from the
moment of conception and stated that she
would organise a referendum on the issue if
she ever became president. Ironically, Bishop
©kvorËeviÊ criticised this very idea, saying
that “a commandment of God cannot be put
to a referendum”. Only the current President
and the HSLS candidate clearly stated their
agreement with the existing legislation.
Jadranka Kosor's pre-election hesitation
does not seem to indicate HDZ's willingness
to change the legislation, which is obvious
from the statement made by the former Health
Minister, Hebrang, who is one of HDZ's most
influential members. His statement is
consistent with the crucial, but little known
role he played in the prevention of a revision
of the law on abortion in 1995:39
“The right to abortion must remain legal. This
is a sad provision, but the experiences of
others point that it is less harmful than
criminalised abortion”.40
Although Hebrang's statement does not
reflect HDZ's official attitude, it indicates that
the balance in the HDZ's leadership has
swung towards acknowledging the majority
public opinion. The attitude shared by most
parliamentary parties (apart from the Croatian
Party of Rights and some factions in the
Croatian Peasant Party HSS) is reflected in
the prevalent European practice of abortion
regulation - at the expense of the
institutionalisation of Christian Democrats'
Although Hebrang's statement does not reflect HDZ's official attitude, it indicates that
the balance in the HDZ's leadership has swung towards acknowledging the majority
public opinion. The attitude shared by most parliamentary parties ... is reflected in the
prevalent European practice of abortion regulation - at the expense of the
institutionalisation of Christian Democrats' views that life begins at the moment of
conception.  HDZ's party manifesto professes the same attitude.
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views that life begins at the moment of
conception.  HDZ's party manifesto professes
the same attitude.
At the same time, the feminist movement
stepped up in defence of the right to abortion,
as was the case on several different occasions
in the 1990s when there were signs that the
right to abortion could be limited as a result
of the pressure exerted by proponents of
pro-life attitudes.41 Both of these initiatives -
 the one defending the right to abortion and
the other defending the right to life according
to a Catholic understanding of it - primarily
address the public in the sense of promoting
their respective views, while women's
organisations speak more directly to the
Government and the Parliament, reminding
them of their responsibilities in implementing
the existing laws. There is no direct
communication between these parties, apart
from one-way items served in their own
respective or national media.
The Catholic Church's
activity as concerns the
right to medically
assisted fertilisation
It was in 2004 that the Church in Croatia first
came out with its views regarding medically
assisted fertilisation. With its own top-quality
experts and, on average, over 15,000
newborns on an annual basis, Croatia had
been one of the leading countries in this field
for 20 years. The reaction of the Church was
prompted by a Government bill that had been
brought before Parliament on October 1,
2004.  The bill, which was not affected by
successive changes in the Government
structure, was prepared by the Ministry of
Health's working group headed by Dubravka
©imonoviÊ, an expert in the legal aspects of
medically assisted fertilisation (MAF) and the
head of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's Board
for Human Rights. The passing of the new
law on MAF is a requirement that Croatia
must fulfil if it wants to join the EU, especially
as the old law from 1978 does not include
provisions for medical procedures which have
been developed in the meantime, such as
egg cell donation. An additional reason for
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the speedy passing of the law was a scandal
involving the illegal use and sale of egg cells,
which had previously resulted in a far-reaching
investigation carried out by the Ministry of
Health in 2003. While it seemed that this bill
presented a rare case of consensus between
the experts and politicians, the Government,
the opposition and non-governmental
organisations, CBC's statement of October
2, 2004 resulted in the Government's failure
to implement the decision already made to
bring its own bill before Parliament. This
caused a heated public discussion that has
been going on for four months ago.
The main objections of the Church in regard
to this bill refer to the availability of MAF to
unmarried women, the donation and use of
sperm and egg cells of third persons, and
particularly the selection of embryos during
embryo-transfer and the freezing of a number
of embryos for future procedures. In a
clarification issued at the beginning of 2005,
CBC representatives condemned “the
destruction of embryos” as a serious crime
against the sanctity of human life, which, they
believe, begins at the moment of conception,
and supported their claim by giving an
estimate that, in the last 20 years, 285,000
embryos have been destroyed for the sake
of bringing no more than 15,000 children into
this world.
Immediately after CBC's statement was
issued the bill disappeared from the legislative
procedure, and the working group which
wrote it never had a chance to make final
modifications. Even after several attempts
had been made by RODA, a reproductive
rights NGO, the media and MP AntiËeviÊ to
find the reasons for the withdrawal of the bill,
but the Government provided no clear answer
and offered vague replies, involving, for
instance, the need to be harmonised with
EU regulations,42 the need for the bill “to be
adjusted to our people”, and Minister
LjubiËiÊ’s most recent explanation that the
only thing that remained to be done was the
modification of the provisions on cloning. The
already confusing process in the passing of
this law was further complicated by a
statement made by the National Bioethical
Board on Medical Issues (Government’s
advisory body), which announced that their
working group would soon propose rather
fundamental amendments to the bill,
amendments which would be consistent with
CBC's objections. Even though Minister
LjubiËiÊ, and even deputy Prime Minister
Kosor, disassociated themselves from the
prospect of this advisory body being in charge
of drafting the new bill, it still remains unclear
as to what kind of Government bill on MAF
will be brought before Parliament. Meanwhile,
the Democratic Centre (DC) and the Croatian
The main objections of the Church in regard to this bill refer to the availability
of MAF to unmarried women, the donation and use of sperm and egg cells of
third persons, and particularly the selection of embryos during embryo-transfer
and the freezing of a number of embryos for future procedures.
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Social Liberal Party (HSLS) announced their
own drafts of the MAF law, in which DC's
draft will limit the availability of MAF to women
below the age of 45 who are married or in a
common law marriage, while HSLS has been
lobbying for the availability of MAF to all
women, regardless of age or marital status.
In February, the organisation RODA started
an Internet petition for the urgent passing of
the law, and a similar request has been made
by the Women's Network of Croatia.
In parallel with the events related to the bill,
CBC and expert Catholic organisations were
intensely involved in promoting their views in
the public and among Catholic believers, and
their methods, messages and arguments
met with strong criticism from experts, non-
governmental organisations, citizens and the
media. The issue of MAF has been extensively
dealt with in the Religious Communities' joint
statement43 from December 2004, and an
especially negative response from the public
was provoked by 170,000 leaflets distributed
in the door-to-door blessing of houses. The
leaflets, entitled “A Child - A Gift of God or
a Thing?” contained a condemnation of MAF
and referred to allegedly scientific indications
of malign consequences MAF can have on
women and children. The organisation RODA,
outraged by the Church's implicit message
that children born through MAF are a thing
and not a gift, organised a public protest on
February 4, 2005 in Maksimir, to which they
invited parents with children born with and
without MAF, and addressed CBC and the
public with the message “Guess who here
is a thing and who a gift”'. The CBC Office
for Family soon responded by addressing
the public and explaining that the Church
never even thought of a child being a thing,
regardless of how it was conceived, but it
also condemned MAF even more radically,
and particularly focused on the seriousness
of the crime of embryo destruction.
The discussion was further inflamed by the
Croatian Catholic Medical Association, at
whose conference the Church's attitudes
were defended by Prof. Damir BukoviÊ, Prof.
Albert Despot, and Ante KlobuËar, who listed
ample, allegedly scientific, proof that MAF
drastically increases the risk of ovarian cancer
and causes psychological and physical
malformations in children. In addition, the
media widely reported Dr. BukoviÊ's
statement that “the Bible is the best medical
book there is”. In a rapid response to this,
15 MAF experts took legal action with the
Ethics Board of the Croatian Medical
Chamber and the State Attorney's Office
against the above-mentioned doctors for
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using false information in order to frighten
the public. The Croatian Catholic Medical
Association then partly disassociated itself
from the problematic claims, saying that the
doctors in question were not members of
the Association. The organisation RODA
demanded that CBC issue a public apology
for having deceived the public on the issues
of infertility and MAF, as well as for inflaming
the public against people who fight against
infertility, and for attacking their children.
RODA also announced that if a similar
situation arose, they would seek legal
protection for these people's rights. CBC did
not respond to this demand. RODA’s
spokesperson reported that the organisation
received several calls over the next month
from worried women who have to face the
fears and resistance of their environment
regarding MAF, which is a direct consequence
of the way MAF has recently been portrayed
by Catholic doctors and CBC.
From the overview of the Catholic media,
one can see the Church’s activity on the
promotion of its views regarding MAF within
its own community during 2004 and 2005,
and particularly on the Day for Life (February
6, 2005), when Rijeka Archbishopric’s Office
for Family organised the discussion on
“Responsible parenthood, truths and
misconcept ions regarding art i f ic ia l
insemination”. On this occasion, Dr. Josip
Grbac pointed out the theological reason -
the “inseparability of the procreative element”,
as well as the bioethical reason – the
“problem of the surplus of embryos” as the
main grounds for the Church’s opposition to
MAF. The same explanation was stated in
June 2004 by Dr. Valentin PozaiÊ, the present
Assistant Bishop of Zagreb, on the occasion
of the discussion of NaPro technology which
the Church promotes as the only acceptable
alternative to MAF. Disapproval of MAF has
also been present in sermons and bishops'
other religious appearances in the public.
The Church's influence on MAF regulation
has obviously been considerable during the
past year - the government bill was not
brought before Parliament, and its main
provisions became the subject of public
discussion, even despite the fact that the bill
had already been adopted by the
Government. In addition, the main opposition
party, SDP, as well as non-governmental
organisations for reproductive rights
protection gave their approval for the bill and
its quick adoption in the Parliament. At the
same time the information presented by the
Catholic doctors stirred the public and
somewhat undermined the understanding of
The Church's influence on MAF regulation has obviously been considerable during
the past year the government bill was not brought before Parliament, and its
main provisions became the subject of public discussion, even despite the fact
that the bill had already been adopted by the Government.
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MAF as a procedure safe for the woman and
the baby. A strong moral condemnation of
MAF as an act that involves murder, as well
as the promotion of marital sex as being the
only morally correct option, introduced an
entirely new ethical dimension into this public
and expert discussion, whose ethical aspect
used to be limited to the prevention of abuse
of the procedure and illegal trade in genetic
material.
In this case the Church clearly showed its
willingness to directly comment on new laws,
which is significant in the case of MAF,
because the Church's potential success in
limiting embryo manipulation on bioethical
grounds (rather than exclusively for the
prevention of illegal trade) could be used as
legal basis for a request for the abolition of
the abortion law.44
On the other hand, the fierceness of the
moral condemnation and the questionable
validity of the information concerning MAF's
negative impact on health seem to have been
more harmful to the Church than to the public,
especially as the Church's attitudes have
received criticism from the leading experts
in this field, organisations and politicians, and
the media, who seem to have been more
inclined towards the Church's critics as well.
As the RODE representative Karmen Rivoseki-
SimiÊ said: “the Church really misjudged this
case because it touched upon what is most
dear to people - their children”.
The Catholic Church's
activity regarding the
right to sex education
Good quality sex upbringing (a term used by
the Church), or sex education (a name used
by Dr. ©tulhofer - an expert in the field), is
the most important prerequisite for the
realisation of reproductive and sexual rights
and health, and this is something that experts,
religious and state officials and citizens all
agree on, regardless of their political or
religious beliefs. The discussion that has been
going on since 2004 refers to the issue of
defining quality and the set of values and
ideological beliefs sex education should be
based on. At present, two extra-curricular,
optional sex education programmes are used
in the Croatian education system: the MEMO
AIDS Programme, organised by the
Reproductive Health Centre at the Children's
Illnesses Clinic in Zagreb, and the Teen STAR
Programme, organised by the Teen STAR
Organisation for Holistic Sex Education.
The Church has been clear in its attitude
towards the two programmes: while it publicly
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condemned MEMO AIDS in February 2004,
Teen STAR has been implemented in parishes
and schools since 1997 with CBC's
recommendation, and is regularly presented
at expert conferences organised by CBC's
Office for Family and Office for Catechesis.
In addition, the Board for the Assessment of
sex education programmes for primary and
secondary schools which was appointed by
the Ministry in January 2005 includes 5
Catholic theologians, who make up over a
fifth of the Board's members and are the
Board's only religious representatives. The
Church is, therefore, actively involved in the
shaping and implementation of sex education,
whose quality and ideological suitability it
understands in accordance with the following
principles, stated in the religious communities'
Joint Statement:
“'Our efforts are aimed at a good quality
upbringing for children and young people, a
system based on authentic scientific insights
and our shared ethical principles, which will
teach the children how to behave responsibly
toward their body and their sexuality, and
not reduce the teaching to a mere
familiarisation with techniques and methods
for the prevention of pregnancy and venereal
diseases. It should include sufficient objective
information on the development of life before
birth and promote respect for all its stages,
and it should have an introduction to the
ethical principles and norms for humane
behaviour in the field of human sexuality.”45
While this statement seemingly gives a lot of
room to Catholic theologians and reproductive
health experts to agree on the aims and
contents of sex education, (apart from the
issue of defining the beginning of human life),
the practice is radically different. Regardless
of the statement's mention of birth control
education as an integral, even though not
the central part of sex education, in its special
statement in February 2005, CBC severely
attacked the MEMO AIDS programme,
especially regarding the education of
secondary school students about the use of
condoms as insufficiently reliable and as
ethically unacceptable in protection against
HIV. It should also be mentioned that the
Church ignored what it usually regards as a
central aspect of sexual education, and which
is particularly stressed in the MEMO AIDS
programme - the development of a
responsible attitude towards one's own
sexuality by developing young people's
communication skills to help them become
more assertive and more competent in
refusing unwanted sexual contact.
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MEMO AIDS is the result of the Ministry of
Health's cooperation with UN's Global Fund,
and is a part of the National programme for
fighting HIV/AIDS as a focused, preventative
and successful education system, which was
supposed to be introduced into most
secondary schools in the academic year
2004/05 as an optional programme. After
CBC's reaction, the schools' interest in the
professional teacher training programmes of
MEMO AIDS suddenly dropped from a stable
80% to about 50%.46 Even though the signing
of a petition was started among the general
public against the Church's interference in
the programme, and although the president
of the National Programme for fighting
HIV/AIDS publicly defended the programme,
the Government, as a partner in the
programme's implementation, remained silent
until December 2005, after the president of
Global Fund's visit to Croatia, which prompted
the Secretary of the Ministry of Science,
Educat ion and Sports to send a
memorandum to  schoo ls  w i th  a
recommendation that they should become
involved in the programme. Dr. Hirπl-HeÊej,
the manager of the Centre for Reproductive
Health and the head of the MEMO AIDS
programme, holds the Government
responsible for the damage that has been
done to the programme, and, as a result of
a drop in the schools' response, the
programme will not be able to meet the
deadline for achieving its goals.
The example of MEMO AIDS shows the
strength of the indirect influence of the
Church, whose single decisive statement
was enough to influence the behaviour of a
number of headmasters, who, probably from
fear of being denounced as opponents of
the Church by their local community, chose
to remain passive on the issue of educating
young people about scientifically based
methods for the prevention of this lethal
illness.
The Teen STAR programme became the
focus of a public debate in November 2004,
when a complaint by the Kontra and Iskorak
legal team prompted the Office of the
Ombudsperson for Children to analyse the
programme and send a recommendation to
the Ministry of Education to condition the
programme's implementation by having it
harmonised with the legal requirements of
human rights protection within 15 days. The
Office found the existence of discrimination
regarding family and marital status, gender
and sexual orientation, a lack of accurate
and scientific information on birth control,
and a violation of a number of provisions of
The example of MEMO AIDS shows the strength of the indirect influence of the Church,
whose single decisive statement was enough to influence the behaviour of a number
of headmasters, who, probably from fear of being denounced as opponents of the Church
by their local community, chose to remain passive on the issue of educating young
people about scientifically based methods for the prevention of this lethal illness.
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the Convention on Children's Rights. These
violations were related to the obligation of
ensuring education on gender equality and
human rights as a crucial element of
educational programmes, and education for
promoting the respect of parents. At the
same time, the Ombudsperson for Gender
Equality, on the basis of correspondence with
the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports
regarding the same complaint, assessed the
documentation she received about the Teen
STAR programme as totally inadequate for
making any expert judgments.
While the public entered into a discussion
on the suitability of the programme, and the
Teen STAR representatives publicly stated
that they regard homosexuality as a less
worthy form of sexuality (for which
organisations Iskorak and Kontra pressed
charges with the State Attorney's Office), the
Ministry of Education avoided directly stating
its position and instead announced the setting
up of a special Board for the assessment of
all the sex education programmes. This also
postponed the Ministry's direct assessment
of  the amended proposal for a third sex
education programme entitled Human
sexuality and the quality of life, which the
Ombudsperson for Children had already
confirmed to be consistent with the
international and national standards for the
protection and promotion of human rights.
The Church, however, continued its public
and internal support for Teen STAR, without
paying much attention to the Ombudsperson
for Children's well-founded claims, and even
though the Republic of Croatia and the Holy
See both signed the Convention on Children's
Rights.
While the influence of the Catholic concept
of sex education on the Board's final sex
education proposal to the Minister will not
be known before the end of April, it is obvious
that the Church manages to have a negative
impact on the educational institutions'
willingness to voluntarily participate in
preventative programmes which openly
educate young people on birth control and
different forms of normal human sexuality.
This example also clearly points to Minister
Primorac's difficulty in expressing his opinion
on the relevance that the Catholic concept
of sex education has for state educational
programmes. Still, it is not known what
influence the Church has on the young people
themselves and their understanding of
sexuality, considering that research suggests
that adolescents in their intimate relationships
are not guided by their religion, or by
responsibility for their health for that matter
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(something which should be of Church's
concern as well).47
The Catholic Church's
activity regarding the
equality of sexual
minorities
Without going into the question of the Catholic
dogma on homosexuality, it can be said that
the Catholic Church's Catechism rejects
discrimination against homosexual persons,
some of whom, as the Catechism clearly
states, are not Christians, and the Church
has no right to expect them to adhere to
Catholic rules on sexual abstinence:
However, the Church must have compassion
for people with this problem. The Catholic
Church's Catechism requires that these
people are treated with respect, compassion
and consideration. “Any sign of unjust
discrimination towards them must be avoided.
These people are invited to realise God's will
in their life, and if they are Christians, to unite
with the sacrifice of the Lord’s Cross the
difficulties that they may encounter on
account of their condition” (no. 2357).48
A positive example of the application of its
own principle was when the Church did not
issue any kind of official condemnation of the
Gay Pride Parade in 2004, although the
Parade directly addressed the Catholic
Church's homophobia. The only religious
community which condemned Gay Pride
was the Evangelical Church. Also, an analysis
of the Catholic web pages indicates that the
more detailed theological texts which deal
with sexuality, such as the above mentioned
Dr. NikiÊ’s lecture, point to the unacceptability
of discrimination against homosexual people.
An example of discriminatory practice is the
reference to homosexuality found in the
textbook for the 8th grade of primary schools,
where it is described as a “wrong” and, later
on, “sinful form of sexuality”, without any
additional explanation of the importance of
avoiding discrimination against homosexual
people (as is stated in the Catechism).
Although Minister Primorac gave CBC the
recommendation of the Ombudsperson for
Gender Equality to have this formulation
harmonised with the Croatian and
international legislation, CBC responded by
changing the socio-moral category of “being
wrong” into the ethical-religious category of
“being sinful”, and by doing so managed to
disable further questioning of the legality of
An example of discriminatory practice is the reference to homosexuality found in the
textbook for the 8th grade of primary schools, where it is described as a “wrong” and,
later on, “sinful form of sexuality”, without any additional explanation of the importance
of avoiding discrimination against homosexual people...
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this statement. It is significant that in this
case the Minister acted as a mediator in the
legalisation of CBC's amendment, without
giv ing h is personal  v iews on the
Ombudsperson's arguments, and by doing
so gave precedence to Croatia's obligations
regarding its agreement with the Holy See,
and not the national and international legal
framework for human rights protection.
There are indications that Catechism teachers
risk losing their profession and their job in a
state service if CBC deprives them of their
licence to teach Catechism, on the grounds
of their minority sexual orientation, which,
according to the provisions of the Code of
Canon Law, is a violation of morality and can
be a legitimate reason for revoking their
licence. The problem is that in this case these
Croatian citizens would not be entitled to
protection from discrimination in the work
place as is stated in the Labour Act, since
the Church, according to the international
agreement between Croatia and the Holy
See, is not obliged to justify its reasons for
revoking the Catechism teachers' licences
to the state. Since the state did not foresee
such cases or the compensation mechanisms
in the case of a potential dismissal (and the
loss of profession as well, it seems), its ability
to give citizens protection is limited in this
context, and any lawsuit against Croatia at
the European Court of Human Rights would
likely end unfavourably for the state.49
The most widespread form of the Church's
negative influence on the equality of sexual
minorities is the existence of discriminatory
discourse in the Catholic press and the work
of Jutarnji List's columnist don Æivko KustiÊ,
as well as HTV religious programmes.50 Media
analysis carried out by the lesbian organisation
LORI,51 which from June 18 to December
17 2004 looked at 723 articles from 145
newspapers, showed that the coverage of
this topic in the only religious paper which
was analysed - Glas Koncila - was consistent
with the average amount of coverage this
topic received in the whole sample (11 items
in 10 months). However, Glas Koncila had
almost three times more items in which the
author’s attitude towards sexual minorities
was negative (18.2%), compared to the share
of the author's negative attitude in all of the
analysed items (5.8%). It is particularly
interesting that in Glas Koncila there is not a
single item where the author's attitude is
positive, compared to 7.5% of such articles
in the total sample. Since the organisations
which promote sexual minorities' rights follow
very closely the presence of homophobia in
the media, it can be expected that the
The most widespread form of the Church's negative
influence on the equality of sexual minorities is the
existence of discriminatory discourse in the Catholic
press and the work of Jutarnji List's columnist don
Æivko KustiÊ, as well as HTV religious programmes.
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Catholic media and journalists will have
increasing opportunity to justify the level of
accordance of their work with the national
and international legal framework of human
rights protection, which is consistent with
the Catholic Church's Catechism when it
comes to the treatment of discrimination
against homosexual people.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, the Catholic Church
during 2004 and the beginning of 2005
focused its “visible” (direct), and “invisible”
(indirect), influence on the regulation of human
sexuality and reproduction, a public policy
area that is particularly sensitive and important
in the sense that it is related to an intimate
human sphere where the issue of human
freedom and responsibility is particularly
emphasised. The engagement of the Church
was especially focused on affecting legislation,
education and the attitudes and behaviour
of individuals. The intention of the Church to
impose Christian/Catholic morality as the
sole morality in a community which is neither
de iure Christian/Catholic, nor de facto fully
Christian/Catholic, is questionable both from
a legal-political and an ethical aspect, as well
as from the aspect of societal openness.
According to the Croatian Constitution,
Croatia is a state separate from the Church,
while the Church aspires to the universality
of its particular ethical position. This leads to
a conflict between Catholic sexual morality
and politics which is based on the concept
of sexual and reproductive rights, supported
by the international legal order on the
protection of human rights. In the public,
both positions are presented in terms of their
diversity in relation to the opposing position
(“Catholic” vs. “liberal” standpoint), where
the insistence of the Church in characterising
individuals, societies and states that favour
the liberalisation of the policy of abortion,
medical ly-assisted concept ion and
euthanasia, as advocates of the “culture of
death”, stands out in its severity and
exclusivity.
The activity of the Church should be observed
in the context of a public debate characterised
by growing dynamics and pluralism which
prevail in the questioning attitudes of the
media and civil initiatives promoting diverse
values. This is something that is undoubtedly
indicative of the opening of Croatian society.
Regardless of the fact that they are convinced
in the unquestionable quality of their own
the Catholic Church during 2004 and the beginning of 2005 focused its “visible” (direct),
and “invisible” (indirect), influence on the regulation of human sexuality and reproduction,
a public policy area that is particularly sensitive and important in the sense that it is
related to an intimate human sphere where the issue of human freedom and responsibility
is particularly emphasised.
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position, the advocates of
both the liberal and the
Catholic concept primarily
turn to the public by directly
addressing the media, but
also through campaigns
aimed at the mobilisation
of citizens. In this way, the
advocates of sexual and
reproductive rights, in
addition to coming forward
in the media, organised three petitions and
three large public campaigns, sending
messages through which they reacted and
directly challenged the views of the Church.
The Church, on the other hand, used public
proclamations in its advocacy. The most
prominent in terms of the comprehensiveness
of its message and strength of public
statement was the Joint Statement of
Religious Communities: Human Life is a Gift
of God, while its main direct campaign, the
distribution of leaflets during the blessing of
houses, entitled A Child - A Gift of God or a
Thing? enabled it to directly communicate
with more than 150,000 citizens, Catholic
believers. In this public discussion, the
Church, besides recognising the importance
of having direct influence on public opinion,
expressed also the capacity of forming
coalitions within and outside its own religious
community. It is obvious that the Church,
regardless of it being convinced of the
unquestionable nature of its own views, is
very much aware of the democratisation of
Croatian society, and knows that it is not
possible to have an effect on formal and
informal societal regulations without becoming
involved in public discussion and without
attentively listening to public opinion.
Therefore, this case clearly reflects the trend
of the opening of Croatian society, and the
Catholic Church also contributes to it with
its readiness for public advocacy.
The negative impact of the Catholic Church
on societal openness, which can be observed
when analysing its activity in the context of
this public policy, relates to the formal and
informal favoured position of the Church in
public discussion and in the process of
enacting public policies, but also to the
content of its requirements that are based
on a Catholic dogma, and which do not take
sufficiently into consideration the fact that
Croatian society is a heterogeneous one in
terms of needs, morality and views in
connection with sexuality and reproduction.
In realising its requirements, the Church may
continue to partially rely on its “invisible”
(indirect) influence which has been derived
from the re-traditionalisation of society during
The negative impact of the
Catholic Church on societal
openness, which can be
observed when analysing its
activity in the context of this
public policy, relates to the
formal and informal favoured
position of the Church in
public discussion and in the
process of enacting public
policies...
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the 1990s. A clear indicator of the “invisible
influence” of the Church in this case is the
sudden retreat of the school principals who
had been presented with the MEMO AIDS
educational programme after it had been
publicly condemned by the Church. It can
be observed that the Church is adapting to
the world in terms of its way of acting in
society, without, at the same time, renouncing
its privileged position. However, it also
continues its efforts to adapt the world to
itself in terms of the values and rules it
advocates. In doing so, its expectations are
unrealistic.
While the influence of the Catholic Church
on the Parliament and the Government is
mainly indirect, when it comes to the working
bodies which draft proposals of individual
laws, and to counselling bodies, it has an
indirect influence on the composition of these
bodies, but it also has a direct influence on
the proposals which are finally sent to the
Parliament and Government. The Church,
for example, can exert both types of influence
within the National Bioethics Commission for
Medicine and the Commission for the
Assessment of all Sexual Education
Programmes that are implemented in primary
and secondary schools. The exaggerated
presence of representatives of the Catholic
Church in these bodies and in public
discussion in general is manifested in the
fact that representatives of other views, for
example,  representat ives of  other
confessions, and scholars in other professions
relating to the humanities
such as non-Catholic
philosophers, theologists,
or sociologists are not
represented at least in
equal measure.
In view of the presented
ana lys is ,  a  genera l
recommendat ion  i n
connection to the current
influence of the Catholic
Church relates to the
necessity of limiting the
“visible” (direct) and
“ inv is ib le”  ( ind i rect )
influence of the Church in the shaping of
public policy, and previously also in public
discussion. In this, we should refer to those
provisions in the Constitution of the Republic
of Croatia and to those laws that guarantee
the separation of the Church from the state,
and respect for the rights of individuals,
regardless of their religious/confessional
affiliation. To limit the influence of the Church,
the primary responsibility lies with the
authorities and with state institutions which
To limit the influence of the
Church, the primary
responsibility lies with the
authorities and with state
institutions which are entrusted
to ensure the rule of law and
which decide on the direct
involvement of nongovernmental
actors in the legislative process.
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are entrusted to ensure the rule of law and
which decide on the direct involvement of
nongovernmental actors in the legislative
process. For this purpose, it would be useful
to conduct and expert analysis of the degree
of harmonisation of the provisions of
international agreements with the Holy See
on one hand, with the national legislation and
international conventions dealing with the
protection of human rights which the Republic
of Croatia has signed on the other hand, in
order to consider realistic strategies of
meeting different and, in some cases,
especially in the area of education, conflicting,
obligations.
The need to limit the influence of the Church
does not mean that the Catholic Church as
an institution, or experts with Catholic views,
should not participate in public discussion,
or in counselling bodies, on issues that directly
relate to specific public policies, including
the policies of sexual and reproductive health
and rights. The stress is on the significant
difference between discussion, or dialogue,
on specific ethical or social issues with
Catholic theologists in suitable forums on the
one hand, and negotiations of the state with
the Catholic Church as an institution about
the legal-political regulation of these issues
on the other hand.
In this sense, the media, state institutions
and NGOs should commit themselves to
discussing with groups and individuals in the
Catholic Church as an institution and as a
community of believers who are prepared for
public discussion, without implications of the
unquestionable nature of the official Catholic
science in the context of considering specified
public policies. In this case, there is
considerable room for agreement on
fundamental values related to the policy of
reproductive and sexual health and rights,
such as responsibility, self-respect, respect
for a person’s dignity, gender equality,
honesty, solidarity, and non-violence.
As for the Church, it should carefully consider
its attitude towards democracy and pluralism,
both from the aspect of the role of the Church
in a democratic society, and from the aspect
of the internal democratisation of the Church
itself as an institution, and the Church as a
community of believers. This also means that
the Church, instead of emphasising the power
of the Catholic Church as an institution,
should focus on the responsibility of
individuals who consider themselves
Catholics, which also implies the responsible
activity of the Catholic Church as an institution
in the spirit of the Vatican II Council’s
Declaration Dignitatis Humanae52 which gives
The Church should carefully consider its attitude towards
democracy and pluralism, both from the aspect of the role
of the Church in a democratic society, and from the aspect
of the internal democratisation of the Church itself as an
institution, and the Church as a community of believers.
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priority to the recognition of human dignity
and freedom. The responsibility, of course,
also lies with those who create the conditions
(and determine the limits) for the activities of
the Catholic Church within a pluralist society,
and these are primarily state institutions and
the media.
The implementation of this recommendation
- as much as it is not desirable for the Catholic
Church and is uncomfortable for the
authorities - would probably not face
resistance among those citizens who declare
themselves Catholics. This can be explained
by the fact that the attitudes of the Catholic
Church towards abort ion, art i f ic ia l
insemination and sexual education, or the
implicit or explicit requirements that its views
be translated into a more restrictive legal
regulation of these issues, have recently been
received with growing and more visible
dissatisfaction by citizens.53 As public
discussion crystallises the understanding that
all these issues, as well as the requirements
of the Church, are interconnected, and that
the democratic formation of public policy is
inseparable from a responsible assessment
of all the proposals, so it can finally be
expected that the Church will become
increasingly aware that a pluralist, secular
society is, in the long run, destined to
“openness to truth”54  and dialogue, in which
the Church is an important, yet no more than
equal, interlocutor.
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The position of the Serbian national minority
in Croatia 2004 - positive steps, key issues
and recommendations
Nataπa ©krbiÊ
Introduction: Subject
matter and method
One of the most complex political issues of
the Croatian post-communist and post-war
transition is the issue of relationship towards
national minorities, the Serb minority in
particular. According to the 2001 Census,
7.5% of the Croatian population, or 331,383
persons, are members of sixteen national
minorities, the most numerous being the Serb
minority with 201,631 persons, or 4.5% of
the total population.1 According to a number
of indicators, the Serbian minority is in a
particular position. The change of status from
being a constituting people in former
Yugoslavia to obtaining the status of a national
minority in the Republic of Croatia sets this
ethnic group the challenge of inventing a new
identity in the framework of the political
community. Although this is a minority with
the largest number of citizens, its share in
the population has been drastically reduced
due to the most recent war events – from
13% (according to the 1991 Census) to 4.5%
(according to the 2001 Census). About
300,000 Croatian Serbs left Croatia during,
and after, the war. It is estimated that about
200,000 refugees, mainly Croatian Serbs,
are still in the neighbouring countries, most
of them in Serbia and Montenegro, while a
smaller part are in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and abroad. This drastic drain of an ethnic
group has not yet been sufficiently raised as
a problem in Croatia, neither is there a clear
view of all the causes and consequences of
such a situation.
Pursuant to many international agreements
and political accession criteria imposed by
the EU, Croatia, through its policy on
minorities, has taken on the task of removing
the negative consequences of the inter-ethic
conflict that arose in the war, and the
problematic relations between the majority
Croatian people and the members of the
Serbian minority after the war. According to
many, with its Constitutional Act on the Rights
of National Minorities of 2002, Croatia is
today at the very top of European legal
solutions dealing with the legislative regulation
of minority rights, although there is still room
 for developing and complementing the
institution of protection and development of
minority rights. As a member of the Council
of Europe since 1996, Croatia has ratified
the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights.2 Pursuant to Article 140
of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,
international agreements are part of the
internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia
and supersede national ones.
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This case study consists of three
key parts as well as a conclusion
with recommendations: 1) Brief
overview of the political and
social context of the Serbian
minority until 2003; 2) Changes
after the 2003 elections: the
pol i t ical strategy of HDZ
regarding minority Serbs; 3) Perspectives of
the Serbian minority on the positive steps,
obstacles and recommendations for the
period of 2004 and the beginning of 2005;
4) Conclusion and recommendations. The
methods used are qualitative ones, and
include an analysis of texts from the media,
documents and reports of international and
local NGOs, observation of a thematic
meeting on housing care in post-war areas,
an individual and a group interview with 10
members of minorities, and consultations
with UNHCR representatives.
Brief overview of the
political and social
context of the Serbian
minority until 2003
Since the end of the war in Croatia,3 Serbian
returnees, but also those Serbs who had
remained in the country, have been facing a
number of discriminatory policies which
prevent them from exercising their basic
human rights. Two key discriminatory laws
were adopted after the war, whose
consequences are still being felt. Pursuant
to the Act on the Temporary Takeover and
Administration of Specified Property of 1995,
about 19,000 housing units, almost fully
owned by citizens of Serbian nationality, were
allocated to refugees, mostly Croats from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, preventing for a
considerable period of time the return of the
original owners to their homes. The second
Act on Areas of Special State Concern of
1996 allowed the temporary tenants to
become owners of the property after ten
years of uninterrupted use. In spite of efforts
invested by the international community, and
specific assistance provided for the
reconstruction of destroyed houses, until the
Programme of Return was passed in 1998,
there had been no serious steps made
towards the reconstruction of destroyed
houses. However, even after that, it was
considered that the efforts made for the
reconstruction of Serb-owned houses by the
Croatian Government, except in cases of
cooperation with the international community,
were insignificant. As a consequence of
negative policies, long-term absence, and
Since the end of the war in
Croatia, Serbian returnees,
but also those Serbs who had
remained in the country, have
been facing a number of
discriminatory policies which
prevent them from exercising
their basic human rights.
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numerous obstacles to return, a large number
of Serbian refugees had not returned, and
neither could it be foreseen that this situation
would change.
The change of government in 2000 led for
the first time to the adoption of more serious
measures, including budget plans. However,
numerous obstacles to return had had their
effect in discouraging return or placing the
Serbian minority in a long-term position of
inequality.
As indicated by the sociologist Æupanov, it
is not possible to restore the pre-war
demographic structure, so that the
“dislocation of the population will be
expressed as an irreversible process.
However, the new facticity will not cease to
be a problem but will be built into the new
stability of this area” (Æupanov, 1998:219).
Another sociologist, KatunariÊ, considers that
the post-war reintegration and restoration of
coexistence of Serbs and Croats will be
difficult, but the key issue is the “official or
unofficial” strategy of the political leadership:
“If the tone of this area of politics continues
to be marked by ethnic homogenisation
together with a component of ethnic
cleansing, the amount of hate among the
population will become a more or less
irrelevant fact. What is most important, as in
any political process, is the official or unofficial
attitude taken by the political leadership”
(KatunariÊ: 280-281).
It was only the outcome of the parliamentary
and presidential elections in 2000 that
changed this political “tone”, leading to the
greatest political changes since the elections
of the 1990s. After the elections, there was
also an expectation that the Croatian
Government of that time would work on
intensifying the return of Serbian refugees to
Croatia. In the period of 2000-2002, the key
laws dealing with the issue of return were
reviewed, and the discriminatory provisions,
which had earlier favoured ethnic Croats,
were eliminated, but the legal solutions
continued to primarily protect the interests
of temporary tenants over the original owners,
because the rights of the latter could only be
exercised after alternative accommodation
had been found for the temporary tenants.4
Pursuant to the Act on Citizenship and
Electoral Laws, citizenship, and the right to
vote that accompanies it, is granted to Croats
living abroad, and not in any way connected
with their former homeland, only on the basis
of ethnic belonging. On the other hand, the
Government of 2000 did not introduce a
provision granting to many Croatian Serbs
exiled in 1995, who wished to become
Pursuant to the Act on Citizenship and Electoral Laws,
citizenship, and the right to vote that accompanies it, is granted
to Croats living abroad, and not in any way connected with
their former homeland, only on the basis of ethnic belonging.
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citizens again, the right to prove their status
with documents in order to be given the right
to vote, and, eventually, also the right to
return. Not even today has an amendment
to the law been passed which would resolve
this problem and create equal opportunities
for obtaining citizenship, regardless of ethnic
belonging.
Besides the above-mentioned legal
amendments, the Government has also
introduced specific changes in connection
with the unfavourable conditions related to
the reconstruction of houses when the Serbs
for the first time began more intensive
reconstruction compared with that of the
Croats. However, according to the opinions
of the Croatian majority, as well as the minority
Serbian community, the steps that RaËan’s
Government took were not sufficient,
especially in regard to the right of real estate
owners and revoked tenancy rights. Although
this was the Government that “paved the
way” through numerous legal regulations and
measures working towards an intensification
of return and the abolishment of discriminatory
provisions, it did not do enough, and the
general impression remains that it lacked real
political will (or courage) to fully accept and
implement the protection of the basic human
rights of all its citizens, regardless of their
nationality or faith. The 2003 elections, leading
to HDZ regaining power, led to new political
changes in Croatia, to the strengthening of
the orientation towards European integration
and, for many, an unexpected, but positive,
turn in minority policy.
Changes after the 2003
Elections: the political
strategy of HDZ regarding
minority Serbs
There have been three crucial and specific
political moves made by the HDZ Government
regarding the Serbian minority - The
Agreement on Cooperation with SDSS
(Independent Democratic Serbian Party), the
signing of a bilateral agreement on the
protection of minorities between Croatia and
Serbia and Montenegro, and support given
to the work of the Council for National
Minorities and the councils of national
minorities. In addition to specific political
moves, the political leaders also sent for the
first time an explicit message to the public,
at a symbolic level, on the attitude towards
the Serbian minority, compressed in
Sanader’s Christmas greeting “Christ is born”
to the citizens of the Orthodox faith, and in
There have been three crucial and specific political moves made by the HDZ Government
regarding the Serbian minority - The Agreement on Cooperation with SDSS, the signing
of a bilateral agreement on the protection of minorities between Croatia and Serbia and
Montenegro, and support given to the work of the Council for National Minorities and
the councils of national minorities.
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the visit to a family of returnees in the
hinterland of Zadar.
In December 2003, the Independent
Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS), in
exchange for giving a vote of confidence to
Ivo Sanader’s Government, signed the
“Agreement on Cooperation between the
New Government and the Independent
Serbian Democratic Party in the Croatian
Parliament”.
Among other things, the Agreement contains
six points relating to the full return of refugees,
the repossession of illegally occupied Serbian
property within 6 months, and damages for
demolished property outside the areas
referred to by the applicable Reconstruction
Act. In this Agreement, the government
undertook to implement within 3 months the
provisions of the Constitutional Act on National
Minorities which guarantee the participation
of minorities in bodies of local and regional
government, the foundation of councils of
national minorities as counselling bodies at
the local level, and the Council for National
Minorities as an umbrella organisation
promoting national minority interests at the
national level, the allocation of budget funds,
and the introduction and participation of
minorities in public and political life which is
derived from the Constitutional Act.5 As
agreed, the Government will fund the training
of members of local minority councils,
established to advise local government bodies
on political issues of interest for minority
communities.6
In December 2004, Prime Ministers Sanader
and Koπtunica also signed the Agreement
on the Mutual Protection of National Minorities
between Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia.
Pursuant to this Agreement, both
governments are committed to preserving
the existing level of protection of minority
rights while the “mother states” commit
themselves to financially assisting the
preservation of the cultural identity of their
minorities.
At a symbolic level, one of the most significant
events, covered by all the media, including
the main news programme of national
television, was the visit of the Prime Minister
and the Speaker of Parliament to the Serbian
National Council in Zagreb at its Christmas
reception. On that occasion, Prime Minister
Sanader forwarded his greetings to Orthodox
believers with the traditional “Christ is born”,
followed by, “Being a new government, we
are proud that we have succeeded in
establishing cooperation and in signing an
2 1 6
agreement with representatives of the Serbian
and other national minorities. We are proud
of that, and, as a government, we will act in
such way to heal the wounds caused during
the war. We have agreed to make the
humanitarian aspects of our cooperation a
priority and we will take this into account”.
(Novi list, 7 January 2004). He also added
that his “Government wishes to show, both
at a demonstrative and also at a substantial
level, that the manner in which it began its
mandate does in fact represent what it really
means”. On this occasion, the Speaker of
the Parliament, Vladimir ©eks, who had arrived
with the Prime Minister, said that “The bitter
and tragic experiences of our recent past
must be left behind… The time of
misunderstandings and discord is behind us.
Now a time is coming when we will build a
better and happier future together and in
harmony”. The reactions of the president of
the Serbian People’s Council, Milorad
Pupovac, were also optimistic, “In Croatia a
time of new relations is coming which the
Government of the new Prime Minister defines
in its programme and in its first steps [and
that the Serbs in Croatia now] have access
to a form of cooperation and partnership
which will additionally encourage and
st imulate Croat ia to meet general
expectations”.
Another symbolic move covered in the media
was the visit to returnees in Benkovac, a
municipality where the least progress has
been made in relation to the return of the
Serbs, on which occasion the Prime Minister
again stressed that “we wish to build a new
future, for all our citizens”.
Overview of
implementation of the
Agreement with SDSS
In its Human Rights Report for Croatia, the
State Department mentions that the Croatian
Government in 2004 strengthened its efforts
on the return of refugees, especially in the
area of reconstruction and restitution of illegally
occupied houses. A total of about 80% of
assistance in the reconstruction of houses
was provided for the Serbs, which follows
on the trend of 2003 when the total
reconstruction of Serbian houses amounted
to 75%. According to this report the number
of legally and illegally occupied properties
has been significantly reduced.7 However, it
also mentions that, in cases dealing with the
restitution of property, laws still implicitly
favour the Croats over the Serbs and that
another 1,750, mostly Serbian, refugees
could not access their property occupied by
Croats.
In its Human Rights Report for Croatia, the State Department mentions that the
Croatian Government in 2004 strengthened its efforts on the return of refugees,
especially in the area of reconstruction and restitution of illegally occupied houses.
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About 12,478 people returned from Serbia
and Montenegro in 2004. According to the
Government’s data, an average of 115,148
refugees (mostly Serbs) have returned to the
country since 1995. The repossession of
occupied private property, mostly owned by
Serbs, also significantly speeded up the
process of reconstruction of damaged and
demolished houses. During 2004, the
Government reconstructed 9,000 houses
and flats of mainly Serbian returnees. The
repossession of occupied property was also
accelerated, although, as it seems from
available reports,8 the Government in 2004
was still giving precedence to the rights of
the temporary occupants, mostly Croats,
over the rights of the legal owners, minority
Serbs. The number of legally occupied houses
and flats was reduced from about 3,500 in
January to 1,197 in September. The number
of illegally occupied houses and flats was
reduced from an average of 500 in January
to about 54 in December. Also according to
UNHCR records from 2000 to 2005
(especially since 2003), great strides were
taken at the national level, and repossession
of property was executed in about 94% of
cases.9  However,  the problem of
accommodation of former tenancy right
holders, mostly ethnic Serbs, to socially-
owned property is stil l present. The
Government has adopted a number of
measures to allow former tenancy right
holders in Zagreb and other large cities to
rent or buy flats built by the state at a reduced
rate. Although efforts have been made
towards the restitution of lost tenancy rights
to socially-owned property, real progress has
yet to be made.10
Difficulties in implementing the Agreement
within the set timeline did not escape this
Government either, and increasingly frequent
complaints were heard during the year from
the leaders of the Serbian minority, which
“peaked” in the spring of 2004. At the request
of minority leaders and NGOs, the timelines
for the regulation of foreigner status and the
submission of claims for housing care, for
the repossession of property and
compensation in areas (outside areas of
special state concern) where no laws can be
applied, was extended.11 Although the “end
of the coalition” was increasingly stressed in
the media due to the obstruction of return
and non compliance with the Agreement, it
is obvious that both contractual sides tended
towards a compromise, and that the HDZ
leadership was continuing to show readiness
to implement the Agreement.
A meeting of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and
his associates with the representatives of the
Independent Democratic Serbian Party
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(SDSS), Milorad Pupovac and
Vojislav StanimiroviÊ, was held
in March 2004, confirming the
agreement that a Government
Commission would supervise
the implementation of the Agreement. After
the meeting, Sanader said, “There are certain
problems in implementing this Agreement in
the field, and at today’s meeting all doubts
have been cleared” (Hina, 25 March 2004).
 It was decided that the Commission would
make sure that the most important item of
the Agreement be implemented within the
set timeline, 30 June 2005, in other words,
the restitution of illegally occupied property
to their rightful owners, and that the task of
the Commission was to find accommodation
for the people who had been occupying this
property and who did not have any other
solution. On that occasion, Milorad Pupovac
stressed that all guarantees had been given,
that all the rulings on reconstruction claims
which had been submitted in due time would
be issued by the end of April, and that they
had established the dynamics of restitution
of about 500 housing units to their owners
by the end of July.
As for the restitution of tenancy rights, in
August 2004 the Government admitted that
they had only to begin implementing this
package of measures. In order to intensify
return and encourage the provision of
information, the Government initiated a public
information campaign and extended the
deadline for the submission of claims by
former users of flats in areas that were not
affected by the war to September 2005. It
was concluded at the last meeting of
representatives of NGOs, the Ministry, and
UNHCR that neither the campaign nor the
provisions had borne any results.12 NGO
representatives considered that the Housing
Care Campaign implemented by the Croatian
Government and UNHCR was inadequately
conceived because the deadline for lodging
a claim for housing care, set for 30 June
2005, was too short, and the campaign itself
did not present examples of positively
resolved claims, which was of key importance
to motivate people to submit claims. Until
now, there have been 2,350 claims, out of
which 980 relate to rent, and others to the
purchase of flats. Priority will be given to
claims for renting flats. However, to begin
resolving these issues it is first necessary to
resolve the issue of state-owned property,
because the flats are mainly registered as
socially owned or owned by individual
companies, and only when they are registered
as state property may the procedure continue,
and thereafter they can be sold.
In order to intensify return
and encourage the provision
of information, the
Government initiated a public
information campaign and
extended the deadline for the
submission of claims by
former users of flats in areas
that were not affected by the
war to September 2005.
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Besides the mentioned housing care scheme
(Government of the Republic of Croatia and
UNHCR) which began 10 months later than
had been foreseen, and thus the time to
submit a claim was in real terms reduced,
there is also the pro-return campaign
conducted by the Croatian Government,
OSCE, and the Serbian Democratic Forum
(SDF). However, the opinion of NGOs is that
none of these campaigns has been visible
enough to the public, either in Serbia or in
Croatia. Besides pointing to the inadequacy
of these campaigns and requesting an
extension of deadlines, NGO representatives
also express doubt in the existence of political
will to provide housing care, since HRK 21
million from the 2004 budget which had been
allocated to housing care was not spent but
reallocated to reconstruction. In the case of
devastated property, the Ministry of the Sea,
Transport, Tourism and Development
proposed to  the  D i rectora te  fo r
Reconstruction to resolve cases of devastated
property through a settlement: reconstruction
or payment in cash. According to the
experiences of NGOs, settlement often proves
to be a fiction because the assessment of
the value of the property is not realistic.
The part of the State Department report
dealing with the processing of war crimes
mentions the problem of trials for war crimes,
which are still considered to be “ethnically
biased against the Croatian Serbs”. The
OSCE report stresses that criminal
prosecution for war crimes is still more
motivated by “ethnic factors than by an
impartial administration of justice”. The report
states that a different
rate of convictions
and acquittals was
recorded depending
on the ethnic identity
of the accused - 67%
of ethnic Serbs were
convicted compared
to 25% of ethnic
Croats.13 The CHC
report also states that
proceedings in the absence of the accused,
“in spite of efforts to reduce this practice,
involved almost exclusively Serbs”. The OSCE
Mission, which monitors and reports on
domestic criminal proceedings, stresses the
lack of impartiality, the pressure made on
witnesses and the need for the additional
training of judges and prosecutors.
Pursuant to electoral law, up to eight seats
in Parliament are reserved for members of
national minorities. Out of 152 members of
Parliament, eight are elected into Parliament
Out of 152 members of Parliament,
eight are elected into Parliament as
minority representatives. At the
November 2003 elections, members
of minorities participated in larger
numbers than in 2000, so that the
Serbs elected three representatives.
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as minority representatives. At the November
2003 elections, members of minorities
participated in larger numbers than in 2000,
so that  the Serbs e lected three
representatives. According to the law,
minorities also have to be represented in local
government bodies, provided that the share
of minority members in the local population,
according to the Census, reaches a specified
percentage. This legal provision was mainly
implemented after the Government and the
Independent Democratic Serbian Party
(SDSS) had signed the Agreement in
December 2003, but it was not standardised
across all the units of local self government.
Elections for the local councils of minorities
took place on 18 May 2003, but due to a
lack of Government support, short deadlines
and the poor organisation of the minority
organisations, fewer than half of the councils,
to which minorities are entitled pursuant to
the Constitutional Act on National Minorities,
were elected. Additional elections for
members of the councils of national minorities
were held on 15 February 2004 in 15
counties, 64 towns and 132 municipalities,
with a turnout of about 8% of the total minority
population.
Another big challenge for the sustainability
of return of minorities, but also for the entire
Serbian minority, has been the difficult and
slow economic development. Although the
Government passed measures for the
economic development of areas of return
through the Act on Areas of Special State
Interest, and although the first two operational
plans have been drafted for the County of
Zadar and the County of ©ibenik-Knin, there
are no specific measures designed for
returnees. Economic and employment
opportunities for minority returnees are scarce,
due to discrimination in employment both in
bodies of local government and in the public
sector. The Constitutional Act of December
2002 binds the state to ensure a pre-war
level of minority representation in local
government bodies, as well as in state, county
and municipal courts. However, in most areas
the law has not yet been adequately
implemented.
The SDF is conducting ad hoc field research
on the employment of members of the
Serbian minority in bodies of local
government, the justice system, the police,
public companies and the private sector in
eighteen municipalities with a minority
population and returnees.14 The findings of
this study vary from municipality to
municipality. However, they generally show
an extremely low representation of members
Economic and employment opportunities for minority returnees
are scarce, due to discrimination in employment both in
bodies of local government and in the public sector.
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of the Serbian minority in bodies of state
administration and the justice system, and
in many places they are not even ensured
representation in bodies of executive power.
The Agreement by which the Government
made an undertaking to implement within 3
months the provisions of the Constitutional
Act on National Minorities which guarantee
minority representation in bodies of local and
regional government (Article 22), according
to this albeit preliminary research, has not
been implemented, and the results show that
the Government has not systematically met
the obl igat ion of the proport ional
representation of minority members in the
police, the justice system and the public
services.
Not even during 2004 did the Government
accept, or “convalidate”, the legal and
administrative documents of citizens of
Serbian nationality (in most cases related to
years of service) for the period of 1991-1995,
which is another obstacle to the return and
reintegration of Serbian refugees. Without
the acceptance of these documents, minority
Serbs cannot resolve a number of problems,
from pensions and disability insurance to
determining their work experience, which
prevents them from exercising their social
rights.
The attitudes of the
majority population and
refugee Serbs related
to return
The attitude of the public towards the return
of Serbs to Croatia has been slowly changing,
but is still far from positive. With the aim of
encouraging return, and through the
organisation of a pro-return campaign in the
countries of former Yugoslavia during 2003
and 2004, the OSCE Mission to Croatia,
financially supported by the US Agency for
International Development (USAID),
conducted research on attitudes related to
the return of refugees and attitudes related
to the support to return.15 Research results
show that out of 1,000 surveyed Serbian
refugees from Croatia who live in Serbia and
Montenegro, only 14% expressed a relatively
strong intention of returning to Croatia, and
only 5% firmly intend to return to their pre-
war homes in the next five years, which
confirms the doubts that, due to an
excessively long process of return and
discriminatory policies, a large number of
Croatian Serbs have most probably decided
to become permanently integrated in the
country of refuge.
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On the other hand, within the framework of
the same research, the results of the Croatian
research agency Puls show that there is still
resistance among the Croats in Croatia to
the return of the Serbs who fled, because
about 63% of Croat respondents who live,
and who had also lived before the war, in
areas from which the Serbs fled, consider
that the return of the Serbs is not a good
thing for Croatia, and only 26% of local Croats
in the post-war areas claim that it is good for
Croatia if the refugee Serbs return to their
homes.16 However, in spite of the negative
attitude of the majority towards the return of
Serbs to Croatia, as many as 65% of Croats
who had lived in the areas from which the
Serbs fled even before 1990 think that
coexistence with the Serbs is, after all, mainly
or wholly possible. About 30% of respondents
consider that life with the Serbs is today
impossible, while 6% do not have a clear
view of this issue.
The identity policy of the
Serbian minority
The factor which speaks most eloquently
about the negative attitude and the still deep
ambivalence of the Croatian public, as well
as of politicians, towards the attempts of the
Serbian minority to begin building their “new”
identity by way of various symbols, and thus
exercise their rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, are the media.
During 2004 and at the beginning of 2005,
the easiest way of focusing on the challenges
of the policy of the identity building of the
Serbian minority in Croatia was by following
the media. Although the media coverage of
the Serbs, according to reports by the CHC,
continues, with a falling trend in proclamations
of hate, we cannot yet speak of a pro-minority
media policy. There are two illustrative
examples, and both relate (only) to symbols:
the right of the Serbian minority in Croatia to
a coat-of-arms and an anthem, and the
change of names of the streets in Plaπki.
The news that the Serbs in Croatia will soon
have their coat-of-arms, flag and anthem,
irrespective of the fact that such a right is
guaranteed by the Constitution to all national
minorities, was presented as a sensation in
the media and was mainly received with
animosity. A smaller proportion of politicians
and experts consider that this was a legitimate
and innocuous matter, but most of them,
including Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and
President MesiÊ, warn that, due to the recent
... as many as 65% of Croats who had lived in the areas from
which the Serbs fled even before 1990 think that coexistence
with the Serbs is, after all, mainly or wholly possible.
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war, this issue remains a sensitive spot and
that the representatives of the Serbian
community in Croatia should take this fact
into account. Journalist Darko Plevnik also
speaks about a negative reaction to this move
in the daily Slobodna Dalmacija. “From
ordinary citizens to the citizen-president MesiÊ
comes a rerun of old films and fears: if the
Serbs obtain what we have provided for them
in the Constitution for the sake of the EU -
their own symbols - they will again gain power
and build themselves a state within a state,
evoke Greater Serbia, and disrupt this painfully
gained eschatological peace among the
Croats.”17
The newest example in Plaπki relating to the
decision of 22 March to change the names
of streets, passed by SDSS, which is the
ruling party in the area, was not received
much better. The print media announced in
unison that this move is “a provocation
threatening coexistence” (Vjesnik), “an
example of irresponsible politics” or “a
continuation of Chetnik provocation with
Greater Serbia” (Jutarnji list) calling on the
leaders of the Serbian community to revoke
the decision. On national television, HTV, in
the most viewed programme, Otvoreno,18
the programme editor and presenter, besides
insisting on describing this event as an
incident , also stressed her ethnic Croatian
status, and with the choice of guests and
the broadcasting of “offensive” telephone
calls, allowed the untrammelled expression
of opinions, such as the one that “the idea
of Greater Serbia, although defeated, still
lives” or that this is so because “Chetniks are
sitting in the Croatian Parliament”.19
Such reactions have been further encouraged
by the recent establishment of the “Republic
of Srpska Krajina in Exile”, which was severely
condemned even by the leaders of the
Serbian minority in Croatia. However, at the
same time in Croatia Ustasha symbols are
glorified, monuments are raised, and different
forms of extreme right-wing behaviour on the
streets are tolerated.  However, such a surplus
of expression of national identity on the
Croatian side does not cause an equal
response of the public and the media,
although positive moves have been made if
we take into account the reaction of the
leading party which, since the demolition of
the monuments to Jure FrancetiÊ in Slunj
and Mile Budak in Lovinec in the summer of
2004, has began to consistently demolish
Ustasha monuments and publicly condemn
extreme right-wing outbursts.20
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Perspectives of the
Serbian minority on the
positive steps and key
obstacles
A consultation meeting21 included nine
representatives of the Serbian minority, also
members of the Council for National
Minorities, representatives of minority NGOs,
other NGOs which deal with the protection
of minority rights and the provision of free
legal aid, and the representatives of local
authorities from Dalmatia (Knin and Biskupija),
Lika (Korenica and Vrhovine), western
Slavonia (Pakrac), Karlovac and Zagreb. An
individual interview was conducted with a
representative of an NGO from eastern
Slavonia (Osijek).
Perspectives related
to positive steps
Key positive steps are mostly reflected in the
fact that the Serbian minority is much less
afraid of turning to institutions and to the
public, and that communication is improving,
as are the relationships between Croats and
Serbs at the level of the local community
- “a Serbian returnee today feels much better,
he is able to walk around without holding his
head down”, and people are becoming
increasingly focused on economic survival
so that “nationality is no longer as important
as it used to be in the previous period”.
Excessive behaviour is subsiding, and
communication among the members of
different nationalities in the population has in
genera l  improved.  In  th i s  case ,
communication is easier with “local Croats,
while it is more difficult with immigrants,
usually due to property legal relations”.
Proclamations of hate in the media are not
as evident, although there is no significant
progress in the sense of promoting an anti-
discrimination policy towards the Serbian
minority. “If a Serb commits robbery this will
always be emphasised”.
Other key steps are visible in the fact that
the coalition with SDSS at a local level has
generally been realised, that councils of
national minorities have mostly been
established and included in the budget of
the municipalities in which they are located
and where they cooperate relatively well with
the local authorities. However, for the
moment, the representatives of the Serbian
minority are only being duly informed, but
In addition to spontaneous progress, which occurs every day and relates
to relationships among people, steps forward have also been made in
the relations of state institutions towards the Serbs “there is greater
freedom in relation to services, and communication is more secure”.
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they do not yet play a significant role in
decision making.
In addition to spontaneous progress, which
occurs every day and relates to relationships
among people, steps forward have also been
made in the relations of state institutions
towards the Serbs - “there is greater freedom
in relation to services, and communication
is more secure”. Improvements are greater
in places where their numbers are higher and
where they are part of the authority or where
“Serbian parties” are in power. Positive steps
have also been taken in terms of the
repossession of property and reconstruction;
reconstruction of houses has generally been
accelerated in the last two and a half years,
but the same is not true of flats. Differences
in these positive steps are also visible both
inside and outside areas of special state
concern. Nevertheless, the same rights,
despite equal requirements, cannot be
exercised in different municipalities since
much depends on the attitude of the officer
receiving the applications. The situation is
not the same in all regions, and the situation
is also different depending on the total number
of persons of Serbian nationality in certain
settlements or regions.
Certain positive steps have also been
recorded in a few settlements where the
majority in power is Croatian, such as Knin
(Serbs have, for the first time, been employed
in the school), while in others, such as
Korenica, no such steps have been taken,
although qualified staff exists. In some local
communities, even in those where Croatian
immigrants are in power, this progress is
insignificant, but a great improvement lies in
the attitude of the “local authorities who are
now considering the possibility of employing
members of Serbian nationality”. The abolition
of visas for Serbian citizens is “also being
considered at the local level”. This has had
a significant effect on the return and reunion
of family members who lived apart. These
positive steps also depend on the activities
of the Serbian population, “if they are more
active, there are more positive steps”, and
“people are now more aware of their rights“.
The question that arises when speaking about
the significance of these positive steps is
whether these steps are sufficient. In
observing them in the context of a period of
ten years following the end of the war, these
steps are tiny ones, progress is very slow
and does not follow “a natural path, but is
there more because it is imposed by different
commitments related to EU accession”.
In observing them in the context of a period of ten years following the end
of the war, these steps are tiny ones, progress is very slow and does not
follow “a natural path, but is there more because it is imposed by different
commitments related to EU accession”.
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Perspectives related to
obstacles and problems
A great obstacle preventing the same
provisions from being implemented equally
in all areas is the obvious inequality in the
implementation and interpretation of
regulations. A more significant barrier is the
long duration of court proceedings in resolving
status issues. The current problems and
obstacles are also visible in the fact that
status issues have not been fully resolved.
The housing care of former holders of tenancy
rights has not been resolved either. In some
areas, discrimination on the basis of nationality
in employment still occurs; “there are no
persons employed in administration and
public companies”, and the total employment
of employable members of the Serbian
minority is insignificant, or has just begun.
Another large obstacle is the fact that
representatives of the Serbian minority in
local authorities are still seen as a necessary
evil “they are an imposed solution” - and not
as equal participants in the decision-making
process.
Part of the problems and obstacles is certainly
connected with the work of the councils of
national minorities which include “people who
have insufficient awareness and who are not
prepared to channel the interests of the
population of Serbian nationality towards
instances of authority”. The representatives
of the minority itself also often “see them in
this way and do not count on them when it
comes to protecting their own rights and
interests”. For now, only political parties have
political influence, and the work of the
councils, in the true sense of the word, is still
questionable. In some communities, where
the councils have already begun operating,
their work is also thwarted by polarities
between party and non-party councillors.
However, even citizens of Serbian nationality,
discouraged by the economic situation, are
not interested in political issues and do not
make an effort to become proactively involved
in exercising their rights.
In areas of special state concern, where the
development of a communal infrastructure
as the basis of economic revitalisation is still
inadequate, and where the economic situation
poses a large problem for everyone, minority
Serbs in particular, “a kind of social ghetto is
taking shape, inhabited by the Serbs”. Specific
administrative obstacles and a lack of
opportunities to exercise social rights is also
related to the poor management of county
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records, archives of public services and
companies, or criteria, which are particularly
evident in convalidation cases, for which the
deadline expired in 1998, and which are now
a topical issue in the area of the County of
Lika-Senj. Thus, for example, the documents
needed to exercise the right to a retirement
pension, which has to be preceded by a
record of years of service for the period before
1991, may be located for some people, while
for others these documents cannot be found,
although they all used to work together at
the same time: “even those who succeeded
in lodging a claim in time must have a
“qualified witness” in addition to all the material
evidence, which means a living workmate
whose years of service in the specified job
have already been recognised”. Access to
information is not fully possible, and the costs
for the retrieval of documents are too high.
Conclusion and
recommendations
Although certain positive steps have been
taken in terms of the internal political
framework and the normalisation of relations
between the majority and minority population
in local communities, leading to the conclusion
that, in this sense, there is a general trend of
society opening up towards the Serbian
minority, the study shows that there are still
significant obstacles to the full affirmation of
the Serbian national minority in Croatian
society.
In spite of the constitutional protection of
minorities, of the continuity of affirmative state
politics since 2000, of concrete efforts made
by Ivo Sanader’s Government, and the
improved position of the Serbian national
minority in 2004 which was the result of these
positive changes, in practice there is still
discrimination against the Serbs, particularly
in the justice system, in social protection, in
employment and in the resolution of property
issues. There are also numerous challenges
related to the consistent exercise of the right
to political participation at regional and local
level. In addition, there is still a deep
ambivalence, or negative attitude, of the
public towards moves made within the
“politics of symbols”, or within the process
of shaping the identity of the Serbian minority
in Croatia.
The factors that have until now contributed
to the positive steps and their reasons are
the pressures made by the EU, and the need
to harmonise the Croatian legislation with
In spite of the constitutional protection of minorities, of the continuity
of affirmative state politics since 2000..., in practice there is still
discrimination against the Serbs, particularly in the justice system, in
social protection, in employment and in the resolution of property issues.
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European legal standards. Therefore, it is
crucial to achieve agreement and unity among
the international community that return,
reintegration and a non-discriminatory
relationship towards minorities are of key
importance for the democratisation of Croatia,
which cannot expect to develop further in
the direction of European integration until its
results are in harmony with the rule of law
and international regulations relating to respect
of basic human rights. Other
important factors are the
agreement between the
Government and SDSS, and
a marked change of direction
in the political rhetoric of the
ruling HDZ.
In order to resolve the
problems faced by the
Serbian minority in Croatia,
the changes in the direction of improving the
position of the Serbs in Croatia must become
real, and not just declarative. The
Constitutional Act on Minorities must be
implemented to the letter, and the
mechanisms for monitoring its implementation
should be secured and strengthened. It is
necessary, and as urgently as possible, to
advocate changes related to the proportional
inclusion of minorities into the public sector.
It is important to work systematically and
with focus on the removal of unemployment,
and on the local socioeconomic development
of the post-war areas to create the
preconditions for sustainable return. It is
necessary to review the deadlines for
reconstruction, convalidation, and housing
care outside areas of special state concern,
because an acquired right should not be
limited by deadlines. It is certainly crucial to
conduct further education and raise the
political awareness of the members of the
Serbian national minority to enable them to
use all the institutional mechanisms which
should be put at their disposal. At the same
time, work should be conducted on making
all political factors send messages to the
public and the population, promoting
antidiscrimination values and the protection
of human rights and the rights of minorities.
The following three recommendations are
stressed as particularly important for removing
the current obstacles to the equality of the
Serbian national minority in Croatian society:
1) The key mechanism for exercising these
rights is the Constitutional Act which should
be thoroughly implemented. In doing so, it
is crucial to intensify monitoring by the
Council, the Government, and by NGOs. In
The factors that have until now
contributed to the positive
steps and their reasons are the
pressures made by the EU, and
the need to harmonise the
Croatian legislation with
European legal standards.
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order to avoid vagueness, it is also necessary to precisely determine which provisions of the
Act require implementing regulations.
2) As discrimination is being reduced at the level of politics and administration, it becomes
increasingly important to monitor its presence and prevent its emergence in the socioeconomic
area. The first step that connects these two spheres is the problem of the employment of
Serbs in public administration and in public institutions, which is also partially guaranteed by
the Constitutional Act. Furthermore, as the partial SDF study shows, employment through the
ethnic key has been widespread in most post-war communities. Therefore, it is necessary
to systematically investigate and monitor discrimination in employment and, if it turns out to
be a serious problem, to adopt special measures in this particular area. In the context of
regional development policy, it is certainly necessary to strengthen incentive measures,
especially economic ones, which are propitious to sustainable return.
3) It is necessary to ensure further support to the councils, which includes an analysis of their
real potentials for being fully functional, and systematic support for the education of councillors
on the rights and possibilities of their activity. In parallel to the strengthening of the role of the
councils, it is necessary to ensure the training of staff in units of local self-government which
should be able to accept the councils as equal partners in all issues that relate to minorities.
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revocation of such practice, only the accused Serbs were tried in this way. Furthermore, 21 persons are still in prison
on charges for war crimes and similar offences for which the judgement was passed on the basis of politicised or
non-transparent trials (HRW:2004)
14 These are the municipalities of Dvor, Petrinja, Glina, Plaπki, VojniÊ, Gvozd, Pakrac, Lipik, Daruvar, Korenica, Udbina,
Donji Lapac, Vrhovine, Gospic, OtoËac, Knin, Benkovac and Kistanje.(A study on the employment of members of the
Serbian minority, December 2004 of the Serbian Democratic Forum
15 A sample of 1000 Serbs from Croatia internally displaced within Serbia and Montenegro or Republika Srpska in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, then 600 Croats who fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina settled in different parts of Croatia
and 600 domicile Croats who lived in today’s areas of return even before the war. The study comprised 1000 citizens
of Croatia who live outside areas of special state concern, in towns which were not directly affected by the war, as
a reference group to be compared with the attitudes of Croats living in areas of return, with the purpose of  establishing
to what extent the direct war experience, the loss of a home, created more radical attitudes towards Serbian returnees
(OSCE: Croatia refugee challenge, Empirical research 2004).
16 The reasons given by those who do not support return are as follows: about 44% claim that the return of the Serbs
would increase the negative tendencies in those parts, 33% claim that they are afraid that the Serbian returnees
will start the war again, 28% are convinced that the return of the Serbs will additionally increase the existing large
unemployment in those areas devastated by the war. From the group of return advocates, 56% claim that the return
of the Serbs is a good thing because it will help Croatia to join the European Union, only 25% want the Serbs to return
because Croatia is also their homeland, 14% support the return of the Serbs because this will increase the number
of people living and working in the war-devastated areas, 8% want the return of their Serbian neighbour because
they think it is a pity that their houses are empty, while 15% give some other reason.
17 Slobodna Dalmacija, 4 June 2004
18 HTV, Otvoreno, 24 March 2005, programme editor and presenter: H.N. SrziÊ
19 Besides Milorad Pupovac, the guests of the show were a member of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), two
representatives of the immigrants from Bosnia and Vojvodina, and Peter Semneby, Head of OSCE Mission to Croatia,
who took, on that occasion, a de-symbolisation stand, in other words, gave the examples of South Africa and the
naming of streets after "trees, numbers or fruit".
20 All this happened in the context when Croatia had received the decision on the postponement of negotiations with
the European Union (16 March) due to its insufficient cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the failure to surrender
Ante Gotovina who, according to a number of media reports, enjoys high support of Croatian citizens.
21 The meeting was held on 22 March in the premises of the Open Society Institute in Zagreb.
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Open Society Institute - Croatia (OSI-Croatia)
is a non-profit private foundation, a part of
the Open Society Institute and the Soros
Foundations Network, established and
financed by philanthropist George Soros.
Open Society Institute - Croatia implements
a range of initiatives to promote open society,
by supporting education, media, public health,
human rights, as well as social, economic
and legal reforms, connecting non-
governmental organizations, international
institutions and government agencies with
an aim of promoting open societies on a
global level. The Foundations’ Network was
founded by George Soros to support changes
in Central and Eastern Europe and former
Soviet Union.
In the recent years, the activities of the Soros
Foundations’ Network have expanded to
other areas of the world where the transition
to democracy is of particular concern. The
network encompasses more than 50
organizations, in Africa, Latin America, Central
Asia and Southeast Asia and the USA, apart
from the European transitional countries and
Turkey.
Open Society Institute - Croatia was
established in 1992, in order to assist the
democratic development of Croatian society.
After the initial stage during which the
Foundation provided substantial humanitarian
help for the country in war, it sponsored a
number of initiatives in the fields of civil society,
education, media, arts and culture, public
health, law and economy, with the total
amount of more than 45 million USD, and
contributed considerably to the creation and
development of the civil society in Croatia.
During the 90-es, the OSI-Croatia operated
in an environment that was not very inclined
to it; the OSI-Croatia actively criticized the
dominant political and social models,
presenting alternatives to the authoritarian
and nationalist values and practices, and, by
doing so, contributed to the political shift.
In the new circumstances of social changes,
the OSI-Croatia’s strategy developed in a
way that it moved from the grant-giving into
running its own in-house projects, on its own
or in cooperation with its partners.
The new role and new goals require adequate
tools: in our case the proper tools are activities
that enable systemic influence without leaving
the critical standpoint. These tools can be
applied not only to accelerate processes
started by the Croatian Government and its
institutions, but also to influence their content
and direction. In the context of Croatian
integration into European Union, the OSI-
Croatia will encourage and support civil
society initiatives, particularly those directed
to support minorities and marginalized groups,
as well as projects focused on reforms and
changes.
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